1: Niederle--15   E-5   1911 E16 Slavic Peoples E16
Historical Russia RA2

But alongside these external modifications,[1] great changes
H.R. were taking place in the internal life of the Russian people; tribal
101 life was being replaced by provincial life. The ancient tribal units
S.P. were being dislocated and were disappearing little by little into the
175 new provincial organizations which formed themselves around the princes, and little by little a new division of the Russian people could be seen establishing itself, whereby the old tribal units were replaced by three large groups, differing with respect to language, internal organization and, in certain ways, to political life. Mr. Shakhmatov, in a remarkable essay published in 1899 by the Russian Review of Public Education, has not yet spoken science's final word. We must restrict ourselves to this simple statement. Already at the time of the Tatar domination, the old tribal units had grouped themselves, either as a result of their internal development, or as a result of external causes, into three groups:

In the south (between the San, the Pripet, and the Dnepr) the Ukrainian group which obviously was made up of the former Poliani, Drevliani, Volhynians, Dudlebi, Tiversti, Ulichi, a portion of the Severiani, and the remains of the Croats and the Serbs from the Carpathians;

In the north the Great Russians, made up principally of the Slavs from Novgorod, the Viatichi, the Krivichi, and a portion of the Severiani;

/16/ In the west the Belorussians or White Russians (including principally the former Dregovichi, the Radimichi, a portion of the Drevliani and Krivichi, and the remains of the Lithuanians).

At this period appeared the expressions Great Russia, Little Russia (Ukrainia) and White Russia (it is not known what this last epithet signifies).

S.P. The Little Russian (Ukrainian) group is the one which has re-
H.R. mained the purest from the language viewpoint; the White Russian
[197] group is less pure, as it has been affected by the political union with Lithuania from the end of the thirteenth century and, later on, from the sixteenth century, by a strong Polish influence. The basic elements of the Great Russian group were extremely varied; but the one which was most influential of all was the city which was to become the center of the Russian world, namely Moscow.

Despite this division, the three groups remained three branches of the same nation. The languages were closely related; close ties bound them together from a political viewpoint (at the beginning the common struggle against the Tatars, later the union under the Muscovite

[1] [Migrations and colonizations: cf. cat. 116, pp. 11-14--analyst]

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scepter).

They have had religious unity for too long a period to permit anyone to hesitate considering them as a single whole, the Russian nation, despite the shades of difference already pointed out.

As for the matters which relate to external development, we must indicate the following stages:

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The Russian nation did not succeed in extending itself to /17/ the west; between the space which it occupied and the sea Lithuanian tribes (Lettish) and, further to the south, the strong Polish race were concentrated. The Russians did not advance in that direction; very much to the contrary, their race underwent a very serious period of decline; in fact, it almost perished, on the one hand under the pressure of Lithuania, and on the other, under that of the Poles who were forced to stretch out towards the east, finding themselves pushed back by the Germans. This explains why on the maps of Bielenstien (1) the Russo-Lettish frontier of the thirteenth century is almost the same as today and why the western portion of Russian territory contains a large Polish element.

The expansion towards the north continued though with less success than formerly. The further one advanced into these regions, the less hospitable they became. But, beginning with the fifteenth century, especially from the reign of Peter the Great, the colonial expansion of the Russian element turned gradually toward the north, where colonies of monks and raskolnoki were sent out. (2) These colonies were of slight importance and widely scattered. Then conditions changed. The expansion towards the north diminished, the movement turned towards the south and southeast.

The Tatar invasion had created a solid enclosing wall /18/ which Russian colonization was unable to cross so long as the Tatar Khanates were not brought under subjection. This was not long delayed. After 1486 Russia was freed from its bonds. The desire for revenge, the increase of the population, and other conditions, pushed the Russians very energetically towards the east, the southeast, and the south. They did not stop their advance. Their front line, which had been on the Oka, was replaced in the middle of the sixteenth century by the so-called Tula line, from Putivl' on the Seym through Briansk and Tula, towards the Una, tributary of the Moksha. In the first half of the seventeenth century the Muscovites occupied the Belgorod, Voronezh-Kozlov line,

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1. A German scholar of the nineteenth century who especially concerned himself with the Lett language.

2. Heretics (from raskol, schism). Translator.

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Historical Russia RA2
Tsarist Russia R2

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the Tambov-Simbirsk line, the line of the Transkama (Sengilei-Menzelinsk). On the other hand, they colonized the region of Poltava in great masses. (1) At the end of the seventeenth century the line of the Don was reached, then, under the reign of Empress Anne, the line of the Ukraine (1731-1735), which was replaced forty years later by the line of the Dnepr between the Dnepr and the Sea of Azov.

1. The Ukrainians of the region between the Bug and the Dnestr began in the fourteenth century, under the princes of Kiyev and of Lithuania to penetrate into the Poltava region. But it was not until the sixteenth century that, under the protection of Moscow, they emigrated en masse. In the seventeenth century they already occupied the governments of Kharkov, the western portion of the government of Voronezh and the southern part of the government of Koursk. This immigration is explained by the development of the Cossacks, the necessity of fleeing from Polish domination, and the diminution of the Tatar strength, especially that of the Horde of the Crimea.

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/19/ The movement forward was completed by the conquest of the Khanate of the Crimea in 1783. Colonies of German and Serbian immigrants into Russia accompanied these advances of the military lines. The litoral of the Black Sea was partially colonized in the eighteenth century, and partially, --for example between the Bug and the Dnestr (the present Guberniya of Tavrida)--only in the nineteenth century. At about the same time Russian colonization reached the Caucasus,(line of the Caucasus along the Kuban and the Terek from 1779 to 1799), but it was not completed until the second half of the nineteenth century after the complete submission of the Caucasus (1864).

The Russians penetrated earlier into the regions beyond the Volga, especially from the reign of Peter the Great onwards.

At this period they reached Samara and in the years 1734-1744 the Orenburg line. In the interior of Asia colonization was at first accomplished by the conquests of the brothers Stroganov and of Ermak (1558-1582), in Siberia as far as the Obi and Irtysh Rivers. It was completed in the nineteenth century by the conquest of all of Siberia as far as Sakhalin and Manchuria, by the subjugation of the Kirghiz Steppes to the south and finally of Turkestan (Tashkent, 1864, Samarkand 1868, Khiva 1873, Kokand 1876, Ashkabad 1881, Merv 1884, Murghab 1885). Everywhere the troops were followed by colonists, especially by the inhabitants of Great Russia.

S.P. P. 101 Rivers, and the Carpathians. The Gorals also use this word to designate the country and people of Poland.

Towards the close of the tenth century, as far as we know, the Lekh people consisted of the following tribes:

The Polianes primitively settled on the Warta, the Notec (today in German, Netze) near the lake of Goplo and as far as the Oder.

The Vislanes on the upper Visla (Vistula).

The Mazovi on the two banks of the middle Vistula.

The Kuiavi at the bend of the Vistula, near Thorn.

The Slezani (Silesians) on the upper Oder and to the east as far as the other side of the Bobra. They included the tribes of the Didoshi, the Bobrani, the Bezunchani, the Opolani and the Holasici.

S.P. P. 101 175 /63/ What were the ties of kinship between the Polish tribes and the Slavs of the seacoast, the Pomoriani (1) (between the lower Vistula, the Oder and the Notec) and the Lutitsi to the west on the Varnava and the Elbe? It would be difficult to determine them. The old writer of the Kiyev annals, in the indications which he gives us of the country inhabited by the Poles, relates these peoples to the Lekhs. Here is what he says: "For these Slavs coming to settle on the Vistula called themselves Lekhs and among these Lekhs certain of them called themselves Polianes, Lekhs, some Lutitsi, some Mazovi, others Pomoriani."

1. It is from this name (po, along the, more, sea) that Pommern is derived, the German name of Pomerania now Germanized.

All these tribes subjected themselves to the Polianes of the center under the princes of the Piast dynasty and accepted their name. It is not known when this unification took place. We only know that the principal authors of it were the princes Mesek I (960-992) and Boleslav the Brave (992-1025).

SP P. 75 648 Unity was not accomplished at the outset; it was achieved by the development of internal colonization.

At the beginning, the regions of Little Poland and of the Mazovia were sparsely inhabited. The foreign element which hastened this unification, was obviously the Germans against whom it was necessary to carry on warfare from the time when they subjugated and annihilated the Slavs of the Elbe (eleventh and twelfth centuries).

The struggle against the Germans exercised among the Poles, as among the Czechs, a considerable influence upon their internal and

1[Between the different Polish tribes, cf. Above and page 41, Category 116 - Analyst]

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175 648 external development. From their primitive homeland located in the basins of the Oder, of the Warta, and of the Vistula, they sought to spread out in all directions. But they encountered in the west the resistance of the Germans; they were unable to overcome it; they were even compelled to give way and they sought to assure their existence and expansion by constant fights and invasions against the Prussians, the Lithuanians, and the Russians. Obviously, the Poles clearly recognized that one of their first tasks was to maintain in the north a wide passageway to the sea and in the west, their frontier on the Oder, if not on the Elbe. Unfortunately all of the advantages, all of the conquests which they gained in this direction were of a purely ephemeral character. A terrible blow fell upon them through the Tatar invasion and through the battle of Legnica--/In German--Liegnitz/ (1241). It broke the bonds which united Silesia with Poland and threw this province into the arms of Germany, who began to Germanize it. Another check was the summons of the Teutonic Knights into the country of Chelm and of Loba (1226) which facilitated the Germanization of the seacoast.

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[513] Finally, let us point out the German colonization which the ecclesiastical or lay princes invoked, beginning with the thirteenth century, in Silesia, into Little Poland, Great Poland and Mazovie; these colonies did not become assimilated and remained completely German in language and customs. Thus a grave peril for Polish nationality was created and developed. "Exterminare idioma Polonicum" /exterminate the Polish language/ became the order of the day for the Germans on the western froniter. Beginning with the thirteenth century, the Polish nationality appeared to be gravely compromised.

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175 668 However, it succeeded in escaping from this peril.[1] The clergy showed themselves to be highly patriotic; literature was born and exercised a happy influence upon all classes of society. The Hussite movement also exercised its influence in Poland against the Germans. The dynasty followed a national political line. It accomplished noteworthy successes, especially over the Teutonic Knights, who were defeated at Grunwald

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668 in 1410. In truth, the provinces beyond the Oder and to the north could not be saved. The Poles lost three-quarters of their primitive domain; but what they lost in the west, they attempted to regain in the east, that is toward the northeast, and toward the southeast. This double direction was imposed upon them by the very nature of the terrain; in the center, the basin of the Pripet presented an inhospitable and insurmountable area; to the south rose the barrier of the Carpathians. The Polish flood had to direct itself on the one hand towards Lithuania,

[1] [Germanization of the Polish nationality beginning with the 13th century--Analyst]

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on the other, towards the Ukraine, and this double march characterized a new phase of Polish history.

The offensive movement was begun at an early date, /66/ but it achieved no serious result until the Union of Lublin (1569) when Lithuania was rejoined to Poland together with a large section of southern Russia (see above in S. 3).^

Kazimir had already occupied Red Russia in 1340, and in 1370 the Galician area was detached from the political control of Kiyev.

In Lithuania Polish institutions and language gained the upper hand over the native institutions and language; the upper classes of society took on Polish ways, and Polish colonization penetrated into the country, especially in Polesia. The same occurred in Galician Russia, the Volhynia and Podolia. The Poles were unable to hold Russian Galicia except by making it a base of operations for invading the basins of the Dnestr and the Bug. In the fifteenth century they colonized Podolia and Volhynia, and carried on this enterprise through the sixteenth century. Bobrinskii (1) claims that at this period this province was half Polish! To these attempts at colonization was joined a religious action, the "union" of Polish-Lithuanian Russia with Rome.

During that time the Russian princes, emancipated from the Tatar yoke, had formed at Moscow a new and formidable political center. They /67/ had undertaken to group about them all of the Russian countries. We do not need to explain here how this plan was carried out. Moscow naturally entered upon a struggle with Poland: the war at first had as its object the Lithuanian provinces, then the Ukraine and finally Poland proper. It went steadily against Poland and finally resulted in the three partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795.

These events naturally had an ominous influence upon the development of the Polish national group; the conquests of the Poles were annulled and with them all of the Polish colonization of Russian territory. The states which divided up the Polish domain among themselves had for some time the idea of annihilating the Polish nation. But the vital force of this nation, its great traditions and its high hopes for the

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1. A contemporary Polish historian. See my Coup d'oeil sur l'histoire de Pologne in the 3d series of the Monde Slave (Paris, Hachette, 1902). Translator.

^[cf. E16 Slavic Peoples, 1: Niederle, p. 16, category 116—Analyst]

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future, preserved it and even strengthened it so that its adversaries themselves had partially to renounce their intentions.

The struggle which the Polish national group has undergone for its existence since the fall of the Republic has been extremely painful and still is so today, especially the struggle against the Germans.

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When the Congress of Vienna in 1815 perpetuated and revised the partition, it annexed to Russia the Duchy of Warsaw and set up the realm which the Poles call "Kongressowka." It guaranteed to the Poles their nationality and their autonomy. /68/ At first they enjoyed these benefits; but beginning in 1830 the situation changed. The revolution of Warsaw was smothered in blood. An the anti-Polish reaction which already existed in Russia became only more pronounced. The unhappy revolution of 1863 brought about the enslavement and the misery of Poland. Russianization was carried out with eagerness, and it required a terrible blow struck at the governmental system--the unfortunate war with Japan--to permit Poland to breathe a little more freely. The advent of the constitutional regime and the institution of the Parliament provided her with the possibility of making known her miseries, and we can hope that at the present moment, they will, at least in the Russian Empire, receive satisfaction.

The situation in Prussia is more serious. There arose, before 1775, a new and intensive movement of German colonization, especially in the basin of the Netze, and, after the insurrection of 1830, a political evolution which tended very simply to Germanize the Polish element. The attempted insurrection of 1845 and the events of 1848 gave this policy an opportunity to assert itself. At the beginning neither force nor violence was used. The Prussian government was convinced that the Polish element would eliminate itself little by little. The census of 1870 proved the contrary. Bismark then had recourse to new methods. He strove to uproot the Polish nation and had /69/ recourse to the most violent means. Certainly, in Russia the Poles were not comfortable; but in the Empire such violent measures, such refined ones as the Prussians thought up had not been employed. What no nation had ever before attempted to do against another nation, the Germans now undertook against Poland. They sought to dispossess an entire people by the law of colonization (Ansiedelunggesetz), which placed at the disposal of the government one hundred million marks to purchase ground from the Poles and to establish German colonies there. Thanks be to God

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that up to the present all of these efforts have failed. At least, the results obtained are not in any manner in proportion to the pecuniary sacrifices. The law of expropriation voted in 1908 succeeded no better, and there is room to believe that all the efforts of the German "hakatists" (1) will break against the energetic resistance of the Polish people.

1. This name of Hakatists is given to a Prussian association founded in 1891 to colonize the routes to the east. This association was founded by Hansemann, Kennemann, and Tiedeman. It is from the initials of these three persons, H, K, T, that the word "hakatists" has been formed. (Translator).

Nevertheless, the situation of the Poles of Poznan and of Silesia remains a difficult one and there is no reason to hope that it will improve. The Prussian minister Von Arnim clearly stated in 1907 that they cannot be Germanized and that this is not being thought of. However, it is the goal towards which Prussia is steadily striving. And naturally the struggle /70/ of three and a half million souls against sixty million Germans can only be looked upon with anxiety.

And in fact Germanization is making serious progress among the Mazuri, in Silesia and Poznan, even though in certain places the Poles succeed in gaining the upper hand.

It is in Austria that the condition of the Poles is the most bearable. For the past forty years the former system of Germanization has been abandoned and the Polish nationality has developed in complete liberty; it even exercises a certain influence upon the destinies of the Empire and of the other nationalities.

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S 12. The Domain of the Polish National Group.

We do not encounter as many difficulties in outlining this domain as we did in the case of the Russian domain. However, we do run into certain difficulties.

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Here again our principal criterion is the language.[1] It is upon the basis of the language that certain ethnographic maps have been drawn up in Prussia and in Austria. But the work has not always been done correctly. The latest census carried out in Prussia, has been based upon the mother tongue; but it is known that a great number of persons on the side of both the Poles and Germans have declared that they spoke

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[1] [i.e. to determine the domain of the Polish national group — Analyst]

1: Niederle--59 E-5 1911 E/6 Slavic Peoples E/6
Sorbs

101 At the period for which we possess somewhat more detailed historical data about them, the Polabian Slavs were divided into three great families:

1. The Obotrites in Mecklenburg, Lüneburg and Holstein (as far as the Varnava River), whence they penetrated into the Old Mark;

2. The Lutici or Veletiz between the Oder, the sea, the Varnáva and the Elbe;

3. The Sorbs on the middle Elbe between the Verra*, the Havel, and the Bobrawa.

● 175 177 From the time when history records the presence of the Slavs on the Elbe, their history has been but a long struggle for existence; they carried on this struggle simultaneously against the German Empire and the Roman Church. The campaign undertaken by the Germans against the Polabian Slavs was at the same time of a political, national, and religious character. The Slavs resisted energetically, but the struggle was too unequal. The Germans had as allies the Danes, and upon occasion also the Polish and Czech prines. Furthermore, they were not in agreement among themselves.

Under Charlemagne and his immediate successors, the Germans achieved only insignificant victories.

The Saxon dynasty was more fortunate; the entire country of the Polabians fell into German hands. The conquest was accomplished by the /93/ Margraves. The Slavs were not only conquered, but were in a short time denationalized. Beginning with the twelfth century German colonization penetrated into their country; in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Germans were already superior in numbers, and by the fifteenth century only a few rare specimens of the Slav race were to be found.

On the island of Rugen* (Rouiana* in Slavic) the Slavs disappeared in 1404; on the Elbe towards the middle of the sixteenth century, they occupied only the districts of Luchow* and Danneberg*, the southern part of the district of Blekede*, a third of that of Ulzen*, and the northern section of the Old Mark (Altmark). Further to the east no more than a few remains were to be found in Mecklenburg, which was still rather thickly populated by Slavs in the thirteenth century (between the rivers Elde and Suda), and in Brandenburg in the district of Priegnitz (Brizan). But this rather sizeable group in Luneburg, was completely unable to maintain itself. In 1671 there were still Slavs

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177 there; about 1700 they were in great measure Germanized; the last Slav group was that of the Dravani (Drawaina) in the district of Luchow which even today is called Wendland, country of the Wends.

17719 The Slavic language disappeared between 1750 and 1766. It was in 1751 that mass was celebrated in Slavic for the last time.[1]

161 In the years 1890-1900 the newspapers reported, according to A. Parczewski, that the census /94/ of 1890 had found 570 Slavs-Wends still in this region. But it was an error. The official census had indeed found in the Luchow area 570 Wends, but they spoke only German.

197 The Slavic tongue in this region has been dead for more than a century, as Mr. Muka reported without hesitation.[1] He was sent out as an investigator by the Academy of Sciences of Cracow.

000 However, the Slavic character is still found in great measure in the type and in the manner of life of the inhabitants of the Wendland.

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175 Originally the Sorbs of this region[2] occupied in a compact mass all of the country situated between the Saale, the Verra*, the Fulda, the upper Havel, and the Spree. They extended as far as Frankfort on the Oder, on the Lower Bobra, the Hvizda (Queis). The group included the so-called Sorbs between the Saale and the Elbe (1) then the Lusatians on the middle Saale, and the Milczani on the upper Elster, the upper Spree and the Neisse. From the eleventh century on the Germans began to penetrate into these regions; but they only came there in large numbers beginning with the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At this period the Sorb national group began to diminish to the west of the Elbe; it finally succumbed as a result of the Thirty Years War. The situation was better in /95/ Upper and Lower Lusatia, united under the Bohemian crown. Unfortunately, in 1635 the Treaty of Prague ceded
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668 the territory to the House of Saxony. The Sorbian national group commenced to decline, especially in Lower Lusatia. Its decadence was not arrested until the nineteenth century by the literary renaissance which restored some energy to this small people.

Thanks to the efforts of a few patriots, the national conscience

1. These Sorbs are designated in Latin texts of the Middle Ages by the name Sorabes. (Translator)

[2] [Wendland -- Analyst]   [1] [Among the Polabian Slavs - Analyst]

175 668 was reawakened, literature revived, the Slavic tongue was introduced into the primary schools and the Germans of Saxony granted to their Sorbian fellow-citizens a tolerable modus vivendi. How long will this state of affairs endure? It is difficult to foretell.

177 Germanization is making great progress especially in Lower Lusatia, subjected to Prussians.

101 162 S 17. Boundary of the National Group.---In 1886 Muka established on his ethnographic map, the best which exists up until the present, this boundary by a line which began to the south of Lubja (Lobau), passed between Rychbach (Reichenbach) and Wosporg (Weissenbach*), ran to Nizka (Niesky*), Reczice* (Rietschen*), went toward Muzakow* (Muskau*) on the Neisse, then following the Neisse reached Barsc (Forst), ran to Gresna* (Griessen*), to Barklawa* (Baerenklau*), to the west of Gubna (Guben*). The line then went straight to the west by Luboraz* (Lieberose*), Mochow*, Waldow*, Bocklin* (Burglehne*) then toward the south through Lubnjow* (Lubbenau*), /96/ through Wotrowce* (Bischofsdof*), Kalama* (Kalan*), Rudna* (Reuden*) and Bukowina; then towards the southwest the boundary ran around Komorow* (Senftenber*), Rolana* (Ruhland*) on the Elster, went through Nadzicow* towards Kamence*, Elstra*, Biskupci* (Bischofswerda*), where it turned sharply to the east towards Velecin* (Wilthen*) on the Lubia*. Such was the outer boundary of the region in which the majority of the people spoke Sorbian; there was in this region an absolutely Sorbian territory in the neighborhood of Chotebuz* (Cottbus*) and of Grodk*. There were also numerous German islands.

On the map drawn up in 1902 by A. Czerny, the territory had diminished and the Germans had gained ground. Today the northern part of Lower Lusatia is separated from the southern part only by a straight line between Grodk* and Chotebuz* on the two banks of the Spree. However, Tetzner in his book wrongly indicates Lower Lusatia as forming only an island.

161 S 18. Statistics.--The figures in effect confirm that the number of Lusatians is diminishing. At about 1880-1884, Muka, travelling from village to village, had set the total number of Sorbs at 175,966. He counted 72,000 in Lower Lusatia and 103,000 in Upper Lusatia. The official statistics for 1900 numbered only 93,032 Sorbs, speaking only Sorbian. If one adds about 23,000 bilinguals speaking both Sorbian and

1: Niederle--65 E-5 1911 E/C Slavic Peoples E/C
Czechoslovakia EB1

S.P. C. 174 101 and in Moravia, at the beginning of history. However, it appears very likely that the different groups which are still met with today, the Czechs properly speaking, the Hanaks, the Lahs, the Slovaks, and the Valachs existed in those days. But we do not know where the frontier between the Czechs and the Slovaks was located: was it on the lower and middle Morava, as Safarik would have it, or farther to the east?

We know more about the Czechs. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, we see leaving the forest bordering Germany, a whole series of tribes that appear among them: to the north from the sources of the Oharka, proceeding towards the east, the Sedlicany, the Lucany, the Lemuze, the Deczany, the Litomerice, the Psovany, the Charvaty (Czechs?); in the center, the Czechs; near them the Zliczany; and to the south in the area of Budejovice (Budweiss), the Dudlebi.

Very soon the Czechs became the most numerous and strongest of all of these tribes /103/; thanks to their central location, they soon dominated the other tribes and fused them into a single people. From the ninth century their name was used to designate the entire aggregation of tribes.

S.P. C. 175 Thus this nation was formed.[1] Settled in the watershed between the streams flowing to the north and those flowing to the south, near the source of the large rivers, protected by natural walls, it developed under excellent conditions. And, were it not for the errors of its princes, who through egoism caused serious damage to its prosperity and to its future, the history of this nation would have been entirely different from what it has been, and would occupy today a different position in the Slavic world from that which it now occupies.

S.P. C. 175 167 What caused it[2] a terrible blow was the German colonization in Bohemia and Moravia. In the south, the Germans, pushing forward along the Danube towards the east, thrust back the Czecho-Slovaks who were settled in this region. This was a completely natural movement and one which should not have caused any great harm to the development of the Czech national group, seeing that the Germans would soon come into collision with the Magyars on the Litava (Leitha).

What was particularly harmful to the Czechs was the German colonization summoned into the country by the national princes of the Premysls dynasty, Premysl Otakar I (1197-1230), Vaclav I (1230-1253)

[Czechoslovakia — Analyst]

1: Niederle--66 E-5 1911 E/6 Slavic Peoples E/6
Czechoslovakia EBI

S.P. C. 175 167 and especially Premysl Otakar II (1253-1278) and their successors; the nobility and the clergy, /104/ particularly the monks, followed their example. As a result of this colonization, the Czech element found itself blockaded in the interior of the country by a belt of German cities and towns, a belt which continually drew tighter; at first below the Metallic Mountains and the Boehmerwald, then on the lower Elbe, then in the areas of Liberec (Reichenberg), Trutnov, Kladsko (Glatz) and in the region of the Jeseniky (Gesenke) Mountains. Moreover, German groups settled in the interior of the country. From the thirteenth century Bohemia and Moravia became bilingual countries. S.P. C. [191]

From the standpoint of area the German zone was neither wide nor compact; it formed itself especially in the clearings of the forests on the west and northwest.

S.P. C. 101 563 In the fourteenth century, according to Professor Sedlaczek, the frontier of the nations in Bohemia ran from Kynwart* toward Zdar*, Kralupy, Chomutov (Komotau) which was German, toward Most, then toward Duchcov and Decin. Bilina and Teplice were still Czech. Then the frontier ran to Benesov* which was German, to Jablonna*, crossed Mount Iestied* and reached the sources of the Jizera (Iser). From the fourteenth century Liberec (in German, Reichenberg) was German. The Germans were settled in the mountains beyond Vrchlaby* (today Hohenelbe) which was still Czech. Pilnikov (Pillnitz), Trutnow, Zacler, Stare Buky* were already German. Starkov* remained Czech, but the region of Brumov*, and the country of Kladsko /105/were Germanized. Olesnica and Rokytnice* were Czech. Beyond Policzka* and Litomysl* the situation was as it is today. At Nemecky Brod there was a German island; Jindrichuv Hradec was mixed, as well as Budejovice (Budweiss). Krumlov and Prachatice were mixed; the Kasperk Mountains were German; in the region of Domazlice the frontier was Czech. Klatovy was mixed, Tachov German.

S.P. C. 175 167 S.P. C. [565] Less is known about the German penetration into Moravia and into Silesia. From the thirteenth century the greater part of the fortified towns in Moravia have been German. In many of the cities, notably at Brno and at Olomouc, from the thirteenth century on a German bourgeoisie developed. The religious orders and the clergy contributed in summoning the Germans, especially Bishop Bruno who has been called the greatest Germanizer of Moravia. In the Teschen area the Czecho-Polish frontier has been the same from the fourteenth century

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to the present.

Slovakia, belonging to Hungary, was not spared by the German invasion. Germanization began to penetrate into the northern portion--perhaps Slovak--the Pannonia, beginning in the ninth century, as is attested by a celebrated text of 850: Conversio Bagoiarorum et Carantanorum. In the north of Hungary, from the twelfth century, the regents during the minority of Geza II (1141-1161) called a great number of Germans into the county of Spis to act as /106/ a counterweight to the attraction which Poland was exerting upon the county of Zvolen. Following the example of these first colonists, the Germans, beginning in the thirteenth century, penetrated from the west into the counties of Bratislava and of Nitra, from the south into those of Bars and of Honta where they were not to be found before this period. This immigration increased particularly after the Tatar invasion of 1241. Hungary had been ravaged, and the kings,--notably Bela IV--called for new colonists. Thus, towards the end of the fifteenth century and in the first half of the sixteenth century, there was in Slovak territory no commune in which some German family was not established. The center and the base of German colonies aside from the towns of Spiess, was the association of mining towns with Kremnitz at their head. The sources mention in the first place Krupina, in 1238, then Banska Bystrica in 1255, and Nemecke Pravno in 1267. This state of things lasted until the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. Two laws promulgated by the Diet in 1563 and in 1605 put an end to the privileges of the German towns and to the Germanic intrusion. Beginning with this period the Germans in the north of Hungary were Slovakized or Magyarized in turn. (Among the towns which again became Slovak may be cited Pukanec*, Nova Bana, Bela, Lubietova* and, to a considerable extent, Stiavnica and Banska Bystrica).

S.P.
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Alongside the penetration of the frontier regions /107/ in Bohemia and Moldavia there should be pointed out, the influence beginning with the thirteenth century, of the German element upon the internal economy of the country, the customs, and the language. German almost assumed the role of an official language. German inhabitants received privileges. At court, among the nobility, in the towns, the German tongue played so important a role that some patriots, like Dalimil, (1) began to fear the ruin of the Bohemian language.

S.P. C. 175 177 191

1. Quite a long time ago I indicated the importance of this chronicler. See my Boheme pittoresque et historique (Paris, 1867).

At the beginning of the fourteenth century matters had gone so far that at the coronation of King John in 1311 the larger part of the people sang in German and the minority in Czech.

S.P. C. 175 668 [798]

Under Charles IV and his son Vaclav a reaction took place to the benefit of the Slavic element[1] The nobility and the clergy took an interest in this. This evolution was crowned by the wars of the Hussites, who fought at the same time for Czech faith and Czech nationality. The Germans lost their influence in the towns or were completely driven out; the Czech language reassumed its place. Among the towns which became Slavic may be cited Zatec (Saaz), Litomerice (Leitmeritz), Usti nad Labem (Aussig), Dvur Kralove, Jaromer, Hradec Kralove, Nemecky Brod, Caslav, Kutna Hora, Pelhrimov, Susice, Budejovice, Kaplice, Stribro and Plzen, all of which were already Czech at the end of the fourteenth century.

/108/ At this time, in Bohemia, in Moravia, in Siberia, Czech became an official language. It was proclaimed to be the sole administrative language at Opava (Troppau) in 1431, at Tesin (Teschen) in 1434, in Moravia in 1480, in Bohemia in 1495. In short, in the course of the fifteenth century Bohemia and Moravia rapidly became Czech, the national consciousness grew stronger, all the more because germanization became weaker within the country and in the frontier districts. Nevertheless, this very brilliant period had no enduring results. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a portion of Czech territory was again germanized as a result of the introduction of Protestantism and through the efforts of the new dynasty. Then came a long period of wars and persecutions which desolated entire regions and was followed by the new influx of German colonists from Misnie*, Voigtland*, from Franconia and from the Palatinate. Thus, at the very moment when the Czech language became official within the kingdom, when the Czech literature was flourishing, a great section of Czech soil was lost.

S.P. C. 175 177 167

S.P. C. [728]

Then came the defeat of Bila Hora (1620) and the unhappy events which placed the Czech nation in the hands of a dynasty which was German and absolutist. In 1627 a new organization was imposed

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[1] [Against the influence of the German element upon the country - Analyst]

S.P.
C.

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upon the country; German acquired an importance which it never had before. Bohemia found herself engaged in a series of wars, of miseries, of sufferings which diminished to the /109/ lowest degree the numbers and the energy of the Czech nation and rendered it a prey to the immigrants whose number increased each day. Many families which were faithfully preserving the national tradition emigrated, many perished, many changed their nationality. Immense domains were confiscated and passed into the hands of foreigners. Many of the most distinguished German Protestant families also left the country.

Thus, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the German population increased and the Germanic belt which surrounded Bohemia became wider. At this moment the Czechs lost in the north the regions of Zlutice (Luditz), of Zatec (Saaz), where, however, the Czech tongue resisted until the end of the seventeenth century, then that of Postoloptry (1) (Postelberg), Teplice (Teplitz), Usti (Aussig), Bilina, Lovosice (Lobositz), (Litomerice was not germanized until the eighteenth century), Ceska Duba, Steti, Mimon, Vartemberk*. To the northeast they lost the districts of Rokytnice, Vrchlaby, Hostinne; to the west, those of Primda, Hostoun, Pobezovice (Ronsperg), Horsova Tyna*, Straze*, Bor, Plane*, as far as Manetin. The German area, as it was described in the years 1699-1701 by the Czech pilgrim Antonin Frozin, is practically identical with the German area of today. According to the studies of Slavik, as much may be said for /109/ Moravia at the end of the seventeenth century. In the last two hundred and fifty years, however, there have been some modifications in northern Moravia. The towns of Usov*, Unczov*, Zabreh and Stity (Silperk) have been germanized.

On the other hand, the national language, and with it the national consciousness of the Czechs, disappeared more and more under the governmental pressure. The nobility, the intellectual class, the bourgeoisie gave in one by one. In the eighteenth century the patriots despaired compaired completely of the future.

In 1790 Pelcel said that in fifty years it would be difficult to find a Czech; in 1810 Dobrovsky wrote to Kopitar the famous letter: "Causa gentis nostrae, nisi Deus adjuvet, plane desperata est". /"The cause of our country is, unless God helps, quite hopeless"/. And

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1. This name simply comes from the Latin "Apostolorum Porta." Translator.

1: Niederle--70 E-5 1911 E& Slavic Peoples E/6
Czechoslovakia EB1

S.P. C. 175 177 167 again in 1827 Jungmann in a moment of discouragement gave vent to this sad cry: "We have had the sad fate of being the witnesses and the accessories of the final annihilation of our mother tongue."

S.P. C. 175 668 517 Nevertheless, certain men succeeded in awakening the nation, in saving what might be saved. The history of the Czech literature since the second half of the eighteenth century shows us in an admirable fashion the work which a little group of men, obscure but impassioned, taken with a great idea, have been able to accomplish.

Aroused by the progress of liberalism in Europe, by the "Josephinism," they succeeded in reviving an interest in national affairs, in shaking the people out of their torpor, at first among the lowly ones who had preserved the language, then in the intellectual class. This Czech people, whose existence appeared doubtful one hundred years ago, of whom the Viennese educator Kindermann von Schulstein, basing himself upon the new scholastic program, had proclaimed the approaching disappearance, this Czech people, is today conscious of itself, it forms a compact mass of six and one-half million persons and constitutes an impregnable citadel against which the powerless efforts the germanism bent upon the ruin of the Slavs come and break. There is only one thing to regret and that is that political conditions have prevented the union and assimilation of the two million Slovaks settled in northern Hungary.

S.P. C. 101 S 21. National Frontiers.--The compact mass of the Czechs and Slovaks are distributed among six administrative regions: in Austria, in the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margraviate of Moravia, and the Duchy of Silesia, in Hungary, and, for a few segments, in Prussian Silesia.

The ethnographic boundary which separates the Slovaks from the other Czechs runs across Moravia; but the Slovaks of Moravia are so closely associated with the life of the Czech nation and are drawing so much closer to them each day that one may /112/ consider as the true boundary the political frontier which separates Moravia from Hungary. There, in the Carpathians, a wall stands which separates the two groups, Czechs and Slovaks, and unless unforeseen circumstances intervene, it is to be feared that their former unity will wind up in a dualism: Czechs on the one side, Slovaks on the other.

Thanks to a series of ethnographic studies, and also to the acute

1: Niederle--83 E-5 1911 EG Slavic Peoples E16
Czechoslovakia EB1

S.P.
C. Slovaks broke away from the Bohemian crown in 1031; despite the
184 relations which they have maintained since that time with the Czechs, and many attempts to bring them more closely together, the separation persists and, except for an unexpected miracle, it will finally lead to the division of the formerly single nationality into two different nations.

S.P.
C.
● 175 During long centuries, the Czechs and the Slovaks of Hungary, even though they spoke different dialects, had neither the same costumes,
182 nor the same customs, and were living under different sovereigns and
[197] in different states, were nevertheless not conscious of these differences. Their literary representations proclaimed the unity of their language and rejoiced in it.

Attempts have been made in these latter days to demonstrate that the Slovaks were of a non-Czech origin, that they have merely been Czechized by the influence of religious literature, and that the divergences which have recently occurred were only a return toward an ancient state of affairs.

S.P.
C. This thesis, which was that of Czambel, recently deceased, is
[197] not sufficiently well-founded. What is certain, on the contrary, is that the Slovaks and the Czechs at the outset formed an ethnic and linguistic unit with some /132/ dialectal differences, a unit which occupied the region located to the south of the Sudeten and Carpathian mountains. But this common domain was divided by the Carpathians into two regions, one of which had its center to the west, the other to the east. These geographic conditions gave birth to two political organisms. The Danube, which was their natural bond, fell into the hands of the Germans. In 1631 the Slovak areas were detached from Bohemia and from Moravia. The religious and literary ties between the two groups in no wise succeeded in reuniting the broken bonds.

The differences between the two peoples grew more and more pronounced. Among the upper classes the idea developed that they belonged to different states, to another fatherland, that they had a different ideal of autonomy. These ideas were expressed for the first time in 1787 and towards the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, at the period when the Slovak literature broke away from the Czech literature.

Beginning with this period the Czechs had to reckon with this

S.P. C. 175 182 tendency, which replaced the once purely theoretical unity of the two groups by two units, akin no doubt, but independent of one another, which assigned to the Slovaks a special place in the sequence of Slav peoples.

000 The history, the internal differentiation, the political life had sufficiently prepared the ground /133/ for these events. Have they taken place in a way favorable to the future of the Slovaks? It is difficult and premature to solve this question today. We have only to recognize and to respect the individuality of the Slovaks and to hope that they may remain faithful to the feeling of solidarity and of moral unity of their group with the Czech nation.

S.P. C. 141 From a physical viewpoint, according to the latest research, the characteristic traits of the Czechs are that they are of medium height (169.2 centimeters for the men, 157.3 centimeters for the women) and very well proportioned; a rather large cranial capacity; with a rather round skull (index 83.3); an oval face of average proportions; the hair is brown or dark blond; the eyes usually light in color.

The brachycephalics are in the majority; among 100 skulls, are found 1% subdolichocephalic, 13.5% mesocephalic, 56.5% sub-brachycephalic and 29% brachy--and ultra-brachycephalic. Up to the present it has been impossible to demonstrate differences by localities.

S.P. C. 142 Statistics drawn up in 1880 showed that among 100 children, 38.17% had blue eyes, 30.86% grey eyes, 30.70% brown eyes; 44.04% blond hair and 55.75% brown or black hair. The light type (blue eyes and blond hair) is represented in Bohemia by 18.3%, in Moravia by 15.9%; the dark type (brown eyes, brown or black hair) /134/ by 23.4% in Bohemia, and 23.6% in Moravia. Moreover, the crossing of types darkens the complexions, as may be verified by the statistics prepared for the ethnographic exhibition of 1895. (1) This indicates

1. About this exhibition, which I had the good fortune to visit, see my volume Russes et Slaves (2d series, Paris, Hachette, 1896, p. 340 ff.) Mr. Niederle was one of the principal organizers of this exhibition. Translator.

among the adults 75% with dark hair.

000 The outcome of all of this is that the Czech type does not

1: Niederle--86 E-5 1911 EK Slavic Peoples E16
Slovenes EF7

S.P. Sl. 175 101 what is certain is that, from the end of the sixth century, this region[1] was flooded with Slavs. In the year 551 Jordanes did not yet know of them, for he drew the frontier of the Slavs from the Vistula to the lower Drava. In 595 Thassilo, Duke of Bavaria, was already fighting the Slavs in the area of the Korutania (Carinthia); in the year 600, we know that they threatened Italy. Evidently it was the departure of the Lombards for Italy which facilitiated the expansion of the Slavs.

At the beginning of this expansion they settled upon very extensiv areas; but their groups were not very dense and they did not occupy all of the territory. To the east and to the north they had the Danube as their frontier--onto the right bank of which the Czechs crossed in certain localities--to the west, a line running from Linz through Wels, Dachstein, Tauern, Dreiherrenspitze and from there through the western corner of the Tyrol, as far as Innichen and Udine.

Thus they occupied the southern half of Lower Austria, all of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the territories of Gradiska and of Gorica (Goritz), the region of Lienz in the Tyrol, that is to say the east part of the Pusterthal, the Langau of Salzburg /137/ and the southeastern portion of Upper Austria. We are assured of this by the topographic nomenclature, by the ancient name of Sclavinia, and by a series of documents directly relating to the Slavic colonies. In this territory the sources mention very strong ancient tribes, such as those of the Dulebi, of the Suselci*, of the Stodoranes* alongside the Croatian colonies.

S.P. Sl. 175 At the outset of their history the Slovenes fell under the yoke of the Avars. They were freed from it by Samo (623-658). On the contrary, they were unable to resist for long the attacks of the Germans from Bavaria; their chiefs had to become the vassals of Bavaria (745-772). Then they were subjugated by the Franks (788) and by the Friuli.
Sl. [795] Their country was invaded by German colonies, which systematically sought to Germanize it. The Catholic Church played the principal role in this policy of Germanization. This work was carried on at the same time by the diocese of Salzburg and by that of Aquileia. The conversion to Christianity almost always redounded to the profit of Germany. The Slav diocese of Great Moravia did not endure long (1) and exercised slight influence.

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1. About this diocese, see my book on La conversion des Slaves au christianisme, ch. vi ff. Translator.

[1] [the region of the Alps -- Analyst]

1: Niederle--87 E-5 1911 EK Slavic Peoples E 16
-Slovenes EF 7

S.P.
Sl.
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Beginning from the eight century the Alpine Slavs, who had occasionally crossed over the frontiers which we mentioned earlier, began /138/ to withdraw, especially in the north between Carinthia and the Danube, in the region called the East Mark (Ostmark). There in the north, German colonization established itself firmly upon the Danube, then upon the Leitha and upon the Mura, in the neighborhood of Celovec (Klagenfurt) and on the upper Drava. However, it scarcely descended at all along the course of this river. Then it penetrated to the banks of Lake Balaton (Plattensee), and, except for the arrival of the Magyars and the defeat of the Bavarians in 907, Germanization certainly would have invaded all of Panonia and the basin of the basin of the Drava.

The German frontier today would not be on the upper Raab, but on the lower Sava. The Magyars prevented this expansion, but in turn, they subjugated all the Slovenes--except a few groups. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Alpine areas were Germanized is explained by various circumstances. The Slavs were never very numerous in the Alpine regions of the East Mark (Ostmark). They lived in groups which were isolated and from the outset mingled with German groups.

In the texts having to do with the establishment of the churches founded by the Slavic prince Pribina and consecrated by Liufram, bishop of Salzburg (850), we find fifteen names of Slavic chiefs and fifteen names of German chiefs and we read an entire list of names of German localities. In this region the Slavs were never /139/ very strong nor very compact; thus, we must not be surprised to see them disappear in Austria proper, beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Evidently they did not exist in compact masses exept in the south, in Carantania, that is to say in southern Styria, in Carinthia, and in Carnolia, areas where they have maintained themselves until the present.

S.P.
Sl.
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S 26. Territorial Boundaries.--Today the Slovene country includes: 1) the entire Duchy of Carnolia (except the German island of Kocevje /Gottschee/), the north of Istria, Gorica /Hung: Kerrce/, the region of Udine in the Friul, the southeast part of Carinthia, southern Styria and a small section of eastern Hungary (the two counties of Vas* and Zalad*).

Croats EF4
Serbs EF6

S.P. Cr. Sb. 174 [101]

difficulty. They isolated themselves from one another, they were concentrated in different political groups, they assimilated the debris of the autochtonous nations. In the northwest the Croat area in the largest sense of the word took shape--bounded in the tenth century by the sea as far as the mouth of the Cetina (Tsetinia), established on the Kupa and the Drava--the location of the frontier along the Bosnian side is not clearly known; and on the other hand the Serbian area in the largest sense of the word included everything to the east of Croatia as far as the Shara mountains (Shar-Planina) and the region of the Morava. To this Serbian region Constantin Porphyrogenetos added the maritime tribes of the south between the Cetina (Tsetinia) and the Piva, Scutari (Skadar) and Durazzo (Drac).. But originally these regions did not belong to the Serbs. At what epoch did the Serbo-Croats occupy this territory? We do not know exactly.

Certain families, perhaps even tribes, crossed the Danube before the fifth century, but the total immigration did not take place before the fifth or sixth centuries. What we may affirm is that they did not come in the seventh century in the reign of Heraclius (about 630-640), as is recounted by Constantin /149/ Porphyrogenetos according to tradition; they took part in the general immigration movement of the Slavs towards the Balkan peninsula in the fifth and sixth centuries.

S.P. Cr. Sb 101 175

From the very beginning the history of these Slavs, conditioned by geographic influences, followed two different currents. The tribes of the northwest, settled in favorable conditions near the sea, were the first to form a sizeable state (perhaps from the seventh century, but especially during the ninth and tenth centuries). They gave to it the name of Croatia, the origin of which is not known and of which no satisfactory explanation exists.

The tribes of the south and of the east were a long way from the sea; they inhabited a mountainous and poor region; they did not develop a political life until later on, towards the tenth or eleventh century. They grouped themselves about the tribe of the Serbs which originally was settled on the Tara, Lim, and Ibar Rivers. It is in Novi Pazar (ancient Rascia) that the word Srbia is first met with. This name spread throughout the region of the southwest which was detached from the Croat national unit. From that time two political entities developed side by side, often even in combat with each other; and political divorce finally took place when Croatia in 1102 became

1: Niederle--94 E-5 1911 E/C Slavic Peoples E/C
Croats EF4
Serbs EF6

SP
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Sb attached to the Hungarian crown. In 1526 it passed, with that crown,
101 under the scepter of the Hapsburgs.
●/175

SP
CR
Sb
/175 The Serbs on their side were getting ready in the twelfth century for /150/ the most brilliant period of their history, a period inaugurated by the great zupan Stevan Nemanji (1168-1196). The breach widened still further
Ca
Sb
[795] when the two groups found themselves separated from a religious viewpoint. The Croats, as a result of their political ties with the pope, had received from Rome the royal crown, the liturgy, and the Catholic hierarchy. The Serbs, on the other hand, had received from Byzantium Christianity and also antocephalous church, at the time of Archbishop Sava, brother of the first crowned Tsar, Stevan. This double ecclesiastical influence deeply penetrated into the entire national life and manifested itself in the literature.

CR
Sb
[213
181] While the Croats used the Roman alphabet, the Serbs used the cyrillic alphabet. The former followed Latin culture; the latter Byzantine culture.

Sb
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668 Serbian power was destroyed by the Turks at the battle of Kosovo (1389); but they did not draw any nearer to the Croats. Subject to the Osmanlis, they preserved their national character, they again recruited their energy, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the insurrections of 1804 and of 1815, they regained little by little their political autonomy.

The Principality of Serbia appeared as a solid nucleus ready to gather together all of the Serbian elements of the Balkans into a new national unit.

Sb
CR
175
668 /151/ During this time[1] the Croats unfortunately exhausted their strength in perpetual warfare against the Turks and in struggles for either internal independence or for the dynasty. Recently both the Serbian government and the Austrian government have equally disappointed the hopes of the Serbo-Croatian nation.

Recently the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina to Austria has completely nullified the dreams of a Great Serbia.

000 This political situation has exercised a profound influence, not

[1] [from the 12th - 19th centuries -- Analyst]

000 only upon the internal situation of the two sections originally unified, but also upon their mutual relations.

S.P. Cr. Sb. 668 191 There indeed developed between 1830 and 1840 a movement called Illyrian, which sought to unite them,[1] but it had no other results than to unify the literary language for which the dialect called stokavski was adopted. But from the political viewpoint, each of the two sections, despite the original unity of their language, differentiated only by dialectical shadings, followed its own course.

S.P. Cr. Sb. ● 175 167 Sb [361] Their[1] development has been particularly hindered by exterior circumstances. At first there were the Turkish invasions and the servitude which followed them. Many of the groups emigrated from their ancient homes to seek a more certain asylum. At the outset, Serbian colonization went upstream on the Morava, towards the south. The first centers, the first /152/ capitals were Novi Pazar, Pristina, Prizren, and Skoplje.

But the arrival of the Turks completely displaced the movement. Beginning with the sixteenth century, the Croats went back towards the north, and the Serbs did so even more. To escape from the Turkish oppression, Croat colonies were established in Hungary, in the region situated between the middle reaches of the Raab, the lake of Ferto-Tava (Neusiedler Lake), Bratislava and Vienna. Some even pushed as far as into Moravia and the interior of Hungary.

S.P. Sb. 175 167 These migrations greatly modified the type of the primitive Serbian population. From the regions which formerly had been the home and center of the nation, from Kosovo Polje, from Old Serbia, hundreds of thousands of men came forth to establish themselves in the relatively peaceful regions of Austria-Hungary.

This movement began at the end of the fourteenth century, after the battle of Kosovo (1389) and the conquest of Skoplje by the Turks (1391), after which the Turks began to march towards the region of Lom, Bosnia, and the country of Khum, and finally towards the north. The Serbs then had to withdraw towards the Danube and move their center towards Krusevac and finally towards Smederevo (Semendria). Sb [662] In 1459, the Turks definitely abolished Serbia, and in 1463, Bosnia. The Serbs then began to cross in great masses to the other side of the

[1] [i.e. Serbs and Croats -- Analyst]

Danube and of the Sava. Towards 1481, 50,000 of them emigrated SP /153/ form the region of Krusevac, and these migrations were re- Sb peated several times from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, 175 especially after the defeatof the Turks before Vienna, in 1683, and 167 after the treaty of Karlovci (Karlowitz) in 1699, as a result of which the Turks were compelled definitely to give up Hungary and Transylvania. The Serb colonization was favorably regarded by Austria, and the Court of Vienna did not hesitate to promise liberties and privileges, of which only very few were later realized. Also, on numerous occasions, notably in 1750 and 1752, the Serbs left the Austrian State and went to settle in Russia, in New Serbia, of which we shall speak later on.[1]

From the outset of the fifteenth century, we find Serb colonies in the island of Czeplo, then later in Srem (Syrmien), Backa (Baczka), the country of Torontal and of Timisoara (Temesvar). The great migration into these countries took place in 1690, under the leadership of Arseniye III Tsrnoievitch, patriarch of Ipek (Petch), who led, it is said, 80,000 persons; another took place in 1737 under the leadership of Arseniye Iovanovitch. In Styria, there were Serb colonies near Ptuj from the sixteenth century. The original Slavic domain of ancient Serbia was depopulated to such an extent that it was occupied by Albanian refugees; we can testify even today to the existence of this Albanian wedge which becomes sharper every day which penetrates into the very heart of ancient Serbia, as far as Kosovo Polje, and SP which thrusts its point as far as the present kingdom. /154/ Today Sb the region of Kosovo Polje is called Arnautluk (the country of the 167 Arnaut or Albanians) and, according to the information furnished by 563 Nusic, there are very few villages which do not contain Albanians, and there are some which have no Serbs at all, even though they bear Serbian names. Three quarter of the population is made up of Albanianized Serbs. A few years ago the Albanians were even settled in the Principality of Serbia, on the Toplica, Jablanica, and MoravaRivers; they left after the war of 1878 and the region has again been occupied by the Serbs. In 1900 only 2,151 Albanians were counted in Serbia, almost all of them in the district of Vranie, where 205,000 Serbs are found alongside them.

This withdrawal of the Serb national group toward the north SP Sb was the result of the Turkish wars, and it is only during the past few 167 175

[1] [cf. Cat. 11b, p.101 -- Analyst]

years that Serbia has recognised how much she has lost and how little S.P.
she has gained: for the region of Novi Pazar and of Kosovo is the S.B.
keystone of her future. The Albanian question is a vital question to 167
Serbia. 175
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Furthermore, in the Serbian section of the Balkan peninsula, S.P.
there have been many internal migrations between the different regions, S.B.
migrations which recently have been studied by Mr. Cvijic. In these 166
movements Serbia played a passive role; an active role was played
by Hercegovina, by Montenegro, and by a portion of Macedonia.

/155/ If the Serbs in the southwest withdrew before the Albanians, S.P.
in the northeast they withdrew before the Rumanians. This is what is S.B.
found not only in the Hungarian Banat, where a great number of 167
Rumanian villages bear Serb names, but also in the Kingdom of Serbia 563
where, at a bend of the Danube, between Milonovac and Zajecar,
the Rumanians have penetrated in compact masses and where the Serbs
have been unable to absorb them. It even appears, according to Mr.
Resetar, that they are increasing in numbers, even though the official S.B.
statistics try to diminish their number. For 1900, 89, 873 of them[1] [191]
were enumerated; but there were also 32, 556 bilingual persons speaking
Serbian. To compensate for these losses, one may point out the S.B.
success of the Serbo-Croat national group in Dalmatia, where the sea- 167
coast which previously was Roman, is rapidly becoming Slavisized.
This Slavisation did not take place immediately upon the arrival of
the Slavs in Roman Dalmatia, but was the result of a long process
which in part Slavisized the Romans and in part forced them to migrate. S.B.
It was only in the Seventeenth Century that the Romans disappeared,[2] C.
and a few vestiges of their former tongue remained as a sort of slang [191]
in the island of Krk (Veglia) until the end of the nineteenth century.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Split (Spalato) and S.P.
Dubrovnik (Ragusa) were already Slavic. At the time of the Turkish Cr.
invasions the Adriatic seacoast was first depopulated, then colonized S.B.
again. From the neighborhood of Zadar (Zara) Slav colonies crossed 175
into southern Italy /156/ where their descendants can still be found 167
today. We shall speak of them in a short while.

On the western frontier of Serbia between the Morava, the S.P.
Timok, and the Pirot, there was for a long time a transitional zone S.B.

[1] [Rumanians in the Kingdom of Serbia--Analyst] 563
[2] [Along the Dalmation coast--Analyst] 167

S.P. B. 101 174 and the Slovenes and they did not form a united group. Still in the seventh and eighth centuries we find in the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula an entire series of tribes very slightly united to each other, the Sieveriens and seven anonymous tribes in the north of the present Bulgaria, the Rumeliot Slavs, then the Druguvicnes, /183/ the Smoliani, the Strumenci, the Rynchini*, the Sagudati*, the Berziti in Macedonia. S.P. [197] It is evidently to these latter that the Slavs who pushed into Greece and into the Archipelago are related from the linguistic viewpoint, the Velegezites, the Vajuniti, the Milingi, and the Iezerci. Towards this period a union began to develop, but under foreign pressure. In 679 under the leadership of Asparukh a certain number of Bulgars from the Volga--of Turkish origin--crossed the Danube and penetrated into the Dobrudja as far as Varna; they subjugated the neighboring Slavic tribes, unified them, and little by little unified all of the Slavs of the center of the Peninsula.

On the other hand, the Bulgars of the Volga, who were relatively few in number, became themselves assimilated very quickly with the Slav element and merged with it. (1)

1. Zanetov and Skorpil thought that they found the remains of these ancient Bulgars among the Gagauz (see further on) and among the Turks of Deliorman between Silistra, Shumla (now Kolarovgrad), Varna and Rushchouk, whom their Bulgar neighbors called Gadjaly. Mochkov came out against their hypotheses.

Their name alone, which was given to the new state and to its people, recalls the memory of this element of foreign race. Besides the Bulgars have basically always been Slavs, even though they have not hesitated to assimilate foreign elements. Among these elements, along with the Turkish Bulgars, one must cite the remains of the ancient Thracians, the Germans, /185/ especially the Goths, Turks, and Avars, to whom were added later on other Asiatic elements; the Poles, the Cumaeans, the Oguzes, gypsies, and finally the Osmanli Turks.

S.P. B. 175 The Bulgarian Empire, beginning with the reign of Simeon (893-927) acquired a considerable area; it grew by means of the constant warfare with Byzantines on the one hand and with the Serbs, on the other. The Slavs who belonged to its most remote frontiers at

1: Niederle--115 E-5 1911 EK Slavic Peoples EK
Bulgaria EF1

S.P. B. 175 the period when the seat of the Tsar and of the Patriarch was at Ochrida (1), felt themselves to be even more Bulgarian the further

1. Today in Macedonia. Translator.

they were removed from the ancient homeland of the nation; they retained this more or less strong sense of solidarity, on the one side against the Serbs whose empire confined them to their region, on the other side against the Osmanli Turks. In 1393 the Turks captured Trnovo; in 1396 after the victory of Nicopolis they achieved the conquest of Bulgaria. The country remained enslaved until the years 1876-1878 when the intervention of Russia gave her back her freedom and independence. The area between the Danube and the Stara Planina (Balkan Mountains) was the first to be freed; in 1885 a peaceful revolution annexed the Bulgarian Rumelia to her, as far as Mount Dospat, to the course of the Arda, the Sakar Planina (Sakar Balkan Mountains) and the Gulf of Burgas. The section of the Bulgars who form a compact group in Macedonia /186/ have vainly been waiting up to the present for their deliverance and for the end of a situation which, despite the efforts of the Powers, still remains a very painful one.

SP [144] Such is the political history of the Bulgar people. The development of the nation has furthermore been hindered by perpetual troubles, by disturbances, by the displacements of ethnic groups. When the Greeks again took possession of their ancient domain the Slav colonies of the south had to return north, the Slavs of Greece were completely assimilated during the course of the Middle Ages. But the most serious catastrophe was the Turkish invasion.

S.P. B. 175 167 When the Turks penetrated into the peninsula, under the reign of Murad I, they settled in the region of Plovdiv (Philippopolis) and of Zagora; in the reign of Bajazet I they settled between Plovdiv and the Balkans and then remained in the basin of the Marica, especially in its lower areas, until the nineteenth century. This would follow from the information furnished in 1819 by Pope Constantine and from the nomenclature of the area which is essentially Turkish (names of villages, fields, streams, woods, pastures, hills, etc.). Of 52 villages of the district of Shirpan only two have non-Turkic names, and only three in the district of Seimen (now Marica). Another center of Turkish colonization was the eastern portion of northern Bulgaria, especially the Dobrudja, which became a desert in the fifteenth /187/ century.

1: Niederle--116 E-5 1911 E/Slavic Peoples E16
Bulgaria EE1

S.P. B. 178 167 In this region, before the arrival of the Turks, there were settled a large number of Pecheneg, Uzi, and Cumaeans (whose descendants are today called Gagauz) and later on the Tatars.

It seems that the earliest Turkish colonization took place in the region of Deliorman towards the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries and later on at Tuzluk and at Gerilovo. The Ragusan Pavle Gjordjic, who traveled in these areas, reported a numerous Turkish population at Gerilovo*, at Deliorman, and in the Dobrudja. These areas were not completely assimilated by the Turks until the seventeenth century, and in the case of Gerilovo*, not until the eighteenth century. But many Turkish villages still retain their Slavic names.

All this Turkish colonization in the northeast of Bulgaria evidently had as an object the securing of passageways of the Balkans, especially after the defeats suffered in the war against King Wladyslaw of Poland in 1443.

S.P. B. 101 167 Of the original Slav population‡ there remain only a few rare traces near Provadiya, Shumla (now Kolarovgrad), and Razgrad. Also in the sixteenth century a great number of Turks, Yurvks*, and Koniars* came from Asia to settle in certain parts of Thrace and of Macedonia. S.P. B. 101 166 The old Slavic Bulgars, after the arrival of the Turks, naturally withdrew into the mountainous regions. In the sixteenth century their boundary was formed by the towns of Devna*, Monastir (now Bitolj), Krivnia*, Ravna*, Nenovo*, /188/ Nevcha*, Kaludjerica, Divdiedovo*, Novo Selo, or, in other words, the line from Varna (now Stalin) to Shumla (now Kolarovgrad). But towards the south the Slav element soon began again to take over and regain the terrian. The Osmanlis perished little by little in the perpetual wars and were not replaced by new colonists. On the other hand, new Bulgars arrived from the northern areas (Lovech, Nikopol), a scene of constant troubles and danger.

S.P. B. 175 167 It was on the banks of the Danube that the principal wars were fought and the Slavs moved away from there in all directions. Upon this emigration movement which is a very old one, we have no documentation until after the seventeenth century. Thus we know that in the course of the year 1741 Bulgar colonies went to settle in the Banat of Temesvar where their descendants are still established at Vinga, and Benesov*. From 1752 to 1754 a great number of Bulgars

‡[i.e. in northeast Bulgaria--Analyst]

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and of Gagauz moved into southern Russia, others in 1787-91; during the wars from 1801 to 1812 a very large number came particularly from Vidin to settle in Bessarabia. This emigration was repeated after the war of 1828-1829. In 1821 there were counted in Bessarabia 1,735 Bulgar families with a total of 38,000 persons; in 1829, 4,400 families arrived or about 270,000 souls. Then came the reaction. During the fifty years of peace which followed, many families returned to their own country despite the miseries which they had to undergo. /189/ In 1833, 900 families came back from Bessarabia. On the other hand, from the Balkan regions many of the Bulgars came down to the plain, especially to Rustchuk, the Dobrudja, the country located between Adrianopol (Edirne--Bulg, Odrin) and Burgas, between Shirpan and Stara Zagora, to the outskirts of Kavkalii (now Topolovgrad), of Kyzil Agach*, of Tambol and, under the peaceful reign of Mahmud II, as far as the ouskirts of Rodosto (now Tekirdag), of Derkos* and of Constantinople.

The war of 1877-78 resulted in new movements whose consequen consequences can still be felt today. At the outset of this campaign the Bulgars fled en masse from Stara Zagora, from Kazanlik, from Gjopsa, from Zlatitsa into the country to the north and did not return to their homes until the Russians advanced to the south. In other areas the Turks and the Cherkess evacuated villages which they had occupied for a very long period; the former emigrated through fear of the Russians; the latter did so later on because they were unable to adjust themselves to the new order of things. Mr. Jirecek, historian of the Bulgars, estimates at 100,000 the number of Turks who emigrated from 1878 to 1884. They were replaced by Bulgars who came from Rumelia or from Macedonia, which the Treaty of Berlin retained under Turkish domination.

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On the other hand, emigrants came back from Romania, Bessarabia the Taurida, and Asia Minor and settled in the neighborhood of Svishtov, Varna (now Stalin), and Tuzluk*. With the Macedonians /189/ continuing to move in without interruption, Mr. Jirecek offers figures which give an idea of the changes effected in the population. In 1896, among 338 Christian localities in the dioceses of Varna (now Stalin) and Shumla (now Kolarovgrad), 135 since the war had an entirely new population. There remained only rare traces of the previous generation. On the other hand, according to Miletic, the

5: Thomson S-5 (no date) 1951 E16 Slavic Peoples E16.

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A CENTURY OF A PHANTOM PANSLAVISM AND THE WESTERN SLAVS

by S. Harrison Thomson

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AMONG the gorgeous phantoms of history, none has had a more rich or variously enticing story than Panslavism. It may well be that more literate Europeans have enjoyed the thrill of frightening themselves by it and more designing political manipulators have used it as a stage illusion than would be true of any other fiction. On the other hand there have been published several serious histories of the spectre.

By 1848 Panslavism was already an old and ripe story. To go back to the empire of Samo in the early seventh century is perhaps to be too inventive, but we can certainly trace the idea of Slavic reciprocity in the plans of Boleslaw Chrobry (the Hardy) of Poland, who, around the year 1000, planned a western Slavic empire comprising the Poles, the Czechs, the Moravians, the Elbian Slavs and the western Ukrainians. His obvious purpose was to block further German expansion eastward.[1] Whatever their motivation, those grandiose plans proved ephemeral, as did others conceived by Polish or Czech rulers for centuries thereafter. There is no discernible difference, so far as we can judge, between the territorial and dynastic maneuvering that went on among Slavic princes and that of Austrian, Hungarian and Wallachian rulers in these centuries of the formation of national states. One Slavic people was as likely to be antipathetic to a neighboring Slavic people as to a neighbor who was Germanic or Turco-Ugric. Territorial nationalism or dynastic combination were already the prevailing patterns.

But from the seventeenth century on concepts of a common ethnic and linguistic background begin to grow and take shape. From the Croat Juraj Križanić in the seventeenth century,[2] who spent fifteen years in Siberian exile after proclaiming his Panslav ideas in Russia, to the great Slovak poet, Jan Kollár, in the early nineteenth century, we can trace an unwavering line of western Slavic intellectuals who formulated and reformulated the idea of a glorious Slav race which should of right be united in heart and body, preferably under one paternal Slav ruler.

Somewhat ironically a Baltic German, Johann Gottfried Herder, had contributed much to the most recent upsurge of this Slav feeling by glori-

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[1] On whom the classic study is St. Zakrzewski, *Boleslaw Chrobry Wielki* (Cracow, 1925); and cf. more recently, Z. Wojciechowski, "Boleslaw Chrobry i kryzys stosunków polskoniemieckich" in *Przegląd Zachodni* IV (1948), 369-383.

[2] Smurlo, E., "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* VI (1928), 321-335; of A. Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), p. 20ff.; P. G. Scolardi, *Krijanich, messager de l'unité des chrétiens et père du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947).

175 fying the Slavic race and treating it as one, from the Moldau to the Urals. He would doubtless have been disturbed to be credited with partial parent-
186 hood of both Pangermanism and Panslavism. Early in the nineteenth
668 century most western Slavs were of necessity romantics. Romanticism was the only recourse left them: Poland tragically partitioned, the Slavs of
829 the Austrian Empire barely existing under Metternich, the South Slavs predominantly under the Ottoman Turk. Any voice even faintly suggesting a prouder past, and by implication a comparable future, would be welcome. Their history was their refuge and their hope in time of troubled humiliation.[3]

Philology, poetry and letters, history and the trend of international events in the forties of the nineteenth century all combined to deepen and broaden the feelings but dimly and sporadically aroused a half century before by the wildfire spread of the ideas of the French Revolution. There was now, after decades of scholarship, scientific and historical ground for the concept of Slavic community. The ferment of the Slav Revival, however, romantic it may have been in a technical sense, was a psychological fact of great moment to all the western Slavs, whether living under Magyar repression in Slovakia or Croatia, clumsy Austrian Biedermeier in Bohemia, or awkward Hapsburg pampering in Galicia. The springs of hope and confidence were filling. The single great Slavic state to the east—Mother Russia—was still victoriously radiant from defeating Napoleon, and her very glamor drew irresistibly the yearnings of the Slavic millions enslaved by alien peoples. In many quarters among the western Slavs there was talk of the all-Slavic Tsar, while in Russia there was not infrequently an expression of interest among scholars and publicists as well as among reflective politicians in the possibility of strengthening the natural bonds between Mother Russia and her temporarily estranged children in the west. Pushkin's lines, written after the Polish revolution of 1830-31

> Will the Slavic rivulets pour into the Russian sea,
> Or will it dry up? That is the question.

reflected current Russian thought.[4] A. S. Chomyakov, the Slavophil poet,

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[3] See the illuminating discussion of Panslavism by Waclaw Lednicki in *European Ideologies* (New York, 1948), pp. 808-951, particularly rich in literary background. His earlier study, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 128-140, 649-662, can also be consulted with great profit. It is significant that this study of Polish Slavophilism ends about the middle of the nineteenth century. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej w okresie porozbiorowym*, I (Lwów, 1913) *passim*. For the echoes of this current of thought in Polish literature, and an explanation of how and why it took a line divergent from that in other Western and Southern Slavic countries see Zofja Klarnerowna, *Slowianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (Warszawa, 1926), *passim*.

[4] See Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 168ff., and Lednicki *passim*. The literature on Russian

in the next year spoke dramatically of "the brothers in fetters, who wait /175 ●
yearningly for thy call and thy protective embrace." There was much more, /86
a good deal of it more effusive, and all of it tinged with theology, from
poets, essayists and even historians, but mostly urging the western Slavs, 668
and particularly the Poles, to recognize their divinely appointed lot as part 829
of a great Slavic nation, naturally under Russian leadership. The Slovak Kollár's "On Slavic Reciprocity" was first published in German in 1837, then appeared in Russian in 1838 and a second time in 1840, but the concept of reciprocity was interpreted by the Russian editor and Russian readers in a Russian sense.[6] It would be difficult to determine whether the Russian espousal of Slavophilism was more or less enthusiastic than that of the western Slavs in the period before 1848, but it is certain that Russian Slavophilism could, even at this early date, be more properly called Panrussism than Panslavism.

We can indeed thus early discern a fairly clear and perhaps radical split in the aims of those who supported Slavic unity. On the one hand the western Slavs thought in terms of reriprocal aid, comfort and support, implicitly and explicitly favoring the independent existence of the several Slavic peoples. On the other hand the Russian Slavophils, from their proud vantage-point of an independent state existence, regarded the lesser Slavic peoples beyond their borders as strayed, lost or stolen children who should return to the mother's heart and hearth, the mother of course being Russia. Their principal concern, indeed, was that Russia herself should perceive her providential mission to carry on the torch of the true Christian faith which was visibly falling from the hand of the weakening West. It was taken for granted that the errant western and southern Slav brethren would accept the new situation with appreciation and even enthusiasm.

Decades of Romanticism, the European enlightenment followed by three-quarters of a century of Slavic renaissance in philology, poetry, ethnography, history and science, has made the dispersed Slavic peoples very sensible of their similarities and their differences, and eager to grasp and hold their own future. The events of February 1848 in western Europe only precipitated these feelings into action. German nationalism had found its voice in the Frankfurt Parliament. It was only natural that the western Slavs should answer with a Slavic assembly. In April the Slovak Ljudevit Štur was agitating in Prague for a meeting of representatives of the Slavic

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Slavophilism is tremendous. Of the more recent literature in western languages, see Charles Quénet, *Tchaadaev et les lettres philosophiques* (Paris, 1931); A. Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa* (Bern, 1948); and Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker* (Vienna, 1950).

[6] Clementis, Vl., *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943), p. 38.

175 peoples, and Dr. Fr. Brauner received a letter from Ondrzej Moraczewski
186 in Poznań, dated April 23, inviting the Czechs to initiate a Slavic con-
668 gress.[6] But the first public suggestion to this effect came from the Croat
829 Ivan Kukuljević in the April 20 issue of the *Narodní Noviny*, and a revised call to meet was published on April 30 in the same paper over the signature of Palacký and 19 other leading Czechs.[7] A public statement was issued on May 5 to "our brothers of the Austrian Empire" inviting them to convene in Prague on May 31, in order "to deliberate on our common interests ... We are resolved to remain faithful to the hereditary house of Habsburg-Lorraine ... and to maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire by all means in our power. We therefore reject all accusations of separatism, of Panslavism, of Russianism, which might be brought against us by ill-intentioned accusers.... Our undertaking is essentially conservative in nature and should in no wise disturb our liberal and justice-loving non-Slavic fellow-citizens." This was the voice of Austro-Slavism.

Of the 340 participants, 237 were Czechs and Slovaks, 42 South Slavs, 60 Poles and Ruthenians, and one Russian. Of the Poles several were from Prussian Poland, and the Russian—Bakunin—did not officially represent Tsarist Russia. The very thought of revolution of any sort was uncongenial to Tsar Nicholas I. The Poles would have preferred to have the Congress declare for a restitution of all of Poland, but there was little support for so revolutionary a concept.[8] The ruling motivation was anti-German and anti-Magyar. It was certainly not pro-Russian. Bakunin, the sole Russian present, a voluble guest, was quite un-Russian in his advocacy of Slavic federation.[9] The enthusiasm was tearful and tremendous, the speeches were moving, the parades, dinners and celebrations were elaborate and mystic. Palacký's speech of June 12, resuming the conclusions of the several commissions, specifically demanded a federalized Empire, with Slavs enjoying equal rights and privileges with the Germans and the

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[6] Tobolka, Zd., *Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby*, I (Prague, 1931), 77.

[7] Published in J.M. Černy, *Boj za právo* I (Prague, 1893), 183 and F. Palacký, *Spisy z oboru politiky* (Prague, 1898), p. 24f. See also F. Roubík, *Český rok 1848* (Prague, 1948), p. 199, and K. Kazbunda, *České hnutí roku 1848* (Prague, 1929), p. 182ff.; Albert Pražák, "Slavonic Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks" in *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 141-159.

[8] Batowski, Henryk, *Współpraca słowiańska* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 53. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej* I (Lwów, 1913) 288-291.

[9] *Bakuninová Zpověď* (Prague, 1926), p. 72ff.; see also B. P. Hepner, *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1950), pp. 236-284; and on Bakunin's Panslavism and his participation in the Prague Congress see V. Cejchan, *Bakunin v Čechách* (Prague, 1928), pp. 14-30. It seems quite clear that Bakunin had little or no understanding of the orientation of the Slavs of the Hapsburg monarchy.

Magyars.[10] This was the last plenary session of the Congress. Tumultuous events in Prague, not directly connected with the Slav Congress, made further meetings impossible, and on June 28 it was adjourned *sine die.*[11] An attempt was made to carry on the work of the Congress through a society bearing the name *Lipa slovanská* (the Slavic linden tree), but it did not survive the reaction that set in the next year. There remained, however, for a few years, one insistently free voice. Karel Havlíček, one of Palacký's adjutants at the Congress, refused to be quiet, and through his journal *Slowan* continued, for the two years he was relatively unsilenced, to defend the rights of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire, and went so far as to warn Vienna: "If they will not allow the lesser Panslavism in Central Europe they should take care lest the greater crash on their necks."[12] This is especially suggestive in view of the fact that Havlíček had but recently returned from a trip to Poland and Russia completely cured of any pro-Russian sentiments.[13] There was no western Slav who spoke more frankly than this in the early 'fifties.

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Thus as of 1849, Austro-Slavism had apparently had its day within the Hapsburg Empire, and Tsar Nicholas I, after reading the statements written out by Ivan Aksakov in answer to a police questionnaire, wrote in the margin of Aksakov's plaidoyer two comments: "Under the guise of compassion for the pseudo-persecution of Slavic tribes there is hidden a criminal thought about an uprising against the constituted authority of neighboring and partly allied states and about a general unification, which is expected, not from God's will, but from a revolution, which is perilous to Russia." "Only God can determine what is being prepared in the distant future, but if an accumulation of circumstances would indeed lead to such

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[10] Palacký, Fr., *Spisy z oboru politiky,* p. 46ff.

[11] Roubík, *op. cit.,* p. 230.

[12] Quoted in Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 307f. See Karel Tuma, *Karel Havlíček Borovský* (Prague, 1883) who follows the development of Havlíček's thought in these years with extensive quotations from his letters and editorials. In addition to T. G. Masaryk's classic work, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague, 1896), see the more recent work of Jaromír Bělič, *Karel Havlíček Borovský a slovanstvo* (Prague, 1947), especially pp. 27ff. and 180ff. This latter section is particularly illuminating in its analysis of the changes of attitude Havlíček went through toward the Poles, the Russians and Slavism in general.

[13] Jirásek, J., *Rusko a my* II (Prague, 1946), 161f.; Tuma, *op. cit.,* pp. 71ff., 92ff. Havlíček saw no reason to modify his unfavorable opinion of Russia even after the failure of the Congress and the onset of reaction. He wrote in the August 30, 1848 issue of his issue of his *Narodní Noviny* (quoted by Tuma, *op. cit.,* p. 234f.): "If Russia were a free constitutional country the Austrian Slavs (in case Austria were to be broken up), could consider a union with their blood brethren like the Germans, the Magyars or the Wallachs. They would then be a part of one of the most honorable, and perhaps leading countries of the world. But Russia is a land of despotism, and the rest of us free Slavs must, unfortunately, consider this our brother as our worst enemy."

● 175 186 668 829 unification, it would be for the peril of Russia."[14] Not only did the Tsar disapprove of Slavophilism, but the presence of Russian armies in Slovakia as allies of Habsburg repression in the same year did not encourage Slavophilism among the western Slavs.

For the better part of a decade, both among the western Slavs and within Russia little is heard of Panslavism or even of Slavophilism. The interest of the Russian intellectuals was taken up, in these years, by the polemics focussed around the question of the relations of the Orthodox to the Roman church. The encyclical of Pius IX to the Eastern Christians set off the sharp dispute.[15] In the Empire the reaction of Bach was severely anti-Slav,[16] and Tsar Nicholas would not hear any talk of Slav federation. But the end of the Crimean war, coinciding with the death of Nicholas I and the end of his absolutism, heralded a change in the Russian attitude toward the lesser Slavic breeds beyond the pale. Russia defeated was more receptive to ideas of Slavic reciprocity than before. But to the western Slavs, for a time at least, the shock of Russia's military vulnerability was a bitter disillusionment.[17] This feeling of despair lasted for a number of years until Austria herself was humbled on the plains of Lombardy. Then hope welled anew. Bach's régime was through and Vienna was a suitor for the support of her Slavic peoples. It is not without interest that at about the same time, 1857 and 1858, a Slavic Benevolent Committee was organized in Moscow,[18] and the Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, gave it his blessing. Its benevolence was preeminently directed toward strengthening cultural and ecclesiastical ties with the southern Slavs, particularly the Bulgars. The Tsarevitch was the patron. The list of the founders of the Committee included all the living Slavophils, of both currents—the romantic Panslavists and those we must henceforth call Panrussians. The significance of the junction of these two currents cannot be missed. This date may in fact be taken as a convenient dividing line between the earlier theoretical, romantic, Muscovite Slavophilism, best represented by the poet Chomyakov, the two Kireyevskys, Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov, and the later political Panslavism which should properly be called Panrussism.[19]

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[14] *Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov v jego pismakh* I, ii (Moscow, 1889), 154-55, 160. I am indebted to Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky for this quotation.

[15] von Schelting, A., *op. cit.*, p. 147ff.

[16] Denis, Edouard, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* II (Paris, 1903), 353ff.; Tobolka, *op. cit.*, I, 187ff.

[17] See chapter VI, "Polonia farà da se (1857-1863)" of W. Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)*, (Berlin, 1917). This German work is not identical with the previously noticed Polish work of the same author

[18] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 367ff.; cf. also B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), p. 60ff.

[19] Beneš, *Úvahy o Slovanství* (Prague, 1947), p. 79ff. C. Ouinet, *Tchaadaev* etc., p.

Theoretical Slavophilism was influenced by poorly understood western 175
thought—Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte—into paths of unrealistic and unhistorical 186
grotesquerie and then grafted onto Uvarov's threefold motto of 668
nationality, orthodoxy and autocracy.[20]

It is a simple axiom of diplomatic history that a great and powerful 829
state does not interest itself "benevolently" in other and lesser peoples unless it either needs their help or hopes to profit from that "benevolence." The change in the momentum of Russian Slavophilism in the late fifties of the nineteenth century clearly illustrates this axiom. Before 1855 Russia was too strong to need the support or loyalty of the western Slavs, and her leadership reasoned that her strength lay in the centralized autocratic system. As the system was regarded as good *per se* it was proper to support it elsewhere, in Prussia, in the Hapsburg Empire and, with qualifications, even in Turkey. But the Crimean War revealed considerable weaknesses in her state structure, and Vienna's affections had shifted to the enemies of Russia. Under these circumstances help, psychological at least, was welcome. Panslavism, it was obviously reasoned, might actually have its points, particularly since most of the western Slavs were in the Hapsburg Empire anyway, and a little discreet discontent there might pay diplomatic dividends. This period is thus a decisive period in the history of the theatrical property known as Panslavism.[21]

The Benevolent Committee actively wooed the South Slavs with appeals to their Orthodoxy, developing the thesis that West and East were irrevocably separate, that Slav, Eastern and Orthodox were and of right ought to be synonymous with Russia. Then came the January 1863 revolution of the Poles, put down by the butcher Muraviev with brutal ruthlessness. The Benevolent Slavic Committee was able to convince Russian opinion that it was all the Poles' fault, that their Catholicism blinded them to the truth of their Slavic heritage and made them guilty of the "great betrayal,"[22] but after Muraviev the western and southern Slavs were farther than ever from accepting the doctrines of Muscovite Slavophilism.[23]

408, would call this movement "the second slavophilism." See also M. Prelog, *Pout Slovanu do Moskvy r. 1867* (Prague, 1931), p. 4.

[20] See T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa* I (Prague, 1930), 406ff. The English edition, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), was based on the German text which Masaryk revised for the 1930 Czech edition.

[21] P. N. Milioukov has a chapter in his *Le Mouvement intellectuel russe* (Paris, 1918) p. 3777ff., entitled "La décomposition du slavophilisme" in which his explanation of the processes of Russian thought from *ca.* 1848 to the publication of Danilevsky's *Russland und Europa* is treated mystically. Any resemblance between his discussion and the realities of Russia's changed position in European politics after 1855-56 is not even coincidental.

[22] Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[23] Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen*, p. 223ff., and contemporary literature there cited.

● 175 Among the South Slavs a considerable element of enlightened opinion,
186 particularly the younger generation,[24] supported the Polish revolutionaries,
and among the leaders there was much openly pro-British and anti-Russian
668 expression. Nevertheless the dominant sentiment, both among Serbs and
829 Croats in the 'sixties was one of nationalist aspirations and, as between
other Slavic peoples, benevolent neutrality.[25]

Palacký remarked in 1863 that "Russian Tsardom was not based on Slavic principles but upon an amalgam of Mongolian and German principles."[26] The fact that European opinion had largely turned against Russia finally came home to many of the Russian Slavophils and a natural desire to repair the damage by allaying the suspicions of non-Russian Slavs soon made its appearance. In line with this feeling the Slavic Committee and the recently founded (1863) Society of Friends of the Natural Sciences projected an Ethnographic Congress to meet in Moscow in the summer of 1867.[27] Invitations were broadcast to learned societies throughout the Slavic world. Between the invitation in 1866 and the following summer several events transpired to give the Congress more potential significance. Austria had lost another war—this time to Prussia—and, within the Empire, the Compromise *(Ausgleich)* which divided the Empire into two parts, Hungary and Austria, had become law. The Slavs of the Empire were thus not only split, but put under their enemies, Magyars and Germans. Their long-standing aspirations for an equal share in a federative Empire were roughly dashed.[28] The outlook was black for the western Slavic peoples and it is not surprising that, with the exception of the Poles, the invitations to the Ethnographic Congress at Moscow were eagerly accepted.

In the meantime Ivan Aksakov, enthusiastic over the implications of the visit of so many leading personalities among the western Slavs to the Congress, constituted himself the propagandist of the Exposition, and many editorials in his journal *Den*, beginning with February 1867, concerned the Slav question. He emphasized the bonds between the Russians and other Slavic peoples, and expressed confidence that they had only to know each other to reject foreign, non-Slav control and join forces with

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[24] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[25] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[26] Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* (Prague, 1872), p. 26, quoting himself in 1863.

[27] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 27ff.

[28] Louis Léger recounts the opinion he met on a trip among the South Slavs in 1868, when their participation and hopes in the Moscow Congress were frankly explained to him. See his *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), p. 232ff., reprinted from *La revue moderne* of April, 1868.

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their motherland.[29] His line was followed by most of the Moscow journalists.

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In Prague the *Národní Noviny*, the organ of the Young Czech party, avowed openly the political aims in the minds of the Czech representatives:

> "We make not effort to conceal the fact that the Moscow Exhibition has for us who are going not only philological or ethnographic interest, but a significance deeply political. We are not responsible for that significance; rather those who have inaugurated dualism in Austria and have endangered the independence of the Czech crown and even of the Czech people . . . those who have turned the Slovak nation over to the mercies of the Magyars, those finally who are recklessly sacrificing the heroic Croatian people to the greed of the Magyar magnates."[30]

The majority of the Czech delegates, though men of intellectual and often scientific attainments, were yet men active in political life. The delegates of the South Slavs were exclusively non-political. Bishop Strossmayer and Franji Racki, who were especially invited, did not join the delegation, though the Bishop gave the expedition his active support. Ljudevit Gaj, the leading Croat nationalist journalist, went to Moscow, but was unaccountably quiet.[31]

In the realization that the Poles would not be represented, Palacký and Rieger were anxious to show their consideration of Polish sensitiveness and went to Paris to explain their reasons for making the trip when the Poles refused to go. Prince Adam Czartoryski and Andrew Zamojski urged the Czechs not to go, and the son of Adam Mickiewicz wrote them an impassioned letter begging them not to attend the Congress. Another special delegation of representative Polish emigrés waited on them to the same intent.[32]

Opened by the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich on April 23, the Congress was ostensibly an academic and scientific meeting, but railway passes had been given the foreign guests. The western Slaws, on their way to the Congress, crossed the Russian frontier at Granice (i. e. in Polish Silesia) on May 16 and on the 20th reached St. Petersburg.[33] On the way receptions and entertainment were provided by a number of municipalities, though the government took no official action in the matter. Enthusiasm was unbounded. The Czechs and the Serbs were received by Gorchakov

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[29] Aksakov, I. S., *Slavyanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1886), pp. 117-122.

[30] *Národní Noviny*, 1867, no. 11, quoted by Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[31] Fric, J. W., *Die Kehrseite der slavischen Wallfahrt nach Russland* (Prague, 1867), *passim.*

[32] A considerable literature has accumulated on Gaj's trip and activities. See Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff. and literature there cited.

[33] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 68ff.

175 in separate audiences and greeted with honeyed and unintelligible words.
186 The Tsar received 20 of the leaders of the various delegations in Tsarskoe
829 Selo on May 26. He is reported to have said to them: "May God hearken soon to all your prayers," a hope which thus relieved the Tsar of any
668 further need for action or hearkening. But he called them his "blood brothers here on native Slav soil" and thereby caused a sensation in western Slav capitals.[34] There were copious banquets and eloquent speeches by learned professors and publicists that left no room for doubt that the messianic hope of close Slavic collaboration was well on the way to realization.[35] They were so busy collaborating that there was barely time to visit the elaborate ethnographic and archeological exhibits for which the Congress had been called. The ghost of absent Poland did discreetly appear at several of the more formal occasions, but it was almost dispelled by confident and urbane diplomacy, which naturally deceived no one. The meeting made a deep impression upon everyone present. The Benevolent Committee was profusely congratulated for its felicitous initiative. But very few felt that much had been accomplished. Gorchakov apologetically stayed aloof, save to opine that the Czechs were apparently working for the King of Prussia. General Peter Šuvalov acidly remarked that the pilgrims were pursuing a phantom, and the Austrian minister, Revertera, was told that the Russian court regarded the whole spectacle as foolish.[36] In the western Slavic press reports were, in a slight majority, critical and skeptical. The Moscow Congress may have been the high point in public tribute to the numerous concepts in the center and at the periphery of Slavophilism, but it left much disillusionment in its wake. The Poles were disgruntled at the Czechs for participating against their expressed wishes. The Austrian government had, or affected to have, more than grave doubts of the sincerity of the Czech leaders in their devotion to Austro-Slavism, and even the Catholic clergy saw in the expedition a leaning to Orthodoxy and a defection from Catholicism. Within the Austrian Empire the large Slavic public had lost confidence in the political sagacity of their leaders. There was, of course, after the Congress, not the slightest trace of implementation of all the high-sounding resolutions calling for increased cultural reciprocity between the general Slavic peoples.

About 1870 the vaguely variegated sensitivities and aspirations focussing around the two general concepts of Slavism and Russian expansionism began to coalesce and crystallize. In that year there appeared a small book by General Rostislav A. Fadeyev under the title: *Thoughts on the Eastern Question.*[37] It had passed the censor in 1869. Fadeyev, as a soldier, was primarily interested in strengthening Russia's strategic position and in pointing the way to achieving her natural strategic aims—the control of the Straits. To him the Hapsburg Empire was the principal enemy, and not England and France. As the peoples of the polyglot Empire were mostly Slav, Russia should obviously take them under her wing, and eventually head an all-Slav state. This was Panslavism, clearly put, for Russia's political benefit.

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[34] Kazbunda, K., *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy 1867 a rakouská diplomacie* (Prague, 1924), p. 63, and M. D. Milićević, Etnografska izložba a slovenska sastanak u Moskvi 1867 (Belgrade, 1884), p. 18ff.

[35] The classically bitter report on the Congress is that by Julian Klaczko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" in *Revue des deux mondes* LXI (1867), 132-181. Klaczko, a native of Wilno, had been the editor of the Paris *Wiadomości Polskie*, which ceased publication in 1861. A much more valid short account is that of Louis Léger in *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), pp. 211-249.

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A much more radical and thorough treatment appeared by separate chapters in the periodical *Tsarja* in 1869 and, revised, in book form in 1871: Nikolai J. Danilevski's *Russia and Europe.* He was a trained botanist and geographer, and his broad approach covered questions of race, religion, climate, politics, and strategy. Because of its thoroughness and easily comprehensible conclusions, it became immediately the Bible of Panslavism.[38] Danilevski posited a deep-rooted antagonism between West, that is the Latin and the German, Catholicism and Protestantism, commercialism and pointless diversity, and East, that is the Slav, the orthodox and the ordered universal. Russia had a destiny to realize. She should save the smaller and weaker Slavic peoples from the curse of europeanization. The Poles had indeed gone farthest in that sinister direction, hence the great tension between Russia and the Poles. In their case Russia had had to be severe, but it was properly not with their Slavic nature but with its europeanized, Catholic perversion. The Poles should realize that Russia had had to discipline them for their own salvation. To Danilevski Panslavism, so far as it was good, was Panrussism.

It would be difficult to say which of these two works, Fadeyev on the Eastern Question or Danilevski's *Russia and Europe* had the more in-

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[36] Revertera, on the other hand, had been instructed by Beust in May to give the whole matter no unnecessary notice. The two governments affected not to count it as of any political significance. See Kazbunda, *P[illegible] Cechů do Moskvy,* p. 57. Revertera was recalled the next year by Beust and the Tsar told his successor, Albin Vetsera, that he disliked the whole incident and regretted that it had occurred. "Russia is large enough for me; I want nothing from my neighbor" and disavowed any slightest desire to enitce away from the Emperor any of his Slav subjects. See Kazbunda, *op. cit.,* p. 121f.

[37] English translation by T. Michell (London, 1871), *Opinion on the Eastern Question.* See also Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 400ff.

[38] German translation by Karl Nötsch (Berlin, 1920), somewhat abridged, *Russland und Europa.* See further Beneš, *Uvahy,* pp. 98-107, and the recent study of Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa,* where the focus is on the relation of Danilevski to the church. On p. 238 he calls Danilevski "der eigentliche Systematiker der panslavistischen Weltanschauung."

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● 176 fluence. Their arguments were so dynamic in their implications that
186 together they are a landmark in European psycho-political history. Panrussism
829 now had a divinely appointed mission and a program for political implementation.[39]
668 Those whose interests lay in cultural exchange with their western Slav brothers no longer felt unsupported, and those who had before been politically Pan-Russian could not rejoice in the moral support of the intelligentsia. It was a perfect coalescence of ideals and interests. There is no wonder that Gorchakov, the foreign minister, felt very gratified about the jelling of enlightened public opinion. He had shared the distrust felt by the court at cultural Slavophilism, so vocal at the Moscow Congress. It implied equality among the various Slavic peoples. Russian policy would be much happier if Russia's "leadership" and of course "benevolent" hegemony were generally accepted. It is hardly necessary to mention that the acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy—no longer Greek Orthodoxy—was by now assumed as a *sine qua non* of the whole Slavic program. It is not difficult to see how the atmosphere created by the wide circulation of these two sensational books may have convinced Gorchakov and the court that Ignatyev's reports and suggestions from Constantinople correctly represented the proper policy to be pursued—at least in the interests of Russia.[40] We are here far removed from any semblance of the Panslav sentiments of Kollár, or the Austro-Slavism of the Prague Congress of 1848 or even from the implications of Slav cultural reciprocity so fervently expressed by most of the leaders at the Moscow Congress of 1867. We are dealing with realistic political opportunism which makes use of the slogans and stage illusions evoked by romantic or even philosophical Panslavism. Gorchakov and Ignatyev and certainly—and indeed avowedly—Fadeyev, were quite aware of the political semantics fluttering around the words Slavophilism, Panslavism, Slavic solidarity. The fact that the words sent shivers up and down the spines of western diplomats and at the same time thrilled the Russian people and some western Slavs could only please the anti-western party at the Tsar's court.

In 1874 an Archeological Congress was held in Kiev under the auspices of the Moscow Archeological Society. It was sparsely attended by non-Russian Slavs, about a dozen in all, out of a total of 206 delegates. Several unpleasant incidents at this Congress showed that the resentments and tensions between, particularly, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, were

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[39] See Lednicki, *art. cit.*, p. 845ff., and Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 75ff. Feldman, *op. cit.*, says bluntly: "Unter den Russen vollzieht sich nach dem Jahre 1870 eine Umwandlung der alten slavophilenBewegung in einen selbstbewussten politischen Imperialismus."

[40] On Ignatyev see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff., and his article in *Slavic Review* XI (1932), 343- , 569-

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deep and lasting. Slavic solidarity was certainly not advanced by this meet- 175 ●
ing.[41] 186

It is true that the Bulgarian atrocities precipitated a resurgence, in 8029
Russia herself, of the emotional index of the Panslav idea, but basic polit- 668
ical realities were not thereby at stake. The participation of Russian soldiers as volunteers in the Serbian army could not obscure the fact that Russia already saw clearly that Turkey was no longer a major antagonist. Indeed the Balkan wars of 1876-78 were only an incident which, if anything, confirmed the political Panslavists (*lege* Panrussians) of the necessity to consolidate their political program and its psychological and moral bases for use in a coming struggle with enemies much stronger than the Ottoman Empire. The Russian campaign of 1877-78 could have been lifted bodily from Fadeyev or Danilevski.

The fact that Gorchakov and Ignatyev had to retire from public life after the Treaty of Berlin has several interesting if not ironic aspects. What must have played a large part in their downfall was the fact that their aggressive Panslavism or Pan-Russism or Russian nationalism had gained less for Russia at Berlin than was popularly expected.[42] Yet they themselves, and here lies the irony, were substantially responsible for inducing Russian opinion to expect so much. The significant fact is the generality of the adoption of the Russian nationalistic thesis, and, in retrospect, the large-scale perversion of the thesis of Slav reciprocity. What, less than a half century before, seen from Paris or London, had been a cloud, small as a man's hand, on the eastern horizon, now seemed a swirling thunderhead, about to loose a torrent and a tempest. This menace bore the label Panslavism. No wonder the west shivered at the word. Yet it was by this time in no sense Panslav but pure Russian expansionism.

It would be of interest to examine the trends of thought among the western Slavs in these years. It was among them that the ideas of Slav reciprocity had first arisen. The great Croat leader, Bishop Strossmayer, had not modified his stand in favor of a South Slav federation and cultural reciprocity with the lands of Orthodoxy. Professor Jaroslav Jagić and George Daničić, the renowned South Slav philologists, both advocated a union of the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars. Nowhere among these leaders do we detect any desire to join a larger Slavic world led by Russia, or any urge to make Orthodoxy the common Slav faith.[43] Their insistence on their cultural and political independence constitutes an emphatic rejection of the

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[41] Léger, *Le Panslavisme*.., pp. 242-249. Léger was present at the Congress.

[42] Gorchakov's last years have been frequently discussed. See in brief B. Nolde, *L'Alliance franco-russe* (Paris, 1936), pp. 199ff. and 209ff.

[43] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 347ff.; see also R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), p. 126ff.

175 so-called Panslavism emanating from Moscow in these decades. The fact
186 that, under Magyar rule, any move by South Slavs or Slovaks to cultivate
827 their native language or culture was proceeded against as "Panslavism"
and conseqently regarded as high treason[44] is obviously irrelevant, because
668 erroneous in its factual bases. Palacký in his *Politisches Vermächtnis* observed that he had come to the conclusion that a Russian universal monarchy would mean "violent compulsion, absolute subjugation and enslavement of all civilized Europe, the suppression and suffocation of every free and noble thought and aspiration of the human race." He added that he thought that the enlightened minds of Russia would likewise regard the expansion of Russia westward as a misfortune.[45] He might not have counted Dostoyevski among the enlightened minds of Russia.

The Poles, crushed between Russian and Prussian calculated oppression, sought solace from their dire despair in their own literature and art. It was all that was left them. Memories of the Russian soldiery of Muraviev certainly estopped any warmth of feeling toward the Slavs they knew the most about from personal experience.[46] The less they had to do with the Russians the better. Orthodoxy was Russian and therefore they clung to their Roman Catholicism with deepening gratitude. The Poles were grateful also to Austria for the relative freedom they enjoyed in Cracow and Galicia, and used it to fortify their nationalism in literature and science.[47]

By the end of the century, whether because of absorption into a more potent and definitely programmatic Russian expansionism, or because its vagaries had repelled the western and more rational Slavs, or because the anti-Panslav campaign from Berlin, Paris and London had been effective, or because Russian imperialism was not too successful, the Panslavism of the Prague Congress of 1848, of the Moscow Slavophils, or the Moscow Congress of 1867 or even of Ignatyev, was dead. It might be more exact to say that the ghost had been laid.

The subsidence of the noble sentiments of Slavic reciprocity, of "interslavism," did not mean, however, that the scarecrow of Panslavism was not still usable. Eduard Beneš recently put these developments in urbane terms:

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[44] Cf. the Vakanović memorandum of 1872, quoted by Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* ,p. 13; cf. also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 353f. It would appear that the Magyars were the most consistently fervent believers in Panslavism. At any rate they thought every Slovak was a Panslav. The record contains many instances of such fantasy almost too ludicrous to believe. The most fantastic aspect of this complex is its literal truth. See, e. g. Thomas Capek, *The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism* (New York, 1906), pp. 47-52.

[45] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

[46] Kucharzewski, Jan, *Origins of Modern Russia* (New York, 1948), p. 349ff.

[47] Chlebowski, Bronislas, *La litterature polonaise au XIXe siecle* (Paris, 1933), chs. XXVIII and XXIX; and see Feldman, *op. cit.*, chapter IX, "Aufleben der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Zusammenhange mit modernen sozialen Ideen."

"Panslavism then, up to 1905, solved no question fully, it failed to attain 175
its aims, and could not be transferred into the field of politics in any con- 186
crete form. Finally it became a synonym for Tsarist Russian nationalism and 829
as such, in the form of a political doctrine, could only be prejudicial to all 668
concerned: to the Russians, to the other Slavs, to Europe and to the world. It was harmful to the Slavs because, above and beyond the fact that it was in political fact in great measure a fantasy, it was used and misused against them by their opponents to such an extent that not only the Magyars and the Germans but all of western Europe saw in it a real danger and frequently, because of it, opposed them even where the Slavs were in the right. Against us Czechoslovaks it was for instance used during the first world war and here and there one heard echoes of it even during the second."[48]

The year 1905 brought a marked change, not only in Russia's external prestige and her internal constitutional structure, but also in the attitude of the western and southern Slavs toward the whole question of their own future and the relations between them and Tsarist Russia. Whereas for over a half century, since at least the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, they had consciously or unconsciously looked to powerful Russia for moral or physical support, now, that Russia had been militarily humbled and they found their own strength growing and their interests in their western connections in a more satisfactory perspective, the prospect of a future independent of Russia was not unpleasing. The vestiges of admiration for Russia that remained clouded but did not basically alter the vision of the future that opened out before them.

As for the Poles, who had never accepted the thesis of Russian leadership, the harsh campaign for russification under Alexander III only increased their hatred of everything Russia stood for and their determination to maintain their separate polonism.[49] Among the Czechs and the Slovaks the "realism" of Masaryk, by which he had meant simply that they should trust in their own moral strength and the logic of national development in order to win out over an already corrupt, artificial and doomed monarchy, had made much headway and was destined to capture the dominant place in the people's thought. The South Slavs had not forgotten the disillusionment brought by the Congress of Berlin and had quickly adjusted themselves to the thesis that they should and could make substantial gains in cultural and political autonomy on their own initiative in the Balkan ambit.[50] The coup of 1903 in Belgrade furthermore opened vistas of actual independence from the Hapsburg monarchy. All the western Slavs had sensed vividly for a full quarter century that Russia had been increasingly

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[48] Beneš, *Úvahy o Slovanství*, p. 127f.

[49] Cf. M. Zdziechowski, *Wpływy rosyjskie na duszę polską* (Cracow, 1920), p. 33ff.

[50] Cf. E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1920), p. 121ff.

● 175 disintere[illegible]d, indeed bored, with them and their problems. What fleeting
186 political *rapprochements* took place at top levels did not touch real public
668 opinion save to confirm the general belief that arrangements between dyn-
829 asts, foreign ministers and such like were cynical and opportunistic. In this case at least it would have been difficult to prove this instinctive judgment erroneous.

On a basis of these psycho-political developments among the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and along her borders the decade between 1905 and the outbreak of the war of 1914 witnessed the rise to dominance of what is usually described as Neo-Slavism.[51] The leading and best known exponent and expositor of this short-lived but significant movement was the Czech politician, Dr. Karel Kramář. The essence of this movement, fundamentally indigenous and unconnected with Russia or the accidental fact that Russia was largely Slavic, was an effort to counterweight Central Europe and the Balkans against the aggressive expansion of Germany in every field of political, economic and social life in that area. Seeing that Austria-Hungary was weakening in the face of the steady pressure from the north, the Neo-Slavs even advocated support of the Empire on condition that it be federalized. If Austria-Hungary could be weaned away from Germany and the Triple Alliance broken up, Russia and Austria-Hungary could draw closer together. Pan-Germanism would then be blocked and the western Slavs could move and have their being in this larger atmosphere. Along these lines there was even, *mirabile dictu*, talk of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*. Late in 1905 Swiatkowski, an energetic Russian journalist, proclaimed that the German danger made Slavic cooperation absolutely necessary,[52] and he proceeded to beat the drums for a broad-gauged campaign to bring it about—among the Sokols, in the press, by congresses, by cultural and social relations on every level. He envisaged a political union of some sort, but specifically an economic and customs union to which the non-Slavic states of Central Europe should also be invited. In the next two years the idea grew that it was time for all the Slavs to get together again, as in 1848 and 1867, to further their mutual interests. The leader of the movement in Russia was Lt. Gen. Volodimirov, whose recent retirement left him with time on his hands. He enlisted some publicists and men of letters of a poetic cast of mind, travelled to Warsaw, Cracow and Prague, where he found other optimists.

The second Slavic Congress of Prague, which met in July, 1908, was the result of this agitation. It was attended by represenatives of most, though

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[51] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff. The most complete discussion of this movement is the collaborative work, *Slovanstvo. Obraz jeho minulosti a přítomnosti* (Prague, 1912), with a foreword by Dr. Kramář.

[52] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 507f.

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not all, of the Slavic peoples in Russia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans.[53] The slogans were unity, solidarity, reciprocity, equality and unification, though few if any of the delegates knew precisely what they meant. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish delegation, ostentatiously shook hands with Krasowski, the head of the Russian delegation,[54] and the whole Congress echoed for days with the miracle that had been wrought. It all sounded like the ominous approach of peace and good will. But the fact is that the whole idea behind the Congress was based on a completely untenable assumption: that the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary did not conflict.[55] It can only be charitably said that the organizers of the Congress had, in a greater degree and with even less excuse than their predecessors of 1848 and 1867, failed to think through their program, its logic and its practicability. Questions which the literate man on the street in Prague, Belgrade or Warsaw knew had to be faced either did not appear on the agenda or were greeted by bland smiles and silence. Two further facts highlight the absurdity of the meeting. The old Panrussians, now benignly veneered with liberalism, were in control of the Russian delegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that all their vocal support of the new Slavism was utterly cynical. Neo-Slavism in general and the Prague Congress in particular never aroused any enthusiasm among the Serbs. Roman Dmowski told Beneš in 1917 that his aims at the Congress of 1908 were solely the independence of Poland, and in no sense Slav.[56]

The roseate aura of Slavic amity and hope engendered by the Congress lasted less than three months. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hopes of the western Slavs for an acceptable *modus vivendi* within the then political framework were rudely dashed. The next year it became evident that the promises made to the Poles in Russia in 1905 of modest recognition of their nationalistic feelings were valueless and that reaction was again in the saddle in St. Petersburg.[57]

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[53] Léger, *Le Pansalvisme . . .*, p. 271ff.; Beneš, *op. cit.*, 139ff. A rich source of documentation is the printed (but not published) record of the trial of Kramář, Alois Rašín, V. Červinka and Josef Žamazal, which went on from Dec. 6, 1915, to June 3, 1916. Letters, documents and testimony of all sorts on the whole movement, including the various congresses, are printed *in extenso*. See further Paul Milyukov, "World War and Slavonic Policy" in *Slavonic Review* VI (1927-28), 268-290, particularly interesting in its critique of Kramář's ideas and Beneš' opposition to them.

[54] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Dmowski published this same year his *Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestja Polska* (Lwów) in which he argued that Poland's principal enemy was Germany and that it was to the interest of the Poles and the other western Slavs to support Russia.

[55] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 155f.

[56] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 154f.

[57] One of the resolutions passed at the Prague congress to which most weight was

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Yet there were still pleasantly optimistic souls among the Slavic intellectuals. Another Congress was called for Sofia in 1910. It makes even more fantastic reading than those that preceded it. Dr. Kramář was frequently eloquent. No Pole was present as a delegate. The Russian delegation was almost exclusively conservative. No Ukrainian representative came and the Bulgarian Tsar was ostentatiously absent from Sofia during the Congress. This was the last Slavic Congress before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.[68] Almost everybody save the leading Czech slavophil Dr. Kramář left Sofia fully aware that he had witnessed the *rigor mortis* of an ailing phantom—indeed a cooling thought. The Neo-Slav movement had had a short life and an inglorious end. If it accomplished anything it proved that Slavism as a gospel, so long at least as there was an Austro-Hungarian Empire, had insufficient grounding in the tissues of international relations to have the slightest influence upon the trend of events in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is a commonplace among German historians and analysts of the origins of the first world war that it was essentially a defensive struggle by Germandom against Slavdom. Bethmann-Hollweg made the statement early, and so weighty a study as Fischel's *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* is avowedly devoted to this thesis. But it will hardly bear careful examination. There were Germans on one side—there was a majority of Slavs on the other. But that is more accidental than essential. Along with many Slavic-German issues there was in fact a greater number of issues completely unrelated to the Slavic-German question which in the inevitable logic of history would have had to be decided completely regardless of ethnics and culture. After the war, out of which arose three new or revised west Slavic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the principal inter-Slav questions were solved and there was hardly a whisper of Panslavism. Bolshevik Russia, emphasizing its multinationality and its supranational foundations, in the early years at least, had no interest in Slavic countries *per se*, and Panslavism, Slavophilism, Neo-Slavism and even Pan-Russism became historical curiosities, objects of antiquarian research.

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attached was to the effect that St. Petersburg should be the meeting place of the next Pan-Slav conference the following year. Léger (*op. cit.*, p. 278) says: "l'on se sépara en se donnant rendez-vous pour l'année suivante à St. Petersbourg. Ce rendez-vous ne devait pas se réaliser." S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1929), 401, and B. E. Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 248, mention the congress in the summer of 1909 and the circular letter sent to Slav organizations in the Balkans. The contradiction is only apparent. There was such a conference and such a secret circular, but very few South Slavs attended the meeting. See dispatch from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (German chargé d'affaires in Vienna) to Bethmann-Hollweg of July 25, 1909, in *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 844f.

[68] See the *Kramář-Prozess*, pp. 402-407, for interesting sidelights on the meeting.

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This should cause no surprise. Whenever in the past these national groups had existed as independent states there had not been any discernible urge for exceptional collaboration on a basis of their consanguinity. They had pursued their particular needs, in the same way as France, Italy and Spain, also related by history, language, religion and ethnic bonds, had, throughout their history, tended toward particularism and strenuously rejected any centripetal pressures. It would seem reasonable to allow Slavic peoples to act according to a pattern assumed to be rational and even enlightened farther west.

The Little Enente was, quite accidentally, two-thirds Slav. Its collapse was precipitated by the early defection of Yugoslavia, one of the Slav thirds. The Balkan Entente followed no noticeable Slavic pattern.

The aggressive war of 1939 was variously advertised. It was directed against any people that objected to being nazified, Slav, Teuton, Baltic or Latin. The fourth partition of Poland, shared in equally by Russia and Germany, made it abundantly clear that it was not a war against Bolshevism or of German against Slav. It would have been difficult to arouse among western Slavs any enthusiasm for the Slav idea from August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941.

At this point it is possible to draw some deductions from the history of the variations in Slav feeling. The sense of Slavic community weakened, or perhaps more accurately shuffled into the unrealistic or academic empyrean, in times of peace. Under stress and strain or in times of crisis Slavophilism became again, with the limitations of the moment, an active force.[59] But all wars, the ultimate in national interest, have acted as rapid solvents of these fond dreams. This failure of the idea to stand any real test will explain why we use the term phantom or illusion of the whole concept.

From 1941 on one heard much of Slavic solidarity. There were All-Slav congresses at Moscow in August 1941, April 1942 and May 1943. The Russian speakers emphatically repudiated the political Panslavism and Pan-Russism of the nineteenth century and appealed "for the union of all Slav strength in the struggle against Hitlerism."[60] There was to be a unity of equals with equals, all bound together in a happy family of democratic peoples. Thereafter Slavic committees sprang up and Slavic congresses were held in London, Detroit and Pittsburgh, and in 1945 and following years, in Sofia, Belgrade, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. The themes of all these meetings followed the same lines: rejoicing in new Slav unity

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[59] Cf. A. Mousset, *Le Monde Slave* (2nd. ed., Paris, 1947), p. 385.

[60] Vl. Osmanin, Secretary of All Slav Committee, in May, 1943, quoted by Mousset *op. cit.*

175 under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Whereas the pre-1914 congresses
186 were usually gatherings of professors and publicists, and the realist poli-
529 ticians generally abstained, the post-1941 gatherings were almost exclu-
668 sively made up of politicians and poets. The trained professorate was in
a noticeable minority. It would perhaps be superfluous to quote many of these political leaders on the subject of Slav unity, but it would not be difficult to discover a marvelous, perhaps inspired, unanimity.

There were numerous speeches in all the western Slav capitals which emphasized "the Slavic bloc, directed by the great Russian people"[61] "for the protection of their freedom and democracy."[62] There is no room for question as to what was meant. The signing of every new treaty, of commerce, mutual defense or cultural friendship, was accompanied by headlines, radio propaganda and ministerial banquets, in all of which inter-Slavic devotion was lauded with profound conviction. Ceremonial visits of chiefs of state were exchanged, there were many elaborate parades and happy reunions. In between, naturally, there were visits to Moscow. M. Georgiev, the Bulgarian President, remarked, on landing in Moscow on Jan. 7, 1946: "I am happy to be in the fortress of the Slavic peoples which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of all democratic humanity." M. Vishinsky then visited Sofia.

The years 1946 and 1947 brought electoral and diplomatic victories to Russia. As all the Slavs were now safely enjoying their Slavic solidarity, it was no longer necessary to emphasize Slavism. Marxian Socialism was a more comprehensive concept into which Magyars, Rumanians, Austrians, Germans and Balts could conveniently be made to fit. We have therefore to remark upon the relative silence of western Slavic spokesmen on the subject of Slavic solidarity in the years 1947 and 1948. That stage illusion was no longer necessary, at least in so urgent a fashion as before. On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that it had been completely withdrawn from circulation. The enforcement of Russian language instruction in the schools, the extended tours of Russian artists, authors, scientists and athletes throughout all the Slavic countries, the dominant place in areas of cultural expression, education, science, press, radio, screen and stage, given to the products of Russia, all reveal the underlying plan. It should not be overlooked, furthermore, that the Orthodox Church has, with the support of the Kremlin, been incorporated into the program of implementation of the plan with considerable success in at least Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. Whereas under Tsarist rule the trilogy of

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[61] Quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 237, from Zdeněk Nejedlý, Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

[62] Nikolov, President of Slav Committee, at Sofia, quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p 262f.

175 nationalism, orthodoxy and autocracy was the slogan reserved for Russia
herself, one is justified in remarking that Russian nationalism has now be-
186 come Slavic nationalism or Slavic unity, Orthodoxy is being encouraged
829 outside Russia, and of autocracy throughout the western Slavic states there
668 appears to be quite adequate evidence. We have, on the other hand, little positive proof that thus far the various Slavic peoples love each other more than they did, say in 1860, 1890 or 1935. Titoism rather speaks for itself, and the great popularity of Gomulka in Poland would indicate, if there were any need, the continuity of Polish separatism from time immemorial. A thousand years of determined and consistent western orientation and nationalism are not obliterated in a decade of government by loud speakers, force and fear.

As we look back over the last century of Slav thought, interaction and political mutuality, several broad lines of change strike our notice. In 1848 Slavophil enthusiasm stemmed mostly from within the polyglot Hapsburg monarchy. A century later, not only has this Empire, officially a bulwark of Germanism with all its westward leanings, disappeared, but its place and much more has been taken by the heirs of the Tsars. In 1848 Slavic thought was largely centered on cultural and moral reciprocity. A century later the Slavic nations, under the direction of Russia (excepting, for the moment, Yugoslavia), constitute a solid and ruthlessly integrated political, economic and military unity, more tightly welded with each passing day. But nothing seemed more sure, and indeed necessary, in 1848 than the Hapsburg Empire. Yet that imperial idea was in actuality soon after 1848 rejected by those who had theretofore felt it to be necessary. Under similar circumstances there is every reason to think that the present, stronger than imperial, concept will be rejected. Of their own volition the western Slavs have never in their long history shown any general desire to become part of an inclusive Slav empire. They have at various times experienced the imperial idea only to repudiate it. Nor, in spite of present conditions, is there any evidence that the people of these nations have lost their historic particularism. All the verifiable evidence is in the opposite direction. These peoples have lived long and are wise from bitter experience, a teacher whose lessons last longer than those of ministers of propaganda. Nowhere is the common man more anxious to claim citizenship of the world than in Central Europe, where the western Slavs for much more than this past century have been exposed to the repeated appearances of, only to reject, the phantom of Panslavism.

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no oppressor of the Slavonic race other than the Turk, Krijanich 186*
added the German. He was the ancestor of the Russian 178
Slavophiles of the nineteenth century. He was completely out 538
of harmony with his age, which could not understand an [568]
argument combining the Slavonic idea with Roman Uniatism. He met the usual fate of a precursor. Having offered his services as Librarian to the Czar Alexis Mikaïlovitch, he obtained from Moscow a mission to reform Russian spelling; the manuscript of this work was recovered at Tver in 1888. But it was not long before he was suspected of being a Papist agent, and was deported to Siberia, in circumstances which have never been cleared up. At Tobolsk he drew up a treatise on 'Politics' which, on the lines of Machiavelli's work, was intended to deduce, from the principles of good and evil, the laws of the art of government. Was Peter the Great acquainted with this treatise, and was he influenced by it? Unfortunately, that is a matter which scholarship has not yet been able to decide. After that we lose trace of Krijanich. A Dutch traveller relates that a monk of that name died under the walls of Vienna, in the ranks of Sobieski's army; such would seem to be the crowning adventure of that strange visionary, promoter of a doctrine which was to be revived two hundred years later by a pleiad of thinkers and scholars and which, freed of its denominational utopianism, will remain the 'credo' of the apostles of Slav solidarity.

After the capture of Azov from the Turks by Peter the 186*
Great in 1696, the centre of gravity of Slavonic hopes was fixed 175•
in Russia. If we exclude the Polish point of view, it remained 177
there for more than two centuries. The three reigns of Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Alexander I, helped to awaken the Russian national conscience by contact with the Slavs of the Balkans, Austria, and Hungary. This contact set up currents of mutual influence between sister-nations, discovering each other after long centuries of isolation and mutual ignorance. A Serbian Academician, M. Stoyanovich, published a series of testimonies from Serbs who were contemporaries of Peter the Great, from which it appears that, from this time onwards, the Southern Slavs considered Russian successes as their own.

Readers will not be surprised at the omission here of any 186*
reference to the 'Will of Peter the Great', which the Chevalier d'Eon, of dubious reputation, was said to have brought from

186* Russia to the Court of Versailles. This belongs to the prolific family of apocryphal documents in which the presumed projects of deceased monarchs have found an imaginary embodiment. But this forgery has often been invoked as an argument in favour of the existence of 'Panslavism'. Now, it does contain a programme of Russian expansion, and allusions to the Balkan Christians, but nothing more specifically affecting the Slavs. Which proves, at the very least, that his own contemporaries did not regard the founder of Modern Russia as the instigator of a policy of Slav solidarity.

186* ● 175 648 Under Catharine, every war against the Ottoman Empire was the occasion of levies of Slav contingents. After the failure of their risings, large bodies of Slavs took refuge in the South of Russia, where vast districts were allotted to them. During the Napoleonic wars, Admiral Seniavin's fleet, at the Cattaro Delta, assisted the combined Montenegrins and Serbs. But, at the Congress of Vienna, a failure on the part of Russian diplomacy caused the Cattaro Delta to be handed back to the Austrians. It was alleged that Alexander I had agreed to this betrayal of the Slavs, as the price of a night spent with the beautiful Madame de Metternich. Notwithstanding, Suvorov's victories prepared the way for the Serbian insurrection; when this broke out, the Russian general, O'Rurck, joined Karageorge, to beat the Turkish army at Varvarino, to the north of Nish.

Up to the nineteenth century, the Empire of the Tsars remained aloof from the European concert. When it did join in, through the expedient of the Holy Alliance, it espoused interests which were not its own, and for which, moreover, it showed little concern, by backing up the Balkan risings. In this way it tried its utmost to sponsor solidarity among the absolutist régimes, while at the same time supporting the Orthodox minorities.

186* 178 814 But the movement whose watchword was defence of 'brothers in race', did not arise in official circles. It was a creation of the 'intelligentsia'. It received its first impetus from the immense work of the German historical school in the second third of the nineteenth century. 'Sanctus amor patriae dat animum', the epigraph to the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, inspired Chafarik's *Slavonic Antiquities* in 1837, and Palatsky's *History of Bohemia*. The Slavs threw themselves passionately into these

studies, and allowed themselves to be infected with that racial 186*
pride which German science displayed, with a tremendous orgy 178
of texts and compilations. 814

Kollár, a Slovak, Koukouljevich, a Croat, Kopitar and Stanko Vraz, two Slovenes, with Vuk Karajich, a Serb, formed the pleiad of romantic scholars and men of letters who revealed to the Slav peoples the common basis of their culture and their traditions. Their scientific offensive, which Renan was to call, somewhat disdainfully, 'Comparative Philology transplanted to the political domain', was the prelude to an era of ferment, when far-seeing minds could foretell the catastrophe which would abolish the work of the Congress of Vienna. Never had pure learning let loose such a storm. It was destined to pile up, under the throne of the Habsburgs, the explosive forces whose work of destruction has been completed under our eyes.

The movement was precipitated by the recrudescence of 186*
racial antagonism in Hungary. The 1848 Revolution had scat- 175•
tered powder-trails throughout Europe. Austria-Hungary found 648
herself, in the years that followed, a prey to two opposing 668
currents, representing the different life-aspirations, rather than political conceptions, of two enemy groups among the nations of this heterogeneous Empire. While the Liberals of Vienna, in revolt against absolute power, marched in unison with the Frankfurt Parliament, and included in their ranks the Germans of Austria; while the Magyar Liberals broke with the Habsburgs and bore Kossuth to power, the Slavs of Cis-Leithania and Trans-Leithania, by a repercussion natural to oppressed races, rebelled against tendencies aiming at the strengthening of the two hegemonies, Germanic and Magyar. The ethnical crisis attained its peak in Hungary, where the Croats marched to the defence of the throne under the leadership of the Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, while the Slavs of Hungary (Slovaks and Serbs) kicked against the persecutions of a régime which Western journalism confused with Parliamentary Liberalism. Russia intervened in 1849 not only, as was long believed, to save the monarchical principle, but also under moral obligation not to let the Slavs of Hungary succumb. By the victory of Vilagos, the Russian armies restored to the Habsburgs Hungary, which they were on the point of losing. Six years later Austria, by her anti-Russian attitude in the Crimean War, was, according to a famous

186* saying, to astound the world by her ingratitude. It is said that
•175 Nicholas I, towards the end of his reign, visited Warsaw and,
648 standing thoughtfully in front of Sobieski's statue, said: 'That's
668 the first of the fools who worked for the Habsburgs. And I was the second'.

175 It was in the thick of these racial tussles that the Slav peoples
186 held their first conclaves. Bohemia, the most civilised of the
668 Slav nations, was the first to extend her hand to her sisters. By way of a counter-stroke to the German Assembly in Frankfurt, the Slav Congress took place in Prague in June, 1848. Object: the establishment of periodical relations between the Slav peoples and the drawing up of a programme of action for such of those
[171] peoples as were subject to Austrian or Magyar domination. The language spoken at the Congress was German, then regarded as the Esperanto of the Slavs, thus enabling the Germans to claim the Slavs as belonging to their *Geistesleben*. This Congress, attended by three hundred and sixty-three members, under the chairmanship of the Czech historian, Palatsky, was divided into three sections: Russo-Polish, Jugoslav, and Czechoslovak. Whilst protesting its loyalty to the Habsburgs, it claimed, for the Slav populations, the rights and guarantees granted to the Germans and the Magyars. Outbreaks occurred in Prague after this meeting, and the manner in which they were repressed showed that the Slavs could not expect much from Vienna. Once more, the eyes of the Slavonic world turned towards Russia.

186 Bakunin, in his *Confession*, has left us a picturesque sketch
668 of this Congress of Prague. He had pleaded the cause of the Russian revolution, and of the Federative Republic of all Slavs. 'The Slavs', he said, 'are real children, but I have found among them an unbelievable freshness, and incomparably greater innate intelligence and energy than among the Germans. The Slavs' predominating sentiment is hatred of the Germans. The forceful, if not very polite, expression, "accursed German" ("*prokliatni Nometz*") pronounced alike in nearly all the Slavonic dialects, has produced an incredible result in every Slav. . . . Hatred of the Germans formed the inexhaustible topic of all conversations; it served as a greeting between strangers. . . . As regards the Congress itself, it was, like all the other political

[I. Slav Congress, June 1848 – Analyst]

Chapter Three

THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIONALITIES, OR SLAVISM WITHOUT RUSSIA

THE 1914–1918 War has often been regarded as a settling 186
of accounts between Slavs and Teutons. And it was 175 ●
certainly the Germans who did the most to popularise this oversimplified
viewpoint. At the time of the Balkan crisis, Bethmann-Hollweg,
the Chancellor of the Reich, reduced the possibility of a
European war to a struggle between Teutonism and Slavism:
Ein Kampf zwischen Germanentum und Slawentum. For his
part, General von Moltke wrote, on February 12, 1913:
'Sooner or later will come the war between Germanism and
Slavism, for which all the standard-bearers of Germanic culture
and spirit must prepare'.

At the time when it was formulated, this prophecy might 177
have been found surprising. Indeed, in the course of the ages, 167
Teutonism had secured solid positions against the Slavs, whom,
in nine centuries, it had pushed back from the Elbe to the Vistula.
It had colonised, plundered, or subdued their western tribes.
It penetrated into Russia by two means—the Baltic nobility, and
dynastic marriages. Eleven Tsars or Tsarinas since Peter the
Great were either of German blood or under German matrimonial
influence. This fact alone will give an idea of the
fatality which, since the eighteenth century, weighed upon the
destiny of Russia. In face of this infiltration, we think of the
terrible phrase addressed by Skobelev to a delegation of Serbian
students in Paris: 'In our own country, we are not at home'.
In short, history presented itself to the Teutons as an uninterrupted
process of absorption of their eastern neighbours, or of
domination over their politics.

Moreover, von Moltke's prophecy implied a Slav solidarity 186*
which was then in the realm of conjecture. History offered no 578
recent example of it. In 1848, the Slavs had nearly all fought 175
for a cause which was foreign to, even if not opposed to,
Slavism. In 1885, and again in 1913, the Serbs and the Bulgars
had cut each others' throats. And twelve months later, in 1914,

186* the Slavs were to split up between the two camps into which
578 Europe would be divided. So that, except in congresses, where
• 175 ethnography and philology were discussed, this solidarity
remained a myth. Russian egoism bore heavily upon the little 'Pravoslav' countries, in which the Tsarist policy affected to take an interest. Much more than that; certain territories, caught between two Slavonic currents—such as Macedonia, the Ukrainian Marches, the Teschen district of Silesia—kept alive the spirit of dissidence within the Slavonic family.

175 What remained of von Moltke's declarations was the
167 obsession of an inevitable reckoning between the two races.
Germany, who, from age to age, had extended her sphere of domination at the expense of the Slavs, dimly felt that, one fine day, the latter would grow tired of the role of 'fertilisers' (*Düngervolk*) to which the Pan-Germanic school condemned them. In Merovingian times, a slow but continuous migration, by easy stages, peopled the Eastern Teutonic states with Slavs. These tribes had reached the Elbe and the Oder by the fourth century. To designate the Teutonic peoples, they forged the collective appellation, *Niemtse,* which has remained in the modern vocabulary of the Slavonic peoples, and signifies 'dumb ones', *i.e.,* speaking a language unintelligible to Slavs. But, little by little, the ebb of the Teutonic tribes pushed them back. With the exception of a few descendants of the Pomeranians (the Kachoubes and the Slovinces) and of the Sorabes (Lusatians), the vast group of Western Slavs of the Elbe and the Baltic disappeared in the struggle waged against them by the Germans in the four centuries from the time of Charlemagne to the twelfth century.

829 This withdrawal is explained by the state of dissension—a
167 hereditary defect with the Slavs—in which these populations
181 lived. An Austrian historian of this century, J. Peisker,[1] was
so struck by such a large-scale backward drive, that he sought a different explanation for it. The past, he said, shows such a succession of conquests, and establishments of Teutonism in Slavonic territory, that we cannot attribute it to the fortune of war. We are obliged to suppose the existence of some factor which paralysed the resistance of the Slavs. This factor must

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113 [1] *Die Alteren Beziehungen der Slawen zu Turkotataren und Germanien.* Berlin, 1905.

186* 728 nations, the better they understand each other; witness the Poles and the Bulgarians, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. But to say that living side by side no more ensures agreement among nations than it does among individuals is to state a commonplace.

[578] Yet the reshuffling of the map did, nevertheless, satisfy the essential aspirations of the Slavs. It gave Yugoslavia her unity, Czechoslovakia her independence, Poland her liberty. But some irredentism still remained. Bulgaria claimed Macedonia (although she had lost it before the war). The Yugoslavs regretted that the Slovenes of Istria and Carinthia had remained outside the frontiers of their State, Poland remained in dispute with Russia on her Eastern Marches, and with Czechoslovakia in the Teschen Basin. The Ukraine question was assuming a fresh form and acuteness. Even after the recasting of Eastern Europe, there still remained seeds of discord between the Slavonic nations.

131 • 175 Much more; looked at as a whole, the new map seemed to be based on an age-long law which shuts the Slavs off from the sea. It was because it was cut off from all the seas that the original Slavia remained as unknown to the Ancients as Central Africa was to the Europeans of fifty years ago. One after the other the Scythians, the Sarmatians, the Goths, the Huns, the Avars, the Khazars, the Tartars, all barred them from the Black Sea. It was not until the eighteenth century that the Russians became effective masters of the northern shore of this sea. Similarly with the Baltic, where Scandinavian, Finnish, and Baltic peoples settled; until the Second World War, Leningrad was a Slavonic breach in Finnish territory. As for the White Sea, it was inaccessible to the Russians before the sixteenth century. The Finns, and perhaps the Lapps, had got in before them.

728 131 175 Now the 1919–1920 treaties took the Baltic territories and Finland from Russia. They refused Danzig to Poland, Fiume and Trieste to Yugoslavia. Following the coasts of the Baltic, from the borders of Esthonia to the Free Port of Danzig there was no real Slavonic port, even though the hinterland might be entirely populated with Slavs. On the Adriatic, the Dalmatian coast offered nothing but indifferent outlets, backed by steep slopes—and yet the hinterland was wholly Slavonic. The Aegean had no Slavonic outlet. The Slavs were allowed no possibility of becoming maritime powers, capable of rivalling the Germanic,

Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war 728
had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect. 131

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one— 175 •
in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses [186]
which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czecho- [563]
slovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration—to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the 648
Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the 829
relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as passwords.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav rela- 648
tions. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused 578

Chapter Four

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE SLAV LIBERATION FRONT

THE historians of the future will be struck by one fact which 721
seems to escape those of our own day, and which we 648
consider below. 175

Whereas the wars of the nineteenth century originated in, or had as pretexts, disputes localised in different parts of the globe—Spanish Succession (1823 and 1870), the affair of the Duchies, Italian unity, German unity, the protection of the Holy Places, etc.—the thunder-clouds which foreshadowed the wars of the twentieth century all burst in a Slavonic sky.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 created the atmosphere which favoured the germination of the Italo-Turkish War and of the Balkan Wars. The Sarajevo outrage in June, 1914, was the pretext for the First World War. The Sudetenland crisis in 1938, which led to the Runciman mission, was the prologue to the Munich bargaining. The whole of the preliminary phase of the Second World War was enacted on Slav territory.

Contrary to all international engagements, the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938, sanctioned the mutilation of Czechoslovakia, in whose history this Conference will remain as a 'second White Hill'.

Then occurred various 'Slavonic episodes', as preludes to the general conflagration. Poland occupied Teschen on October 2, 1938. A few days later Slovakia proclaimed her autonomy. On November 2, the Ribbentrop-Ciano arbitration award, pronounced in Vienna, transferred the eastern part of Czechoslovakia (Sub-Carpathia) to Magyar rule.

On March 15, 1939, 'President' Hacha handed over to the Führer the fate of Bohemia; Hitler entered Prague—Czechoslovakia was wiped off the map.

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a ten-year pact of non-aggression. Reassured on the Russian side, Germany turned against Poland. Incidents were multiplied

721 in Danzig; German criminals, dressed in Polish uniforms,
648 attacked German villages in Upper Silesia to provide Hitler with
• 175 the pretext for an invasion. This was launched on September 1,
at 5.45 a.m. The curtain was raised for the greatest drama in
history.

186* But, beyond this, the historian who, with these
578 facts as his starting-point, sought to establish synchronism
648 between the feeling of a common destiny among the Slavs and
the great wars of the twentieth century would very soon conclude that no such feeling existed. At all times of threatened crisis, there have appeared more or less general impulses towards *rapprochement*; the first result of all actual crises has been to set the Slavs one against the other. In this Second World War, as in that of 1914–1918, we were again to find the Bulgars, the Croats, and the Slovaks ranged with Germany, Bohemia trampled upon, Poland quartered, Serbia crucified, Russia at grips with the Teutonic colossus.

Much more: the Slavs participated in the spoils. Poland rewarded herself at Czechoslovakia's expense, Russia at Poland's, and Bulgaria at Serbia's.

175 Just as the 1914–1918 war had started with the crushing of
648 Serbia, so that of 1939 had as its prologue the carving-up of
721 Czechoslovakia. The latter succumbed to the fate which had
forced her to look for support to the Western Democracies, with whom she had no territorial connection, and whose diplomacy, wavering or swept along by the back-wash of internal policy, had been able neither to ensure peace nor to provide for war. The inconsequentiality of France, signing a pact with Moscow, then hastening to evade its consequences, encouraging Yugoslavia to be on her guard against Fascist megalomania, then signing the Four-Power Pact and observing it no more than she had done the previous pacts; all this culminated in the Munich Pact, which—whether justified or not by our military unpreparedness—completed the state of confusion among the nations for whom France was the greatest asset in peace as in war.

It was not only by its inaugural phase—the dismembering of Czechoslovakia and the aggression against Poland—that the war once again seemed destined to become a reckoning between Slavs and Teutons. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had reproached

William II for never having acquired new lands in the east. 175*
It was not, at that time, a question of fighting Communism, but 648
of 'living space'—a theory which, in Nazi ideology, was directed 721
at the States bordering Eastern Germany and, beyond them, the 'fabulous resources' (*unerhörte Möglichkeiten*) of the Ukraine. Once more the Teuton resumed his age-long vocation of 'consumer of Slavs'.

But, looking closer into the matter, this was not, any more 186*
than in 1914, the essential cause of the Pan-Germanic explosion. 829
Hitler's Germany was aiming higher, and farther. Actuated by 721
what she considered to be a prime necessity of her geographical situation and of her 'racial pre-eminence', she regarded herself as the providential elaborator of new syntheses calculated to regenerate the world—but which were, in reality, simply the oldest of hegemonic appetites. It was not upon the Slavs that she declared war; it was upon a form of civilisation made up of Humanism and Christianity which the centuries had identified with the habitable world. The Slavs were the first victims of the *Wehrmacht,* simply because they were considered to be the easiest obstacle to overcome, owing to the inferiority complex which, from time immemorial, the German school had attributed to them. Their geographical position condemned them to be the target for the first onslaught. But the Slavonic world was subjected to unprecedented trials in all the different phases of the war—Czech, Polish, Balkan, Russian. Therein lay the real, the only 'Slavonic' aspect of this war—the recurrence of the periodic catastrophe which crushes these nations as soon as Europe is unleashed against herself.

So March 15, 1939—the date of the occupation of Prague 186*
by Hitler's troops—aroused deep emotion among the Southern Slavs, who realised that the dyke which had hitherto held back the German drive on Eastern Europe had collapsed. There were manifestations of sympathy in Belgrade and in Sofia, especially among the students; messages flowed into Prague from all the Slavonic regions in the Balkans.

Germany herself seems to have had some obscure realisation of 186*
her crime. A curious article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 829
April 23, 1939—an article whose author foresaw the opprobrium that this 'operation' was to cast upon his country—endeavoured to reconcile the policy of the 'Protectorate' of Bohemia with the

186* 829 conceptions of romantic Germany, and with Herder's 'Slavophilia'. He made every effort to show that a nation's interest does not necessarily lie in its elevation to the rank of a sovereign State, but that it may find its development in a subordination of national aspirations to political necessities. 'Geographical and historical facts, and political realities', he said, 'today play their part on an equal footing with the principle of nationalities'.

What the author meant by 'political realities' was to be judged in the light of the volleys of firing which mowed down the students of the University of Prague, guilty of having manifested their attachment to the Czech fatherland.

648 175 The subsequent course of events is too recent to need recalling here. The whole edifice of guarantees, built up to support peace, collapsed like a house of cards; twenty years of vague conceptions of security were swallowed up into the abyss that was to engulf the ruins of a world built up by ten centuries of patience and human genius. The Pacts of the Little Entente, gradually voided of their contents,[1] remained inoperative; Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations—rendered optional at the request of Poland—did not have to be put into operation; the Polish-Soviet Pact of non-aggression of July 25, 1932, extended in 1934 to December 31, 1945, and reaffirmed on November 26, 1938, remained a dead letter; the 'constant peace and eternal friendship' stipulated in the first clause of the Hungarian-Yugoslav pact concluded on December 12, 1940, and ratified on February 27, 1941, lasted five weeks; as for the 'perpetual friendship' sworn between Bulgarians and Yugoslavs on January 24, 1937, it lasted fifty months, to say nothing of the Salonica Pact concluded on July 31, 1938, between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente. The multiplication of security-pacts ended in making them completely ineffective. *In corruptissima republica leges plurimae.*

If Germany's designs on Bohemia and Poland were clear—too clear—the same could not be said of her position in the Balkans. At the most she claimed to put an end to what she called 'the state of anarchy created by the 1919–1920 treaties in the Balkan-Danubian region'.

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[1] In February, 1940, the minutes of the Balkan Conference contained no reference to the territorial *status quo*.

The first pawn she[1] moved upon the chess-board was Bulgaria. 648
On March 1, 1941, the Government of Sofia adhered to the 175 Tripartite Pact with a ceremonial which had the Belvedere in Vienna as its setting. A communication from the *Political and Diplomatic Correspondence* of Berlin announced the news to the world, and added: 'Henceforth Bulgaria is numbered among the nations who enjoy equal status, who will in future serve only their own interests, to the exclusion of all others'. The terms of this adhesion had been 'discussed' on the previous November 17, during an interview between Hitler and King Boris at Berchtesgaden. At least one of the conditions was learned on the day the pact was signed; that very day, the Bulgarian Government notified the U.S.S.R. of the entry of German troops into Bulgaria 'to maintain peace within the country'. It was the first manifestation of a policy which the Bulgarian press was to designate 'passive belligerence'.

In face of pressure from Germany, what could the Bulgarian Government do? Three solutions were open to them—to resist by force, to make a diplomatic protest, to give way. The first was out of the question, the second would have added the drawbacks of a refusal to those of actual acceptance. In Sofia they judged the third solution to be the most 'realistic', and the only one that could save what remained to be saved.

In order to appease public opinion, the President of the Council, Bogdan Filov, declared in the Sobranje that 'Berlin had not demanded anything which ran counter to the obligations arising from the treaties concluded between Bulgaria and her neighbours'. And the *Zaria,* of Sofia, summed up its commentary as follows: 'Bulgaria has just decided her fate of tomorrow'. The press was almost unanimous in seeing in the country's adhesion to the Axis the road which should lead her to the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly, to the realisation, so often glimpsed, so often lost again, of a Great Bulgaria.

But the Macedonian psychosis did not prevent thoughtful people from remembering the evil genius of Bulgarian crises and their antecedents—the Balkan Wars and the catastrophe of 1918. Russia was still the ally of Germany. But who could believe that this *entente,* already beginning to show signs of wearing thin, would last until the end of the war? And if not, would it not be Moscow who would act as arbitrator for the destiny of Eastern

[1. Germany – Analyst]

648 Europe? In November, 1939, on presenting his credentials, the
175 first Soviet diplomat accredited to Sofia had made an unusual and emphatic allusion to the 'historical relationship' of the two countries. Consequently, in Moscow they expected an understanding, if not deferential, attitude on the part of Bulgaria. And so the population was profoundly moved on learning, on March 3, 1941, that the Soviet Government had just indicated, in a fairly stiff note, that they did not share the opinion of the Filov Cabinet, and that the latter's attitude seemed directed rather towards territorial expansion than to the consolidation of peace.

Bulgaria's position then became more and more critical. A Soviet note blamed her adhesion to the Axis. And, with the German-Russian War, began a series of incidents which strained to the utmost the relations between Russians and Bulgarians. In July, the Moscow Government denounced concentrations of troops on the Turkish frontier and preparations, co-ordinated with those of the Axis Powers, for an attack on the Straits.

Sofia denied these accusations. Moscow returned to the attack on September 12 with a note enumerating seven 'facts which the Soviets declared they considered as so many acts of hostility towards them' (movements of German troops, utilisation of aerodromes, ports, railways, etc.). On September 15 the Filov Cabinet again proclaimed their innocence: they had never exceeded the bounds of neutrality.

This diplomatic duel was accompanied by a chorus of violent press polemics concerning incidents, real or imaginary, alternately announced and denied over the air—the projection of Soviet bombs on Bulgarian territory, descent of 'Red' parachutists, acts of sabotage, acts of violence, etc.

And, in the background, was a continual, dogged propaganda tending to strengthen diplomatic action by exploiting both the economic difficulties of the Bulgarian people and the old theme of Russophile affinities. The note of September 12 had discreetly distinguished between the Sofia Government and the 'country'. Agitation was organised in working-class circles. The governing classes retorted by reinforcing the law for the protection of the State. There were executions.

Within a few weeks, Bulgaria saw herself faced with a problem no less social than national.

If the Soviet reaction left any room for doubt, this was entirely removed on the occasion of the drama which was played out in Belgrade in the last week of March, 1941. On the 25th of that month, the Yugoslav Premier, Tsvetkovich, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsintsar Markovich, were received by Hitler and signed Yugoslavia's adhesion to the Tripartite Pact in Vienna. Forty-eight hours later a *coup d'état* put General Simovich in power. Rising magnificently, the Serbian people, more clear-sighted than their leaders, and faithful to their tradition of independence, had swept away the pusillanimous ministers who had just put the country at the feet of the oppressor. War was inevitable. At Vichy, when Pourich, the Yugoslav minister, announced his King's decision to Admiral Darlan, the latter said to him quizzingly: 'How many divisions have you, for resisting Germany?' And Pourich replied: 'Sir, that is a question we never ask in my country. We fight first, and count afterwards'.

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There you have the whole heroic philosophy of the Serbian people. Russia greeted Belgrade's *coup d'état* by signing, on April 5, a pact of friendship and non-aggression with the new Government. She could not do more to indicate where her sympathies lay. *Pravda* recalled the fact that the relations between the two countries had steadily improved since May, 1940, when diplomatic contact had been resumed. But Belgrade learned the news of this pact simultaneously with that of the German attack, which took place a few hours later. To justify this aggression, Hitler enumerated a certain number of complaints, the first of which was a reminder of the Sarajevo outrage. That day, he had no doubt forgotten one of the sentences in *Mein Kampf*: 'It was the hand of the goddess of eternal law and of inexorable punishment that struck down Austrian Germany's most deadly enemy, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand'.[1]

Bulgaria took advantage of the German victory to reoccupy Macedonia, and on May 18[2] the Bulgarian flag was hoisted at Skoplje. She announced that she would limit her occupation to the lands she considered as *irredenta*. Needless to say, the appeal which the Yugoslavs broadcast from London, on the following

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[1] French translation (1934), p. 26.

2 [1941 -- Analyst]

186* June 9, in the name of 'Slavonic fraternity', met with no • 175 response in official quarters. The *Dnes*, of Sofia, replied that 648 Slavism was a myth, and that, moreover, Russia was not Slavonic.

But, even supposing that Slavism was a myth, Russia was a reality. Once again Slav solidarity appeared in its negative aspect. Bulgaria declared war on the United States and on England; to the very end, she maintained her diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., thus showing herself more 'Russophile' than King Ferdinand's Government had been in 1915.

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648 175 Mistress of the Balkans and of Danubian Europe, Germany set up her 'order' in those parts. None of the formulas on which the structure of the Balkan world had been modelled in the past had succeeded in conciliating national aspirations with the tranquillity of Europe. The notion of equilibrium had condemned the Balkan-Danubian States to chronic readjustments, under cover of which the small nations had been made to pay the cost, first of the disputes and then of the reconciliations, of the Great Powers. The hegemony of the large empires (Turkey, Austria-Hungary) had perhaps improved material living conditions for the masses, but it had led to *irredentism* and terrorism. The principle of the *nationalities* (1919–1940) had achieved empirical justice, but had split Europe up into atomic units at the very moment when the progress of communications would have rendered desirable the economic equipment of vast areas. In the crisis that followed the failure of the Creditanstalt, the standard of living of certain Balkan populations fell below what it had been during the Turkish period.

The tangle of races, religions, and historical affinities represented in this region makes any 'rational' solution impossible. Hitler said so himself, in a speech of April 28, 1939: 'I have never left in doubt the fact that it is intrinsically almost impossible to harmonise political and ethnical frontiers to every one's satisfaction'.

But Hitler did more than say this—he proved it. If his principles had triumphed, the Balkan-Danubian world would have been permeated by more irredentism than there had been in the time of the 'Diktat'.

In the first place, the 'Balkanisation' or splitting up with which the Europe of 1920–1938 was reproached was not reduced under German domination, but rather aggravated. The number of small States had increased by three (Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro). The 'corridors' and 'wedges' were more numerous, the general configuration more irregular than ever.

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In the second place, the number of malcontent countries, too, had strangely increased. Before the war there were only two, Hungary and Bulgaria. In 1942 there were five—Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Rumania, and Slovakia; Bulgaria herself, disgusted at losing the western borders of Macedonia to Albania, was threatening to join the ranks of the malcontents. Exercising violence, cynicism, and corruption by turns, Hitler's Reich succeeded only in creating two phases of antagonism, first setting the Balkan nations one against the other, then regrouping them all against itself. The Reich gave the name of 'allies' to nations which were all hostile to it, including some which only joined it in order to secure its support against their neighbours when the time came for a final reckoning. The essence of civilisation is a certain ability to forget; the most backward nations live on a heritage of resentments which forms an obstacle to any policy of unification. And, on the other hand, the régime of conquest ruins the psychological foundations of the reorganisation which it claims to make. Although no European region stood in greater need of rationalisation than the Danube Basin, the nebulous declamations of the Nazi prophets regarding the economic systematisation of the continent missed the mark. In the autumn of 1943, to remedy the disastrous consequences of Italy's volte-face, Neubacher, the representative of the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Balkans, endeavoured to arrange a Conference of the Peninsular States in order to establish a Balkan Confederation within the framework of the 'New Europe', but he met with refusal or scepticism everywhere. Even those of the Balkan-Danubian States who were fighting side by side with the Reich were only awaiting an opportunity to come to blows. Not a day passed but brought news of riots accompanied by bloodshed in the transferred territories—Bulgars versus Albanians, Greeks versus Bulgars, Rumanians versus Hungarians. And all this turbulence was taking place on the margin of resistance to the oppressor—at first masked, then open.

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There was something else they forgot in Berlin—the fact that the prestige of the Reich, in the whole of this sector, was doubly handicapped—handicapped by a generalised scorn of death and by the state of mind of peasants who, having seen, in one and the same generation, the collapse of Ottoman Turkey, Tsarist Russia, and the Habsburg Empire, instinctively failed to consider any hegemonic experiments as permanent. The majority of these nations have been hardened to defeat, as well as to recovery; consequently they believe neither in lasting adversity nor in the permanence of strength. They are the uncertain factor in the European pattern.

In short, in the brief historical parenthesis represented by the domination of the Axis in Eastern Europe, there was no elimination, but first transfer and then coalition of irredentisms. We may say that the incoherence of the concepts elaborated by the Axis Powers and their inability to remedy it, were the best retrospective justification of the treaties which had put an end to the previous war, though this should not lead us to underestimate their errors and omissions.

The decisive turning-point of the war—Russia's entry into the campaign—will remain a key-event in the history of the Slavonic peoples. At the moment when this occurred, some tens of millions of Slavs were perishing under Nazi oppression. It was impossible for this mortal duel between two giants not to flood their hearts with tremendous hope, replacing the discouragement that the unnatural *entente* sealed in Moscow had caused them. The war of which Russia was, for several years, to bear the heavy burden was a real 'war of liberation'. For the first time, in a political speech, made to the Soviet Assembly in Moscow on November 6, 1941, Stalin used the expression 'Russian people' (*Rouski Narod*) in preference to 'Soviet Union'. 'These people (the Nazis), devoid of conscience and honour, have the cynicism to summon the nations to the destruction of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanovs, Lenins, Bilenskys and Tchernichevskys, Pushkins and Tolstoys, Gorkys and Tchekhovs, Setchenovs and Pvalovs, Rapins and Surikovs, Suvorovs and Kutusovs'. To this panorama of Russian genius he added a solemn pledge, calculated to reassure the nations of Eastern Europe, as to the price of the liberty he promised them and which he was to bring them. 'We have no intention of

conquering foreign territories or of annexing other nations. . . . 648
Nor do we intend to impose our will and our régime *on the* 175•
Slavonic peoples or on the other oppressed nations of Europe
who are awaiting our aid'.

Russia, Slavonic peoples, liberation—these words sounded 186*
like a rallying-call around notions long vague and confused, 175
suddenly taking shape in the Titanic conflict in which the 648
destiny of the civilised nations was the stake. Bethmann-Hollweg's war-cry: *Germanentum gegen Slawentum* took on an entirely new meaning. The Teutons had conquered the territories where the first Slavonic tribes had camped; Ferdinand II had broken Czech independence; Frederick had annexed Silesia and Poland; Hitler appropriated Bohemia, Poland, Slovenia, Serbia, and the Ukraine. He chained Croatia and Slovakia to his ephemeral chariot of victory. He was the greatest spoliator of Slav territory that history had ever known. In a sketch broadcast in America, the two Czech comedians, Voskovec and Werych, were discussing the war. 'Who is the greatest man humanity has produced?' asked one. 'Opinions differ', said the other. 'No, no doubt about it, it's Hitler'. 'How can you say such a thing?' 'Yes, Hitler. He is the first statesman to make the Slavs agree among themselves'.

This *entente* was strengthened during the following months, as a result of Russia's policy towards the various countries in revolt against the Hitlerian occupation and also as a result of the Congresses which were held from 1942 to 1944, both in Soviet territory and in the New World.

The old Slavonic instinct of rebellion was rediscovering its traditional weapons—bombs and meetings—and their efficacy increased as German power, undermined by revolt, collapsed. Out of the 5,000,000 Slav 'workers' mobilised by Sauckel, only 200,000 were volunteers.

If we leave out of account the German occupation régime, which in Czechoslovakia took the name of 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' and in Poland that of 'General Government', if we ignore the case of Dalmatia (Zara, Spalato, Cattaro) attached to Italy by a decree of May 18, 1941, and that of Montenegro, which proclaimed its 'independence' on July 13, 1941, but five months later was placed under the authority of an Italian governor, there remain two Slavonic States, Slovakia and

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Croatia, to bear witness to the 'European Order' dreamed of by Hitler and Mussolini.

Slovakia was for long the most outcast of the Slavonic nations. From her went out the first call for Slav solidarity, and it was one of her sons, the priest Jean Kollar, who founded romantic Slavism. Kollar had studied in Jena with the historian, Luden. He had participated in the Wartburg Festival. Every one knows of the disputes the Slovaks had, between the two wars, with the Czechs, whom they accused of practising exaggerated centralism. The anti-Czech elements took advantage of the Czechoslovak crisis to proclaim the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939—the same day as the notification of that of Carpatho-Ukraine, immediately occupied by Hungarian troops. Ten days later the country, presided over by a priest, Joseph Tiso, signed the so-called 'protection treaty' (*Schutzvertrag*) which placed it under the domination of the Reich. The latter guaranteed for twenty-five years the 'political independence' and the territorial integrity of the Slovak State. The head of the Government, Tuka, gave to the German-Slovak friendship the name of *Schutzfreundschaft*. A very active Germanophile minority had always existed in the country: the Popular Party of Hlinka (another ecclesiastic) had maintained close relations with the German Party of the Sudetes, whose propaganda, organised by Conrad Henlein, was one of the immediate causes of the war. As far back as September, 1939, Slovakia was represented by a few modest contingents in the campaign against Poland. Her Government was to pride itself on having been the first to bank on a German victory, and for this reason was to claim a sort of 'right of seniority' among the allies of the Hitlerian Reich. It adhered to the Tripartite Pact on November 28, 1940, and appeared to feel it a great honour to see Slovakia, with her two and a half million inhabitants, put on the same footing as Italy and Japan. 'By receiving us', said President Tuka, 'the German Reich has openly and solemnly placed us in the company of independent states'.

This honour was worth a few sacrifices—particularly of the patriots who had formed a different idea on the matter of independence. On his return from Salzburg, where he had seen the Führer, Tuka announced that it would be a National Socialist State. It was necessary to bring to reason certain elements who were resisting the spirit of the *Schutzvertrag* and following divergent paths. 186* 175•

We may therefore consider Slovakia as a State which, from that time onwards, realised all Hitler's hopes. Better still, it had anticipated them. 'The spirit of National Socialism comes from Hlinka', said President Tuka, 'its methods come from Hitler'. 'Slovakia', he said again, 'must be the vestibule of Paradise'. Racial laws were applied in Slovakia with the same rigour as in Germany, and the Government prided itself on administering 'the most anti-Semite country in the world'. Out of 89,000 Jews who lived there in 1939, there remained in January, 1944, according to official statistics, 20,000 (11,000 of whom had been baptised) and these, moreover, were destined to be eliminated, down to the last man. 'Slovakia was the first country to feel the beneficial effects of the great purification to establish a just world order'—this testimony from the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* speaks volumes as to the docility with which the Bratislava Government responded to Hitlerian control. 648

It is never difficult to attach a conception of the State—however fantastic it may be—to historical antecedents. Slovak propaganda discovered 'positive elements' which justified the Government's policy. Its organ, the *Slowakische Rundschau*,[1] recalled that the Slovak State in its first form, the Great Moravian Empire, founded by King Svatopluk, had collapsed because it had proved incapable of collaborating in peace with the Holy Empire. [208]

It was more difficult to reconcile the Hitlerian ideology with the principles of Christianity to which the people were profoundly attached (Slovakia is the European country in which the clergy are most in evidence in political struggles). This difficulty did not deter either the priest, Tiso, or his Government, who enjoy the doubtful credit of having, despite the Encyclicals, combined the teachings of the Church with the Hitlerian creed. This was a favourite subject for official speeches. 'The victory of Germany will be the victory of Christian principles', declared Mach, the Minister of the Interior, in his message for Christmas, 1943.

[1] Of July 7, 1942.

648 Needless to say, the masses of the populace saw in these
• 175 absurdities nothing but a blind submission to Germany. In August, 1944, the Germans physically occupied the country. The Government was reorganised; Stephen Tiso, President of the Bratislava Court of Appeal, replaced Tuka as President of the Council. His first act was to have recourse to the Germans to put an end to the increasingly threatening activity of the Partisans. On September 13 a National Council was formed which sent a message of fidelity to Benes. The latter replied, 'The Czechs and the Slovaks will give the State a new form, based on absolute equality of rights and on a spirit of democracy and fraternity'.

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186* Croatia presents, from the historical point of view, a quite
175 different personality. She prides herself on having safeguarded her juridical individuality through a thousand years, under régimes of personal union and under the rule of foreign sovereigns. The clique which, thanks to the collapse of the Yugoslav State, took the power into their own hands and proclaimed the independence of the country on April 10, 1941, was composed of revolutionaries, most of them *émigrés*, grouped since 1929 in the *Oustachi* (insurgent) organisations, by Ante Pavelich, who revived the Croatian Law Party dissolved in 1918, and was the instigator (with Italian and Magyar accomplices) of the crime which led to the death of King Alexander and of Louis Barthou.

The new 'Independent State of Croatia' (a term calculated to imply that the Croatian State had existed without independence) was represented by the crown of King Zvonimir, who died in 1089—a feature borrowed from the constitutional *mystique* of Hungary, which personifies in the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen the union of people and monarchy.[4]

The ideology of the new régime was reduced to negative elements—a struggle against Orthodoxy, Liberalism, Democracy, Freemasonry, Judaism, and Bolshevism, hitherto combined, according to the official propaganda, 'under the false geographical label of Yugoslavism'. It thus claimed to renew the tradition

161 [4] The new Kingdom of Croatia had a population of 7,080,000 inhabitants, as follows: Croatia, 5,000,000, Serbs, 1,500,000, Hungarians, 70,000, and Slovenes, 87,000. It covered an area of 71,958 square miles.

which had made of Croatia the bulwark of Christianity 186*
(*Antemurale Christianitatis*). 175 •

But, while Slovakia was the testing-ground of Germany's 175
'European' conceptions, it was from Mussolini's Italy that the 648
Croatia of Pavelich took her watchwords.[5] It was to Mussolini that Pavelich, condemned to death by the Aix-en-Provence Assize Court, fled for protection. It was in the Doges' Palace in Venice that Pavelich signed Croatia's adhesion to the Tripartite Pact on June 15, 1941. Moreover, the 'oustachi' had not awaited the arrival of the Germans and the Italians before rallying to the Axis. The first step towards adhesion to the Tripartite Pact dates from the interview which took place in January, 1940, between Pavelich and Count Ciano, in the latter's home.

Moreover, the independence of the new State had, from the time of its constitution, been seriously mortgaged, for the Duke of Spoleto, son of the late Duke of Aosta, was to reign over it, with the title of Tomislav II. However, he never appeared in Croatia, and notified his abdication on August 27, 1943.

Italy had counted on Croatia to play the same role in the 186*
Balkans as Germany had assigned to Slovakia in the Danube 175
Basin—that of a testing-ground for the New Order. 'Croatia represents the touchstone of the system which the Axis Powers wish to establish in Europe'.[6] As soon as it came to power, the pro-Hitler minority which governed by terror at Zagreb (or at Bania-Louka) had, in the name of racialism no doubt, abolished the word 'Slav' from their terminology. In the propagandist work (*The Croats*) published in Zagreb in 1943, we read (on page 75) that the Croats are of Iranian stock and 'derive their origin from the ancient cradle of the best European races in the Caucasus', while on page 78 we learn that Professor H. M. Chadwick's theory 'completes and corroborates the thesis concerning the Gothic origin of the Croats'. No doubt these two opinions are somewhat contradictory, but the Gothic connection was calculated to rejoice the hearts of the theorists of Nordic pre-eminence. Pavelich himself declared to a German journalist that he wished the German origin of his nation could be proved

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[5] The Croatian National Socialist Party amalgamated with the 'oustachi' movement on July 13, 1941. 648

[6] Broadcast from Radio-Rome, April 27, 1942.

186* and that Croatian science would endeavour to elucidate this
175 problem [*sic*].

186* Croatia had been the starting-point of the defection which
175 dislocated Yugoslavia, but a Croat, Joseph Broz (Marshal Tito),
668 was at the head of the movement which resuscitated that country. This movement began as a guerrilla war waged by partisans; it grew into the rising of a whole nation. 'Tito', by his previous political activity, by his participation in the Spanish campaign (where he had met Rodnitzev, the future defender of Stalingrad), had made numerous contacts with Soviet generals and statesmen. He had Moscow's unconditional support in organising resistance in the Balkans and, at the request of the Russians, he ousted, in the confidence of the Allies, General Mihaïlovich, one of the earliest rebels, but who was reproached with Serbian exclusiveness and with executions of Communists.

By regrouping, under the ægis of Russia, the Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian populations, Tito made himself the champion of a cause that was specifically Slavonic.

In Bulgaria, Communist opposition and popular sentiment (immemorially attached to Russia, but, since Stalingrad, more enthusiastic than ever as the result of the recovery of the Red Armies) obstructed, with increasing boldness the Hitlerophile policy of the Government, which periodic contacts with the Führer failed to stabilise.

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186* In order to galvanise and render articulate the new solidarity
668 on democratic lines which was shaping itself among the Slavonic
544 peoples against their common aggressor, congresses were organised. The first was held at Moscow in August, 1941, only a few weeks after Russia's entry into the war. It may be considered the cradle of this rebirth of Slavism. The opening address was pronounced by the Soviet writer, Alexis Tolstoy. 'We reject', he said, 'the old ideology of Panslavism, which we consider reactionary and contrary to the principle of equality among the nations. . . . Slavs, let us unite, that each Slavonic nation may be entitled, as the other nations are, to a free, peaceful existence, that the culture of our nations may flourish without restraint. . . . The fires of Warsaw and of Belgrade are not yet extinct. From the spark springs the flame; the wind of hatred fans these smoking ruins, in which are consumed German

mediatisation. In the past, Slavism had mobilised more feeling than will-power, animated more Congresses than Crusades. It now reassumed the academic, 'poet and professor' form it had exhibited a hundred years earlier. 186* 668

So that Russia's first acts as a liberating power were not particularly Slavonic. In virtue of the ethnical principle, exercised in her own favour, she annexed to the Ukraine Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had been a Civilisation Front for another Slavonic power—Czechoslovakia. As far as Poland was concerned Russia drew the logical advantages of her victory. Poland's annexation of Prussia's Eastern Marches was simply compensation for the amputations she suffered in favour of the Ukraine and of White Russia. The support discreetly given by Moscow to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav claims on Aegean Macedonia reflected less concern for Slav solidarity than the desire to liberate the outlet from the Straits. 186* 668 725

The award of the Teschen Basin, once more disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided Russia with a very delicate arbitration task, in which the necessity for compensating the sacrifices demanded of the Poles weighed more heavily than the memory of Czech fidelity; had not Czechoslovakia, for ten years, been considered as the 'aircraft-carrier' of Soviet military power?

In reality—and a large dose of ingenuousness was required in order to believe that it could ever be otherwise—the territorial changes over which the Russians presided were all inspired by Russian interests, in the historical and traditional sense of the word.

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Let us briefly recall the evolution of the Slavonic peoples immediately after their liberation. 648 175 •

Poland was, during the war, represented by a Government-in-exile in London, which negotiated with the Allies, to whom they gave valuable military assistance. In Moscow this Government was regarded as 'reactionary' and incompatible with a policy of good Polish-Sovietic relations. So it was constantly attacked by the Russian leaders and the Russian press. [829]

As long as the war was conducted outside Polish territory, London and Washington classed this dispute with those that are

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•175 only settled by being shelved. The English and the Americans were in a delicate position with regard to Poland; the former because it was difficult for them to forget that they had entered the war in order to safeguard Poland's independence, the latter because in the United States there is a large Polish emigration, whose electoral influence is by no means negligible. (It should not be forgotten that Roosevelt was the candidate of the minorities, the allogeneous groups, and the Catholics.)

But the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory put an end to all hopes of postponing until the end of the war the solution of the dispute between the Polish exiles in London and the 'Association of Polish Patriots' set up in Moscow to tie the future of Poland to that of Russia. As in the case of the Baltic peoples, the Kremlin intended to deal only with a Polish authority constituted on her territory and consisting of members not suspected of any anti-Sovietic affiliations or tendencies.

Yet M. Stanislas Mikolajczyk, leader of the Peasant Party, who, on July 5, 1943, had replaced General Sikorski at the head of the Polish Government in London, sought to gain time. The Soviet press conducted a violent campaign against him and his collaborators, representing them as survivors of a retrograde Poland, the inheritance of the 'Colonels' Government', and as reincarnating the anti-democratic, anti-Russian tradition of Pilsudski.

On the day when Radio-Moscow announced the entry of the Red armies into Chelm, the communiqué was followed by the Soviet anthem, then the Polish. From this entry of the Reds into Poland dates the formation, on Russian-occupied territory, of the 'National Liberation Committee', whose first act was to repudiate allegiance to M. Mikolajczyk's Government. Thenceforward there were two Polish authorities.

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175 The National Committee issued a manifesto to the 'People of Poland', announcing that in the Committee was invested the 'sole legal authority' existing in Poland, since it was actuated by the spirit of the democratic constitution of 1921, whereas the London Cabinet had resulted from the authoritarian constitution of April, 1935. The Committee considered itself, thenceforth, as the sole provisional legal organ of the executive power; moreover, this claim was supported by a Soviet communiqué announcing that the administration of the Polish territories

occupied by the Russian armies would be entrusted to the 642
Committee. 175

It will be noticed that in both documents the word 'Govern- 648
ment' was avoided. No doubt that explains why neither London 175
nor Washington received notification of the establishment of this 578
new organism. But the Poles in London reacted indignantly. For them, this new institution was juridically valueless and, in practice, without authority. They declared that out of the fifteen members composing this Executive Directory seven were unknown, while eight were notorious Communists. The President, M. Osubka-Morawski, was a thirty-five year old workman, excluded from the Socialist Party in 1940 on account of his affiliations with Moscow. They therefore asked London and Washington to disavow these 'usurpers'.

Russia's might, and the role of the Soviet armies in the joint military effort, scarcely permitted an unfriendly attitude in regard to an initiative to which the Soviets had already given their sanction. London had not, for years, 'hedged' over misunderstandings which set the London and the Moscow exiles at loggerheads, only to take a final decision just when the Russian armies were achieving advances which left their allies far behind. So London simply announced that Great Britain continued to recognise M. Mikolajczyk's Government, whilst hoping that it would find some way of coming to an agreement with the organisation which had been set up in opposition to it. In the United States, where the Polish question caused very violent discussion during an election year, Mr. Cordell Hull entrenched himself in the silence which was his usual refuge when he was questioned concerning Eastern European problems.

In view of this negative attitude on the part of London and Washington, M. Mikolajczyk decided to seek an interview with Marshal Stalin. He went to Moscow, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Romer. But his interview only served to make him realise the insurmountable prejudices which Soviet circles cherished against the London exiles.

Yet the Allies could not allow the Polish question to remain in this state of uncertainty just when a general settlement of the war was within sight. So this question was included on the agenda of the Crimean Conference in February, 1945. The Three Powers decided that the evolution of the international

646 situation necessitated the creation of a new Polish Provisional
•175 Government on a wider democratic basis than that which had
578 governed the establishment of the organism which functioned
in the liberated regions of Poland (first the Lublin, then the Warsaw Government). M. Molotov and the ambassadors of Great Britain and the United States received a mandate to carry out this reorganisation in conjunction with the members of the Provisional Government and the Polish democratic leaders both in Poland and abroad. This new Provisional Government would, as soon as circumstances permitted, organise free elections with a secret poll.

The Yalta decision provoked a split in Polish circles in London. The Government-in-exile, at the head of which M. Arciszewski had replaced M. Mikolajczyk, declared that neither that Government nor the Polish nation would recognise the decision; but M. Mikolajczyk and the Peasant Party, the majority of the Christian Democrats, and nearly half the Socialists, immediately signified that they would have nothing to do with this uncompromising attitude.

On April 21, 1945, whilst awaiting the application of the Yalta decisions, the Warsaw Polish Government, presided over by M. Osubka-Morawski, signed a treaty of friendship and mutual aid with the Soviet Government. This confirmed the Russian point of view, according to which the Warsaw Cabinet remained the nucleus of the future reconstructed Government. 'This reconstruction', said Marshal Stalin in a declaration to *The Times*, 'will have the effect of favouring a policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union instead of a policy of a "sanitary cordon" directed against her'. Moscow remembered the experience of 1919 and the 'barbed wire fence'.

At Yalta, the desire for prudence by which Mr. Roosevelt was inspired meant that the procedure in connection with the enlarging of the Polish Government was left very vague. Hence Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow in order, among other things, to set this procedure in action. As the result of the Stalin-Hopkins interview, a Soviet note was sent on June 13 convening in Moscow the Three Power Commission and the representatives of the Warsaw Government, together with the Polish leaders abroad.

The forwarding of this note had been speeded up in the hope

of enabling Poland to be admitted, at least *in extremis*, to the 648
San Francisco Conference. For as the result of London and 175●
Washington's refusal, on April 18, to allow an invitation to be 578
sent to the Warsaw Government, it looked as though Poland, the first victim of German aggression, might be absent from the discussion of the statute destined to preserve the world against the recurrence of similar attacks.

The invitation found the London Poles divided. Of the three organisations invited, M. Mikolajczyk, ex-President of the Council, and M. Stanczyk, Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, accepted; M. Witos declined the invitation on health grounds, and M. Zakowski, the representative of the Socialist Party, reflected the discord which had apparently developed in that party by refusing to join the delegation.

The trial of sixteen Poles who had been detained in Moscow 687
for several weeks, charged with sabotage and anti-Soviet activities, 661
interfered with the negotiations. In vain did the Poles in 175
London try to secure their release, by emphasising the role these men had played in the Resistance; Marshal Stalin declared that the Conference must not prevent the trial from taking place. At the hearing certain of the accused pleaded guilty to acts of terrorism directed against Soviet troops, and attributable to the *Armija krajowa* (Armed Forces of the Interior), which had been recognised on the previous August 30[1] by the English and the Americans, and to a political organisation called *Niepodlegosc* (Independence). The verdict returned on June 21[2] was mitigated; the chief offender, General Okulicki, was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, while the remaining accused were either acquitted or received very light sentences.

The objects of this trial, synchronised with the Conference from which, on principle, was to come the reconciliation of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles, seem to have been as follows. Firstly, to discredit the leaders of the Government-in-exile and their staffs; secondly, to give (by the verdict) an example of the Russians' spirit of moderation; and thirdly, to emphasise their unshakeable determination to put an end, once for all, to anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory.

So the agreement reached on June 23[2] found the atmosphere 648
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[1] [1944 -- Analyst]

[2] [1945 -- Analyst]

648 cleared, and awakened a reasoned optimism in English and
•175 American circles.

642 Twenty-four hours after the arrival in Warsaw of the Poles
175 invited by Moscow to join the new 'National Unity' Government the former Osubka-Morawski Cabinet resigned, and was reconstituted with the addition of these elements representing the exiles or the home Resistance movements.

The new Government included representatives of the Communist Party (which were not, as the London exiles maintained, in the majority) as well as of the Socialist, Peasant, and Democratic Parties. For the greater part it was composed of the ministers who had resigned from the Warsaw Cabinet. It kept at its head the ex-President, Osubka-Morawski, supported by two Vice-Presidents, MM. Gomulka and Mikolajczyk.

At the same time, the composition of the National Council—a sort of pre-Legislature—was also modified. Its Presidium, which played the role of provisional Chief of State, was under the leadership of M. Bierut, a Communist, who was, however, given two Vice-Presidents—M. Witos, leader of the Peasant Party, and Professor Grabski, National-Christian.

This Government declared that the first question on its agenda was that of repatriation of the Poles still residing abroad.

648 As soon as the formation of the National Unity Ministry was
175 known, the British authorities negotiated with the former exiled Government in London, with a view to its prompt dissolution.

[578] But on June 25[1] the Government-in-exile published a declaration, affirming that it refused to acknowledge any transmission of power, and proclaimed the new Warsaw Government to be 'illegal'. At the same time, it issued a manifesto to the Polish people justifying its attitude of protest, and declaring itself willing, as far as the fate of the country was concerned, to abide by a free election.

On July 5 London recognised the new Provisional Government, already approved by Moscow and Washington. This meant a break between the British authorities and the Cabinet-in-exile, which England had for so long supported and encouraged. The B.B.C. ceased to broadcast Polish programmes, and the various services installed in London were invited to wind up as quickly as possible.

[1] [1946--Analyst]

208 829 The English press greeted this news philosophically, emphasising the fact that recognition was subject to the promise of free elections as soon as Poland's material situation would allow.

Isolated protests were made; as, for example, that of William John Rose, Professor at the School of Slavonic Studies in London, who wrote to *The Spectator*:—

'The solution adopted is the very one which was rejected by our House of Commons—the co-option of a minority of Poles from London and from Poland to a majority of Lublin Poles, the latter occupying all the chief posts.

'Great Britain and the United States have recognised this Government without any precise information having been given regarding the elections and their nature, though they were the condition on which recognition was granted.

'The renouncing of the principles for which the Allies fought for six years is deplorable. Whatever may be its significance for Poland, it is humiliating for the Western democracies. Obviously, we have an excuse; we are busy with our own elections. Unfortunately, however, while we were inactive others were not. What has become of the anger shown by Mr. Eden and M. Stettinius when M. Molotov exploded the "bombshell" (to use the expression of nearly all the journalists) concerning the fate of the Polish politicians?'

In Washington Senator Vandenberg declared to Mr. Grew, interim Secretary of State, that the settlement of the Polish question was inadequate and unsatisfactory for millions of citizens, himself included. 'This settlement does not appear to give a clear assurance that the Polish people will be able to express themselves freely under this Government, which is imposed on them by the Big Three, within the limits of frontiers likewise fixed by these same powers'.

648 175 In Moscow, on the contrary, the solution of the Polish crisis was considered as a victory for the democracies and a guarantee of European peace. The Soviet Government hastened to regularise its relations with the new State. On July 9[1] it signed a commercial treaty with Warsaw, in order to 'develop and consolidate to the utmost the economic relations between the two countries, in a spirit of friendship and collaboration'.

1[1945--Analyst]

648 •175 And, on August 15, Warsaw and Russia signed a treaty covering the frontier-delimitation of the two States, and war damages. M. Osubka-Morawski welcomed the agreements, which restored to Poland her 'historic frontiers' on the Neisse, the Oder, and the Baltic shore. For his part, M. Stanczyk, Minister of Labour, addressing the Polish troops, endeavoured to dispel their hesitation: 'The new Poland is free and independent. Naturally, in the event of a fresh aggression, Russia would be our ally, but the fact that her line of defence coincides with our western frontier has nothing to do with our independence. If you return you will find, it is true, plenty of work—but you will be working for Poland. That is why I advise you to return as soon as possible'.

162 175 In October, 1945, the President of the Polish National Council, Borislav Bierut, still estimated at six million—a quarter of the total population—the number of Poles remaining outside the national territory. This was a major obstacle to the carrying out of the undertaking given in respect of an early and conclusive election.

But it was not to be doubted that many Poles would, once more, prefer exile to returning to a country whose independence was hopelessly mortgaged.

186* Her geographical position, which condemned Poland to be dominated either by Germany or by Russia, had just fixed her destiny in the East. For a long time anti-Russian (and, since 1920, anti-Sovietic) feeling and ideas had been for Poland a political trend—and, even more, an axiom of international ethics. They had been considered as the fundamental criteria of patriotism—a sort of moral urge, the preliminary condition for the exercise of civic rights.

So that a new era was opening in the history of the Polish people. The previous one was called 'romantic', the present one being designated 'realistic'. But there was a deep-seated uneasiness in the soul of this nation, which—as her history has a hundred times borne witness—has never hesitated to rush into a catastrophe rather than restrain the impulses of a very sensitive patriotism.

186* 795 Poland's strong attachment to the Catholic Faith also opened up possible difficulties. It was natural that the partisans of an *entente* with Russia should be recruited in extreme-Leftist and

atheistic circles. But the international crisis which swept the 186*
country was complicated by a religious crisis. This became 795
evident when the Council of Ministers decided, on September 17, [648]
to denounce the Concordat, accusing the Vatican of having violated its clauses by the publication, during the occupation, of laws contrary to its engagements (an allusion to the nomination of bishops of German nationality in Posnania).

Poland had lost the liberty of choice which, for so long, had enabled her to seek her equilibrium between the Teutonic and the Russian world. Willy-nilly, she had to accustom herself to [578]
the new state of affairs; but she brought to the situation the germ of serious civil discord. And her exiles, maintaining a more than century-old tradition, were to keep alive, especially in Anglo-American and in Catholic circles, an atmosphere of opposition—not to mention the clandestine resistance, all the centres of which were not extinct in Poland itself. Our grandchildren will talk of the 'Polish Question' just as our grandparents used to do.

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In her foreign policy Bulgaria has a 'spare ideology' which 648
enables her to reverse her international situation according to 175 ●
whether she is at peace or at war. Thus she periodically takes her stand beside the Power which seems able to help her to realise her territorial aspirations. This is the effect of that 'Macedonian psychosis' of which we have spoken. But her evil genius has invariably inspired her to 'back the wrong horse'.

In the Second World War, she passed through three phases.

Feeling sure that Germany was invincible, but profiting by her previous disappointments, she first tried to gain Hitler's support at the lowest possible price. This was the period of so-called 'passive belligerency', limited to platonic manifestations—adhesion to the Tripartite Pact and to the anti-Comintern Pact.

But the Axis soon saw through this ruse. In April, 1941, it allowed Bulgaria to settle in Western Macedonia (Serbia) and in Eastern Macedonia (Greece). In return, it expected its troops to have right of passage through and of quartering in Bulgarian territory. Such was the *leit-motiv* of the three interviews which took place between Hitler and King Boris, between March, 1941,

648 and March, 1942. The Führer considered Bulgaria as his
•175 strongest card in the Balkans.

King Boris's Government capitulated, but ensured for itself a strategic withdrawal—the maintenance of its diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. This was the reverse of its 1917 policy, when Bulgaria, then at war with the Russians, kept her representatives in Washington. She was the only European signatory to the Tripartite and anti-Comintern Pacts who did not send even a token legion to fight on Russian soil. Are we to credit this fact to Slavism? In that case, we may liken it to the curious intimacy which during the war marked the relations between Croats and Bulgars: cultural agreements of October, 1942, periods of training spent by Croat officers in Bulgaria, contacts between labour organisations, etc.

The third phase of Bulgarian 'neutrality' opened with the bombardment of Sofia by the Americans (November 14, 1943), which showed the Bulgarians that their declaration of war on the United States was not the harmless operation they had expected it to be. 'Wretched Bulgaria!' Churchill was to say. Thenceforth the Sofia Government lost all hope of deriving nothing but advantages from the war. It entered into the struggle at the very moment when the fate of Germany seemed irrevocably settled.

This aggravation of the external situation coincided with an internal crisis.

King Boris having died on August 28, 1943, in circumstances which have not yet been cleared up, on September 9 following the Sobranje appointed three regents, who, on the 11th, took the oath to King Simeon II and the Bulgarian people. Thenceforward Bulgaria was not fighting simply to satisfy her ambitions, but to save her stakes. The difficulty was to redress the situation with the twenty German divisions stationed on Bulgarian soil, and all the country's strategic bases controlled by the Occupying Authorities.

The Allies reiterated their demands. On May 13, 1944, London, Washington, and Moscow launched an appeal to the Bulgarian people to dissociate themselves from a Government which was leading them to disaster. *Pravda* recalled the adage *Quos vult perdere*. It accused the Bulgarians of being 'the stranglers and executioners of their Slav brethren'. 'There is only one way', declared Stalin, 'for Bulgaria to avoid a catastrophe: to break with the Axis and withdraw from the war'. 648 175 The population heard these warnings over the radio, and gave signs of daily increasing anxiety.

Naturally, the most pressing—and the most effective—objurgations came from the Russians. Already, on April 17, 1944, Molotov had handed to the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires, Stamenov, a note enumerating the concrete examples of assistance given by his country to military operations against Russia, particularly in the Black Sea.

On April 24 the Sofia Government replied, in confused terms; against all the evidence, it denied the charges, and declared itself ready to verify any facts which the Soviet Authorities might bring to its notice. In addition the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chichmanov, protested his 'very sincere desire to maintain correct, loyal, and friendly relations with the Soviet Union'.

This duplicity deceived no one. The Moscow Government returned to the attack on April 26, proposing the reopening of the Soviet Consulate in Varna, which had been closed since the autumn of 1942, and the creation of fresh consular representations in Burgas and Roussé, to collaborate with the Bulgarian authorities in carrying out the verifications which the latter had just proposed.

Bulgaria adhered 'in principle' to these proposals, but made acceptance of them subject to the resumption of economic relations between the two countries—which was simply a way of postponing matters.

The Soviets showed up this manoeuvre; on May 15 the Sofia Cabinet drew up a reply, maintaining its attitude. But the Soviet notes took on a menacing tone; accusing the Bulgars of endeavouring to evade the issue, under cover of this constant postponement, the Kremlin demanded a final answer from the Bagrianov Government, which, on July 29, decided to give way on the question of the Consulates. Meanwhile the war had advanced more rapidly than diplomacy, and the military situation demanded a clear explanation. On August 12, Bagrianov was called upon to break with Germany. Once more he sheltered behind Bulgaria's 'absolute neutrality'. But he was negotiating secretly to get out of the dilemma. On August 25, the English

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and the Americans were asked for an armistice. On the 29th he announced the evacuation of Greece and Yugoslavia by his troops. And on the 31st an armistice delegation arrived in Cairo.

Too late! On the previous evening Sofia had received a Soviet ultimatum, involving the resignation of Bagrianov, who was replaced (on September 3) by Muraviev. The latter proclaimed his fidelity to the policy of so-called 'neutrality', but denounced the anti-Comintern Pact and dissolved the Legislature which had declared war.

This was not the reply which Moscow had expected. A last Soviet note, dated September 5, announced 'not only is Bulgaria at war with the U.S.S.R. but the latter in her turn will, henceforward, be at war with Bulgaria'—an unusual formula which made the latter country the aggressor and conferred a defensive character on the entry of the Tolbukhin army into Bulgarian territory.

This army occupied Roussé and Varna. Bulgaria then resigned herself to declaring war on Germany (September 8). Consequently for a few hours she was, theoretically, at war both with Russia and with Germany. But at 10 o'clock on September 9, four days after the declaration of war, the Soviet Command gave the order to cease fire. Shortly afterwards it was learned that Sofia had accepted the preliminary armistice terms.

The day before, a Government had come into power under Kimon Gheorgiev, leader of the political party called *Zveno* (The Link). He had been the instigator of the military *coup* of May 19, 1934, which had dissolved the Legislature and guided Bulgarian foreign policy in two directions—*entente* with Russia, and reconciliation with Yugoslavia.

To the new Government fell the heavy task of winding up its predecessors' disastrous policy which had, once again, placed Bulgaria in the camp of the vanquished. On October 28th the Government signed the armistice with the Allies, carried out executions on a large scale, and sought an immediate *rapprochement* with Tito. The *entente* between Bulgars and Yugoslavs, sanctioned by the agreement of October 9 between the Sofia Government and the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee, was facilitated by the solidarity which had been established,

during the last phase of the war, between the 'partisans' of the 648
two countries. This solidarity was increased by the ideological 175
affinities between the two régimes.

On September 15 the Russians made their entry into Sofia. The day before, Gheorgiev had issued a proclamation: 'The Homeland Front will place all its means and all its forces at the disposal of the Soviet Union and her great allies, in order to drive the Germans out of the Balkans. It will immediately do its utmost to establish *an indissoluble alliance with the U.S.S.R. and the new Yugoslavia,* and to form ties of sincere friendship with the great Western democracies, with the United States and with our neighbours'.

It was in her effort to reconcile the Russian 'alliance' with her democratic 'friendships' that liberated Bulgaria made her first blunder on the international stage. The Government had fixed the general elections for August 26, 1945. It was backed by a coalition of five parties (Communists, Agrarians, Socialists, *Zveno*, Radicals), forming the *Otetchestvenni Front* (Patriotic Front), which unleashed against its adversaries a violent campaign of persecutions. It did not seem, either to the English or to the Americans, that this régime represented very sound ideas of democracy. Evidently several members of the Bulgarian Cabinet shared this view, for in the month of August they resigned and went over to the Opposition.

It was then that the London and Washington Governments 648
advised Sofia that they could not recognise the régime that might 175
result from the elections, in view of the atmosphere of oppression 666
and constraint under which these promised to be held.

The Gheorgiev Government haughtily rejected this communication, while the press denounced the old 'colonial policy' habits, of which it bore the stamp. But to the general surprise it was learned, on the following day, that the elections were adjourned indefinitely. And a few hours later the President of the Council explained that the incident was due to a misunderstanding; that, in Bulgaria, democracy was of the 'Balkan' type, and that the chief thing for Bulgaria was to conclude a peace treaty by the quickest possible means. On the next day but one (August 27) the American Government agreed to the restoration of diplomatic relations and received the new Bulgarian representative in Washington, General Vladimir Stoitchev.

648 The sudden volte-face on the part of the Sofia Cabinet was
• 175 very easy to explain. Trusting entirely to Russian support, the
666 Bulgarians had never for a moment doubted that Russia would consider the Anglo-American attitude as negligible. They therefore contented themselves with invoking the necessity of consulting the Inter-allied Control Commission, in which the Soviet representative's influence was predominant. Judge of the Government's surprise on learning, from the mouth of that representative (General Birousov), that the Commission had been unanimous in recommending the postponement of the elections!

They had been put off until November 18. The day before, the Washington Government renewed its warning of the month of August, to the effect that the conditions under which the election promised to be held would no doubt prevent it from considering the resulting Government as being the authentic expression of the 'popular will'.

It was difficult to know whether the American attitude arose from the conviction that the Bulgarian electoral law was less 'correct' than the Yugoslav electoral law, or whether the discrimination followed from the fact that Yugoslavia was an allied, and Bulgaria a vanquished, country.

But this time the Sofia Cabinet held out and the elections took place on the date fixed. They gave 75–85 per cent of the votes cast to the Patriotic Front, the Opposition parties having decided to abstain.

However, the Government wisely refrained from giving to this poll the appearance of a retort to the American veto. On the contrary, it advised Washington of its intention to enlarge the basis of the Government on democratic lines.

[829] It is certain that the rivalry between the Agrarians and the Communists offers prospects of internal crises. But, from the external point of view, Bulgaria's policy is fixed *ne varietur*. It will depend on Moscow's goodwill. The Bulgarian people, profoundly Russophile, will find little difficulty in accepting this new state of affairs. There is more doubt as to whether the same thing will be true of the leaders, who will always find it difficult to resign themselves to having only one card in their diplomatic game.

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186* The Slavonic problem presents quite a different appearance

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

in Yugoslavia, where it has two aspects: one external—that concerned with relations between Moscow and Belgrade, the other internal—the *entente* between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 186*

The personality of Marshal Tito, who had the confidence of the Russians and was the animator, first of resistance to the Germans, then of the liberation movement, considerably simplified the question of relations between Yugoslavs and Sovietics. 648 175• 578

Before the soil of Yugoslavia had been liberated, a Government-in-exile (presided over, at the end, by Dr. Ivan Choubachich) continued to function in London, whilst in Yugoslavia Marshal Tito directed the war of liberation. During the winter of 1944–1945, King Peter II tried to bring about an agreement between Tito and the exiled Government. Various obstacles retarded the conclusion of the agreement, and they were later on to paralyse its enforcement.

These obstacles included the conduct of the King during the war. He was reproached with having lived far removed from his people and with not having imitated the example of his grandfather, King Peter I of Serbia, who in 1876 under the name of 'Peter Mrkognich', led a detachment of rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or his father, the Regent Alexander, who had fought in 1917–1918 on the Salonica front. 643 175

He was further reproached with his inopportune marriage, contracted far away from the country, and against the advice of his friends and counsellors. On March 21,[°] 1944, at the Yugoslav Embassy in London, he had married Princess Alexandra of Greece, who, on July 17 of the following year, gave birth to a son.

Now, in Serbia, dynastic loyalty is not (as in Croatia, for example) founded on any fundamental attachment to the monarchical idea. It exists simply in respect of the monarch's patriotic function—what the Serbs call *narodni rad* ('national work')—a name which takes on its full significance only in a country which is periodically reduced to slavery.

The authority of King Peter II was also weakened by the support he had given to General Draja Mihaïlovich. The latter had been the first to rise against the occupation, and his heroic resistance had rallied the best elements of the old army in Southern Bosnia and in Montenegro. But he was reproached 725 648 175

[°] March 20, according to Keesing (trans.).

725 with 'Great Serbian' and 'reactionary' tendencies. Subsequently 648 a much more serious charge was made against him; carried away • 175 by his struggle against the Communist elements, he was said to have parlied with the Occupying Authorites and with the agents of Nedich, the Serbian 'Quisling'. General Mihaïlovich was nevertheless the War Minister *in partibus* to the London Cabinet, where the accusations brought against him were never seriously considered until Churchill[1] echoed them. They were the basis of the case brought against his partisans in July, 1945, and the severe sentence passed against them.

[829] Then there was, between the London Government and the 'Tito Movement', the psychological opposition between the exiled politicians (except those of Czechoslovakia) and the insurgents, who, remaining within the country, risked their lives day in and day out. The latter were inclined to see the 'London people' as theorists, if not profiteers of the Resistance, who, in assured comfort and relative security, carried out a paid task with the pen or by radio.

[668] Finally, Tito's partisans merged, in many cases, with the Communist or extremist elements, for whom the old Yugoslav political formations and their staffs embodied a régime of despotism, patronage, and reaction, whose return to power would have constituted an historical retrogression.

643 661 648 1175 However, the break did not come immediately. Although King Peter agreed, under pressure from the Allies and especially from Russia, to disown Mihaïlovich, he showed greater hesitation in negotiating with Tito, whose republican trend and attachment to the Soviet régime were well known.

On June 16, 1944, he resigned himself, rather against his convictions, to authorising Choubachich to sign an agreement with Tito, which provisionally safeguarded the rights of the Crown. On the following November 1 he agreed to the formation of a National Union Government in liberated Yugoslavia. But he reserved his approval as to the nomination of a Regency and the exercise of political power by one single party, the National Liberation Front, until a Constituent Assembly should have met. On this point he even entered into conflict with his

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[1] 'General Mihaïlovich, I regret to say, has gradually adopted a changed attitude, and certain of his leaders have parlied with Italian or German troops'. (Speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944.)

own Government, which he forced to resign. The Choubachich 643
Cabinet disregarded this and on January 23, 1946 published 661
a communiqué, according to which the sovereign would not 648
return to the country until a Constituent Assembly had 175 ●
pronounced on the question of the régime. In his absence, the
royal power would be delegated to a Council of Regency whose
members would be chosen from the London Government and
from the Tito Government.

On January 30 the King finally agreed to this formula, as recommended by Moscow, London, and Washington.

Then Choubachich went to Belgrade to agree with Tito on 642
the names for the new Government. Prolonged and painful hag- 175
gling resulted in the formation of the Provisional Cabinet on [695]
March 7,' in which Tito kept the Presidency and the War
Ministry, while Choubachich assumed control of Foreign Affairs.
A Serbian democrat, Milan Grol, and a Croat Agrarian, Choutei,
entered the new administration.

Yugoslavia was to be reconstituted on a federative basis; the State itself officially took the name of 'Democratic and Federal Yugoslavia'. So the constitution of the 'Yugoslav' Government was followed by the formation of 'National' Governments, six in number—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia. Care had been taken not to give this federal organisation a statute and frontiers, on account of the conflicts these would not have failed to provoke; the National Assembly would, in due course, decide upon the internal structure of the State.

It remained to be seen whether Tito would bring to the 000
management of affairs the eminent qualities of which he had
given proof in the Resistance. Would history salute him not
only as a detached figure in the epic background against which
the tragedy of the Serbian nation is played, but also as a recon-
structor of the State?

Born in 1893 in the Croat village of Klanyets, Joseph Broz 175
was the son of an artisan. He had known hardship in his youth, 643
and soon exhibited a revolutionary temperament. At seventeen
he engineered a strike, and showed himself to be an agitator.
It is said that he took his appellation of 'Tito' from the bishop
of medieval Crete whose relics rest in the Church of St. Mark
in Venice. Taken prisoner by the Russians in 1914, he took part

'[1946--Analyst]

•175 in the Bolshevist Revolution, and distinguished himself in the
643 attack on the Kremlin. He fought on all the Soviet fronts, from the Caucasus to Finland. He married a Russian, who died, leaving him a son of Soviet nationality (who, for his part in the defence of Moscow in 1941, was to win the title of 'Hero of the Soviet Union').

He returned to Croatia in 1924 and took his place as a militant in the Communist and Trade Union ranks. Arrested for illegal propaganda, he served four years' imprisonment. As soon as he was liberated he went to Paris, travelled in various European countries, and returned to France in 1936, charged with the organisation of the so-called 'railway' for supplying volunteers to the International Brigades in Spain.

When he learned of the capitulation of Yugoslavia in 1941, he returned to Zagreb and launched a summons for a general revolt. He had two interviews with Mihaïlovich, but the Communist and Proletarian ideology which he openly professed frightened the Serbian general—no basis for agreement was possible.

175 The Serbian rising began on July 7, 1941. On that day was
643 constituted, in the region of Belgrade (the seat of the partisans'
668 general staff), the first formation destined to embark upon the struggle with the invader and to continue it until he was crushed. Tito proved to be an irresistible organiser and 'live wire'; his influence grouped around him a veritable army, whose numbers increased daily, and constantly deprived the Occupying Authorities of food supplies and communications.[2] Starting with 35,000 men, Tito's army was to number 700,000 at the liberation. This epic is one of the most glorious pages in the history of the Yugoslav people—and they already possess not a few.

175 Not only did Tito enjoy the confidence of the Russians, who
648 considered him as one of themselves, but he was in constant
643 touch with the Allies. The first English mission reached him on May 27, 1943, during its fifth offensive. At the very end of 1943 Churchill placed his son with Tito, to assist him during the most

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[2] At Bihach, on November 27, 1942, he declared: 'Our country is enslaved, our people the victims of a fruitful terror. Barefoot, starving, bloodless, they are at the mercy of the occupiers and their acolytes. But their determination to live is unshakeable, because they believe in victory'.

critical hours of the campaign. The liberation army effected its 175 •
junction with the Russian Army during the final offensive, and 648
entered Belgrade with it on October 20, 1944. 643

The next day appeared a communiqué, issued as the result of the Moscow discussions, announcing the agreement of British and Soviet views regarding Yugoslavia, on the following basis:—

Union between the Royal Government and the Liberation Movement.

The right of the Yugoslav people to decide their own future constitution.

The United States Government gave its consent to these arrangements. Marshal Tito, who was in Moscow during the Conference, several times discussed them with Stalin and the Soviet leaders.

On April 11, 1945, Russia and liberated Yugoslavia signed 175
a treaty of mutual assistance and collaboration which preserved 648
their traditional policy of *entente*, as well as their united efforts against Hitler's Germany.[1] It formed part of the system of pacts concluded by the Soviet Union with Great Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, to raise a barrier against any fresh effort on the part of German imperialism to threaten the liberty of the European peoples. The experience of the past, confirmed by this war, showed that in all German plans for aggression, the conquest of the Southern Slav countries was a step towards the domination of the Continent. The fact that Yugoslavia had awaited the year 1940 to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. had opened in South-East Europe a breach which had enabled the enemy to disintegrate Balkan solidarity and to force his way through to the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence Article 2 of the treaty provided for immediate and effective mutual assistance in the event of one of the parties being involved in military operations against Germany, if that country resumed her

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[1] About the middle of December 1943, the Yugoslav Government, exiled to Cairo, and then presided over by Bojidar Pourich, had proposed to Moscow a pact of mutual assistance on the model of that which had been concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic. The Kremlin declined this proposal. At that time Tito was, in their eyes, the sole authentic representative of the Yugoslav nation. On this occasion it was recalled that the Soviet Government had already, in the spring of 1942, raised the question of a pact with the Yugoslav Government in London; at that time it was the latter which had opposed a demurrer.

•175 648 aggressive policy, or against any other State which might revive this policy, under any form whatsoever.

Backed both without and within by the might of Moscow, Tito's régime seemed to be irresistibly established.

Its[1] first care had been to renew its claim to the territories of which Yugoslavia had been defrauded immediately after the First World War. It raised the question of Trieste and its hinterland. The Yugoslav delegation in London warmly defended a case supported by detailed and absolutely pertinent documentation, based on ethnographic and economic considerations. But they were imprudent enough to allow it to be understood that they would lay claim to Aegean or Hellenic Macedonia—which was bound to alienate the goodwill of Great Britain. They also mentioned the exorbitant sum which they intended to demand from Italy by way of reparations—thereby upsetting the United States, from whom Italy was at the same time seeking material aid to help her out of her desperate financial situation.

642 661 175 Yet, to tell the truth, the distrustful atmosphere which grew up around the Yugoslav claims arose more directly from the form of government and the political principles established by Tito. Under colour of anti-Fascism, the régime exercised the same reprisals against all its detractors. It was accused of borrowing the methods of the totalitarian régimes; the Opposition said that it had introduced the word 'Democracy' into the name of the State in order to dispense with it in reality, as, in the past, Pavelich gave the name of 'Independent State of Croatia' to a political offshoot of the Axis. He governed, on Russian lines, a very sensitive nation, which perhaps had not a very 'Western' notion of democracy, but had always shown itself stubbornly attached to the external forms of its independence. Certainly Tito had succeeded in grouping around him zealous young men, who had been tested under fire and were indifferent to the juridical or constitutional rites which, in the West, accompany the exercise of liberty. Certainly, too, the Yugoslav National Front represented itself not as a single party but as a synthesis of all the various energies resolved to work for the restoration of public life.

656 204 625 Nevertheless to Anglo-American eyes the régime appeared to be a dictatorship. Was not its slogan—'No liberty for the enemies of liberty'—calculated to justify an administration

[1] [Tito's régimes -- Analyst]

founded on despotism and personal power? The law of 656
August 25, 1945 on the control of the press banned not only 204
the ex-'collaborators', but also the publishers of 'alarmist' 625
news or of news 'contrary to the general interest'—as conceived by the Government, naturally. A well-informed police organisation, modelled on Russian methods, ceaselessly exercised a very close watch over public opinion and, naturally, indulged in arbitrary arrests and acts of violence.

This policy led to dissension within the Government. The 578
leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, Milan Grol, resigned 175 ●
on August 19[1]; on October 8[1] he was followed into retirement by Dr. Ivan Choubachich and the Minister Chouteï, both Croat Agrarians.

Choubachich's resignation was serious, for it upset a ministerial equilibrium which had been agreed upon among the Allies. Yet what was this agreement worth, since Tito, repudiating the terms of the compromise which had sanctioned his authority, had pronounced against the monarchy? 'Not one of our combatants thought that anything new could be created under the leadership of the King, especially as the Nediches and Mihaïloviches committed their crimes in his name. . . . The point is, whether the monarchy is compatible with the new system of Yugoslav Federal Democracy. . . . For several reasons, I think it is not'.

The next day (August 8, 1945) King Peter replied to this declaration by withdrawing from the Regents the power they held from him.

Tito was not intimidated by this retort. He declared that the Government acted in agreement with all the creative and constructive forces of the country, with all sincerely democratic parties. The masses of the populace had acquired, during the war, firmly-rooted political knowledge which had nothing in common with the electoral catchwords with which they previously used to be taken in.

The Opposition replied that free elections would prove the 666
truth of this assertion, whereas those to which the country had 829
been called were not free. The Americans and the English 175
repeatedly emphasised the reserves they made regarding their attitude towards the régime which would result from this poll.

The elections took place on November 11.[1] They gave to the

[1] [1945-- Analyst]

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•175 National Front 80–90 per cent of the votes cast.[4] It is true that the Opposition abstained from voting (its Belgrade organ, *Demokratia*, was suspended) and that the electoral system favoured the Coalition Government. But the Anglo-Americans took no action. They declared the results of the poll to be 'acceptable'. On these results were based the two Assemblies (Union Assembly and Assembly of the Nationalities) which, following Russian lines, were to control the country's constitutional life.

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643 In short, both at home and abroad, Tito was master of the situation. He had armed forces, the levers of control, fanatical partisans, a 'Youth' following, attached to a régime which had radically reorganised the whole staffing of the army, the administrative services, and diplomacy. But certain large sections of opinion were not with him. In the provinces the old parties were still solidly rooted. Those circles criticised the 'personal' and 'plebiscite' character of the régime, which was an unprecedented innovation in Serbian political life. Against the Marshal were the Monarchists, the old army, Serbian nationalism, Croat particularism, [659] Slovene 'Clericalism'. For a long time he alienated the Catholic clergy; on October 18, Radio-Vatican broadcast a letter from the Yugoslav bishops to the Belgrade Government, accusing the latter of systematically persecuting the Roman Church.

And this was only criticism of internal affairs. Tito was further reproached with having reorganised relations between the Yugoslav populations on anachronistic bases. How would this State turn out—a State of twelve million inhabitants, with six autonomous Governments, capped with a Federal Government? Where would the frontiers of Croatia and Serbia be? And those of Serbia and Macedonia? Could the Macedonian question be considered as settled by the granting of autonomy? And would not the Bulgaro-Yugoslav *entente*, advertised as a victory for the régime, be submitted to a severe test when autonomy gave rise to political disputes in this country which, for a century, had been torn by undercurrents of passion and foreign intrigue? Was

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666 [4] According to official statistics, out of 8,383,455 electors and 7,413,214 votes cast, 6,574,975 went to the National Front. The franchise had been given to women; the electoral age had been lowered to 18, and even lower for those who had fought in the liberation.

the resurrection of Montenegro, a country of 200,000 inhabitants, 578
which had disappeared since 1918, and of Bosnia, which had 643
not been heard of in history since the Middle Ages, in keeping with the ideas of a 'new world' that were current in Tito's circle? And had not Tito himself, by liberating atomic nationalisms, super-Balkanised his country at a time when means of communication were suppressing distances—in other words, had he not inaugurated a policy which was opposed to history, progress, and common sense, in order to realise the midsummer night's dream of a Slavophile of the 'Forties'?

The federal régime, it will be said, has representatives in 000
Europe—Switzerland, Russia, Austria. But Switzerland has maturity, Russia has extent, Austria has an historical and cultural homogeneity to safeguard its unity.

Was not the Yugoslav community in imminent danger from [795]
this 'State power' given to regions hitherto divided by so many memories? The Croats used to oppose the Serbs in religious matters. Between the two wars, rivalry between Catholics and Orthodox had subsided somewhat. But the elections in Austria and Hungary showed that, after the liberation, the attachment of the populations of Central Europe to the Roman Church had lost none of its force. Croatia—*antemurale Christianitatis*—could not escape this deeply-rooted tendency, still less at a time when Russia, the protectress of the Yugoslav State, reaffirmed the Orthodox tradition on which her relations with the Serbs had formerly been based. How was it possible not to see in this renewal of religious antagonism between Belgrade and Zagreb a threat of secession?

In Yugoslavia the Crown used to be (as in Belgium) the link 642
between different peoples, traditions, and trends. On November 175•
29, 1945, obedient to Tito's watchword, the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly, composed of the Union Assembly and the Assembly of the Nationalities, proclaimed the Federative Republic. It deposed and condemned to exile the dynasty of the Karageorgevich.

This vote was the logical conclusion of the elections and also—it must be admitted—of the errors of the young King. The latter raised a protest which was greeted, in London circles, with more sympathy than encouragement. The fate of the monarchy in Yugoslavia seemed, indeed, to be definitely settled.

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Marshal Stalin sent his congratulations to Tito and his good wishes to the 'sister nation' of Yugoslavia. The establishment of the republic was greeted everywhere as a victory for the spirit of democracy. In actual fact it is hard to believe that there is more 'democracy' in the Balkan republics than in the Scandinavian or British monarchies.

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The real question still remains to be seen—whether Tito's régime ensures a new lease of life for Yugoslav unity or whether it portends, sooner or later, a disruption of that unity, which might this time be irreparable. It is by no means impossible that in the next few years, even months, the evolution of Yugoslav life may be characterised by a gradual weakening of the ties between the Serbs and the Croats and a correlative strengthening of solidarity between Serbs and Bulgars—in other words, by an end of the union of Southern Slavs, and an attraction of part to the East.

On the international scale, the future of Yugoslavia is at the mercy of the super-powers who are the arbiters of peace. So that all depends on the importance which the Balkan world holds in the policy of Russia who, in Central Europe and in Asia, is occupied with interests of far wider scope. And here it is as well not to forget that, during the time of the Tsars, the Balkan peoples always bore the brunt of all efforts at *rapprochement* between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Will they, tomorrow, form the medium of exchange between the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American democracies, without whose capital it would be difficult for them to exploit their natural resources?

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Of all the liberated Slav States, it was, as might be expected, Czechoslovakia which showed most practical sense. She managed her return to liberty without any unnecessary clashes or violence.

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No serious difficulty arose between the London Government-in-exile and the Resistance. On May 8, 1944, Benes signed an agreement with Moscow concerning the administration of the liberated territories. On the following October 29 he declared that, after the war, the affairs of the Republic would be so organised as to avoid a repetition of the events of 1938. 'Czechoslovakia will be a fully decentralised Republic, organised

on the basis of respect for the principle of nationalities'. No reference to a federal system. 642 643 175

He returned to Czechoslovakia early in March, 1945, and, from Kosice, he followed the last stages of the liberation. On May 10 the national flag again floated from Prague Castle and Cathedral; a few days later Benes made a triumphal entry into the city.

The Government (formed on April 5, under the presidency of M. Fierlinger, and composed of twenty-five members, seven of whom were Communists) avoided the mistake made by the majority of the liberated countries, by postponing the elections until passions had had time to subside a little. The authorised [646] political parties, four in number, agreed on the allocation of mandates to the Provisional National Assembly, which numbered 300 deputies, including 100 for Slovakia. On April 14[1] an electoral body chosen by the local National Committees nominated the members of this Assembly. 'The Czechs', Benes 181 said, 'must take radical measures, while at the same time 186 avoiding extremism'. That was the whole programme of the 643 Czechoslovak Popular Front.

In the international order, the Government observed the same prudence. Benes's realistic attitude towards Soviet Russia is well known. 'The Czechs are a Slavonic people, and they are specially drawn towards the Russians, whom they understand better than any other people'. But Czech culture, and the democratic education of the Czech people, are fundamentally Western. The President continually returned to that assumption. Czechoslovakia is an intermediary region between two civilisations; its historical evolution, its psychology, its intellectual and social structure, all have affinities with the Anglo-American and French democracies.

The Soviet orientation was represented by the Communists, under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister, M. Clement Gottwald, and the Minister of National Education, Zdenek Nejedly, a celebrated musicographer, who attended the Moscow Panslav Congresses. But their influence was exerted moderately, and solely on the lines of the national interest. In reality, the Czech people, with their habits of thrift, their appreciation of property, their aversion to conformity, are fundamentally opposed to the Marxist ideology.

[1] [1945 -- Analyst]

648 It is true that, on resuming possession of the liberated capital,
186 M. Benes affirmed his intention of remaining faithful to the ideas
•175 of the new policy of union with the great Russian nation and
643 with the other Slavonic peoples. But such statements need reading in the context of his previous declarations.

Had not the President himself, in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1944), uttered a warning against any distorted interpretation of his words? 'We must not abandon our old method of evolutive adaptation and our old policy of balance between East and West. Our geographical position does not allow us to make a sudden change in this century-old policy'.[5]

A new fact had previously arisen, which was to turn the scale slightly in favour of Russia. This was the annexing of Carpatho-Ruthenia to the Ukraine. Czechoslovakia thus became one of Russia's neighbours; there arose between the two countries a community of strategic and economic interests, which modified the equilibrium of Central Europe. Benes had always said that Russia's non-participation in the 1919–1920 settlements had distorted the general view of that equilibrium. His judgement was proved correct—probably even more so than he anticipated. When, on December 12, 1943, he had signed the Czecho-Russian treaty of friendship and mutual aid, he had understood that liberated Czechoslovakia would be restored to her pre-1938 frontiers. But, at the time of the treaty on June 29, 1945, which, without any plebiscite or international consultation, transferred Ruthenia to Soviet sovereignty, M. Molotov had put forward arguments based on ethnography, linguistics, folklore, and history, to which Prague could not but submit. Moreover, had they been consulted, the vote of the Ruthenians would not have been in doubt. So Fierlinger, the Prime Minister, recognised that 'the time had come for Ruthenia to return to her homeland, the great Soviet Ukraine'. He forbore to add that she had been separated from it for a thousand years, and he passed over the heavy sacrifices that Czechoslovakia had made

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[5] Compare this declaration with the one Benes had made in February 1944, to the diplomatic editor of *Reynolds' News*: 'Our pact with Russia is a fundamental consolidation of the Czechoslovak Republic. And we consider that, at the same time, it strengthens our independence. . . . Our friendship with U.S.S.R. does not mean that we depend on that country; on the contrary, the pact institutes reciprocal collaboration with our State, which desires to live in real, sincere friendship with Russia, while safeguarding its full sovereignty'.

for twenty years in order to raise the economic standard of this 648
'Ukrainian Piedmont'. And in November, 1945, the National 186
Assembly, without any vain recriminations, ratified the transfer 175 •
of sovereignty. 643

In addition to all that, Czechoslovakia risked losing the Teschen Basin, occupied on October 2, 1938, by Polish troops, and still in dispute between the two countries. But, in the spirit of Slav solidarity (not of conquest) which had, in 1920, installed Czechoslovakia in Carpatho-Ruthenia, she was enabled to cast her eyes on that minority—Serbian or Sorabian or Wend—of Lusatia, whose 80,000 survivors still peopled 1,900 square miles between Bautzen and Cottbus. A Sorabian 'National Committee' was formed in Prague with a view to attaching this territory to Czechoslovakia. But had not the Poles, too, claims to put forward to this detached tribe of the ancient Slavonic community?

In any case, Czechoslovakia could not be reproached with having derived benefit from her fidelity to the Slavonic idea; although, in 1918, that fidelity had ensured for her the rebirth of her national life, in 1945 it brought her nothing but amputations. But was not the good grace with which she accepted the loss of her Eastern province (by a treaty in which M. Molotov saw 'a striking manifestation of the sincere friendship of the Slavonic peoples') a demonstration of her disinterestedness, and did it not prove that her Slavism was free of any expansionist or Chauvinist speculation?

On the other hand, in spite of some rather imprudent expressions on the part of M. Nejedly ('We belong to the great Slavic bloc, controlled by the Russian nation'), the Prague Government endeavoured to protect the individuality of the country from political or ideological domination. It repeatedly asked the Soviet Authorities to hasten evacuation of their troops. It lost no opportunity of protesting against allegations which represented it as a 'satellite' of Moscow. 'A good many people come here with the idea, which is quite unfounded, that the Russians control us', said President Benes to the World Congress of Students. 'The real truth is much simpler; there is no need to seek startling explanations for our decision to conduct our own business as we think fit'. As a more characteristic gesture, and one which requires no commentary, in October, 1945, he

648 sent to London a military mission under General Svoboda, the
186 Commander-in-Chief, to renew contacts with the British General
•175 Staff, and to ask the latter to co-operate in the reconstitution of
643 the Czechoslovak Army.

In short, of all the liberated Slav nations, Czechoslovakia was the one which had most clearly marked out the contours of her independence in the New Europe. She accepted neither 'synchronisation' nor enfeoffment. Without disavowing either her Slavonic affinities or her traditional attachment to Russia, she restored her relations with the West to their 1938 footing.

[829] An intermediary State, Czechoslovakia is carving out her path between the Russian and the Anglo-Roman worlds; nearer to the former by her security reflexes and her views on the future of Europe, she is nearer to the latter by her spiritual unrest, her philosophy of life and her conception of progress.

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186* The rapid tour which has taken us from Warsaw to Sofia and
829 from Belgrade to Prague is sufficient to clarify speculations
founded on the birth of a Slavonic 'Imperialism'.

Once again, it is official eloquence which has nourished these speculations. There was not a Polish, Czech, Yugoslav, or Bulgarian statesman who did not see, in the issue of the Second World War, the end of the curse which, for a thousand years, paralysed the expansion of the Slavonic world. Not one who did not celebrate the establishment and the benefits of an inter-Slav *entente*. Let us quote a few of these heroic declamations at random.

In the first rank was Poland—no doubt because this was the nation which, from the Slavonic point of view, had the worst memories to atone for. Commenting on the signature of the Polish-Sovietic agreement, the head of the Government of the Polish Republic regretted that his country had not, at the time of the German aggression, frankly taken her stand beside the Soviet Union, in order to form a 'Slavonic bloc'. 'This grave political error', he declared, 'caused a great deal of suffering to the Slavonic peoples and, most of all, to Poland'.[*]

[*] When, on July 15th, the new Polish Ambassador handed his credentials to the Regent of Yugoslavia, he alluded to 'Germany, the eternal enemy of the Slavs'. This was an undeniable historical truth; but how fail to recall, on hearing it invoked, the importunate shadows of Beck and Stoyadinovich?

186* in Europe and in America'. And in the Belgrade newspaper,
668 *Politika,* M. Stankovich, President of the Serbian Assembly, showed still greater discretion: 'Only the enemies of democracy could see in this meeting of Slavonic countries a manifestation tending to the creation of a Slav bloc, or an attempt to separate East and West'.

Marshal Tito, supported by Marshal Tolbukhin, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Mgr. Nicolaï, and the President of the Yugoslav Assembly, Ivan Ribar, opened the Congress. 'The Slavs', he said, 'have a mission, but not a mission to create a bloc. Yet the time has come to decide that they shall never again be divided against one another'. A message from Stalin, on the same lines, was read. The *leit-motiv* of the speeches was the merit of the Slav peoples in the triumph of democracy, and their contribution to universal civilisation.

In short, the eloquence of the Congressists did not go beyond a speculative exchange of views; it avoided drawing too much attention to the agreement of views between the small nations and Moscow.

• [175] Nearly a hundred years had elapsed since the Prague Congress of 1848. By a curious trick of fate, over both these demonstrations of Slav solidarity, at a hundred years' interval, Russia exercised unopposed control. Great as was the opposition between the ideas of the Slavophiles and those of the Congressists of 1946, both Assemblies, with the same pride, saw their work as a threat to reaction—Austro-German reaction in 1848 and Western reaction in 1946.

The Congress organised the strengthening of economic and cultural relations between the Slav States. It formed a permanent Liaison Committee to sit in Belgrade.

[208] The press in the Slavonic countries gave enthusiastic reports of these assemblies. In general, newspapers in the other countries were very reserved in their comments. On December 17 the *Manchester Guardian* recalled the century-old vision of a Slovak poet, a vision of the Slavs united in a powerful body with Russia as the head, Poland the trunk, Bohemia the arms, Serbia the legs. 'The new Panslav movement has arisen out of a common struggle against the invader. If it fosters the community feeling on the human plane, it may do good. If it tries to establish itself in the political domain, it will fail, as in the past'.

A sceptic might have observed that, despite the oratorical 186*
manifestations of harmony and goodwill, three specifically Slav 668
problems which had arisen in 1919 still appeared on the agenda of questions at issue in 1946—the allocation of the Teschen Basin, the definitive status of Macedonia, the fate of the Lusatian Serbs.

Indeed, the Macedonian question does not seem to have been 563
finally settled by the creation of a Macedonian Republic within 578
the framework of the Yugoslav Federation. That is why, at the 648
end of 1946, Yugoslav newspapers demanded the incorporation 175 •
of the Bulgarian districts (Petrich, Gornya-Djumaïa, Nevrekop) in the Popular Republic of Macedonia, and reproached the new Bulgarian constitution with submitting every project for the transfer of territory to the decision of the legislature—a step which Belgrade considered as a stipulation derogatory to the 'Macedonian minority's' right to self-determination.[2] In other words, in Yugoslavia the Macedonian population of Bulgaria was still considered as non-Bulgarian in character. Latent, but still discernible, it was the old quarrel which had, for half a century, set the two peoples in opposition to each other. It was recalled in the Sobranje on December 12, by an Agrarian Deputy, who asked the Government whether it did not consider the Yugoslav claims as an interference in Bulgarian Home Affairs. And early in 1947 a much-talked-of action brought at Skoplje plainly pointed to the survival of the famous ORIM (Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organisation) directed by Vanka Mihaïlov—that organisation which had been so widely discussed at the conclusion of the previous war.

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[2] An action which the French Press Agency described (on January 27, 1947) [668]
as 'typically Macedonian' was brought against Albanians, Yugoslavs of Albanian or Turkish origin and 'real Macedonians', accused of having organised, in 1945, an illegal society—*National Chiptare Demokratia*—to overthrow the Albanian Government of Enver Hodja and set up a 'Great Albania', including a part of Western Macedonia, with Kossovo and Metova. The conspirators were in league with Mihaïlov's Revolutionary Committee—the famous ORIM (Macedonian International Revolutionary Organisation), whose hand had already been detected in a separatist Macedonian plot which had been judged in November 1946. In this plot was involved no less a person than Metodijé Andorov Cento, one of the most popular figures among the Macedonian 'partisans' and, up to the spring of 1946, President of the Macedonian Liberation Assembly. Cento was sentenced to eleven years' hard labour. Decorated by Tito, he was in opposition to the Government, criticising its Communist affiliations, and in conflict with Lazar Koulichevsky, Prime Minister of the Macedonian legislature.

648 •175 As for the question of the Polish-Czech frontiers, the Prague Government wanted a return to the pre-Munich *status quo*; it will be seen later that the claim to the Teschen Basin, occupied by the Poles since 1938, delayed the return to normal status in the relations between Warsaw and Prague.

As regards the Serbs of Lusatia (Wends and Sorbs), they sent petition after petition to the peace arbitrators, claiming a hearing and justice. They submitted two memoranda, one on February 1, 1946, to the United Nations, the other in the month of May, to the Four Powers Conference in Paris. They returned to the attack on July 6, to ask for the separation of Lusatia from Germany. They were invariably put off until the German problem should be discussed by the Conference. Czechoslovakia, who had already espoused their cause at the time of the discussion of the Versailles Treaty,[8] signified that she saw in their separation from the Reich a guarantee for her own security.

101 These Lusatians are the remnant of a large tribe which must formerly have been the vanguard of the Slavs on the march towards Bavaria. In the ninth century the country was erected into a principality. But, of all the Slavonic groups, this is the one which has encountered the least favourable conditions for the development of a lasting political unity.

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000 Now a few words on the evolution of the internal and external policies of each of the small Slav States while the treaties were in the negotiation stage.

642 175 On January 15, 1946, Yugoslavia voted her Federal Constitution, which set up the six People's Republics mentioned in the previous chapter. (The 'People's Republic of Serbia' included the two autonomous provinces of Voïvodin and Kossovo). Each of these republics sent twenty-five deputies to the Peoples' Council. They were sovereign States—except for the functions reserved to the central power (peace and war, internal security, basic legislation, currency, transport, postal services, radio, Customs, immigration, etc.)—*i.e.*, essentially in matters of education, public health, and social justice.

As in Russia, actual power lay with the Presidium of the Legislature, composed of thirty members, elected by the Assembly

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[8] See above, p. 41.

and responsible to it. The Assembly comprised two Chambers, 642
the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities; the 175
former was elected by all the citizens, the latter appointed by the republics and autonomous districts. The Constitution established the right of referendum, compulsory military service, the separation of Church and State. Private property was recognised, up to a maximum of 25–30 hectares. But foreign [656]
trade and the greater part of the means of production, mining resources, springs, hydraulic power, woods, transport, wireless, etc. were under State control.[4] The Federated Republics were organised, and elected their Governments, early in 1946 (Bosnia-Herzegovina on February 15, Serbia on February 20, Slovenia on February 23; it will be noticed that the latter took the name of 'Popular Republic of the Slovenes'—obviously with the intention of serving as a magnetic centre for the Slovenes who remained under Italian or Austrian domination).

The promulgation of the new Constitution closed the first 645
stage in post-war developments. The new Federal Government 175
was introduced to the Legislature on February 2, 1946. Its President was Tito, who held the portfolio of National Defence, assisted by two Vice-Presidents, one Communist, the Slovene Edward Kardelj, a militant member of the Slovene Workers' Associations and principal instigator of the Constitution, and one Republican, the Serb, Jasa Prodanovich. Foreign Affairs were entrusted to Stanoje Simich. Kardelj was President of the Federal Control Commission, an all-powerful organism which supervised the acts of the Ministers and of the President himself. The spokesman of the Communist Party was Milovan Djilas, who was responsible for the Youth Movement. The President of the Presidium was a Croat, Ivan Ribar, a former Deputy of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, President of the Constituent of 1921 and one of the authors of the so-called Constitution of Vidovdan. After having joined the Democratic Party, he left it at the time of the dictatorship of King Alexander. Under the occupation he did liaison work between the Republicans and the

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[4] The arms of the Federal State represent a field, between two sheaves of corn, connected by a ribbon inscribed: '22nd November, 1943'. Between the tips of the ears of corn is a five-pointed star; in the middle of the field five torches, bending over, converge into a single flame. The federal flag is red, white and blue (with the red at the bottom), and has a red star in the middle.

645 •175 Communists, then rejoined the partisans in Bosnia and was elected President of the National Liberation Front.

637 175 The chief event of this period was the trial of General Draja Mihailovich, who had organised the earliest resistance to the invader, but was subsequently accused of collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. Arrested on the borders of Bosnia and Serbia, he was court-martialled on June 10, 1946, by the Military Tribunal of Belgrade, which condemned him to death on July 15. He was shot. Some American airmen had vainly asked to bear witness in his favour. The Belgrade Government had documents published establishing his 'treason'; they reveal undeniable complicity with the enemy in the lower ranks, and, especially, the implacable intention of eliminating the Communists from the Resistance; the role of Mihailovich himself is less clearly shown—which explains the emotion his condemnation aroused in England and in America.

[829] The *Daily Telegraph* thus expressed itself on this condemnation: 'The long perspective of history will enable the truth about the much-discussed figure of Mihailovich to be more clearly perceived. His contemporaries can do no more than think that, caught up in the whirlwind of events beyond his control, he was a victim of Fate'.

In the same connection the British statesman, Noel Baker, declared that the decision to suspend aid to Mihailovich during the war had been taken as the result of numerous denunciations from various sources, alleging that he was no longer adequately contributing to the war effort. 'Subsequently', he said, 'it became evident that certain of his lieutenants were actively collaborating with the Germans'.

793 687 175 657 No less sensational was the trial of the Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, Mgr. Aloysius Stepinac. This followed proceedings against numerous members of his clergy, notably that involving some Slovene priests, in December, 1945, at Ljubljana. The bishop of that town, Mgr. Rozman, a refugee in Italy, was condemned to eighteen years' imprisonment.

[208] The action against the Croatian priests accused of collaboration was prepared in January, 1946, by a violent press and radio campaign, denouncing the Archbishop's relations with the *Oustachi* of Pavelich, by whom he had been decorated (in

common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene 793
Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov). 687

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, 175
on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of 659
intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[3]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this 829
verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's 793
sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on 794
a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it 648
nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

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[3] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

793 Concordat in Yugoslavia, the Vatican proceeds directly to the
794 648 appointment of bishops, without previous agreement with the
Government.)

648 Relations between the Holy See and Belgrade again became
• 175 strained when on January 31, 1947, Tito's Government handed
[659] to the Secretariat of State two notes, demanding the handing over of five Yugoslav 'war criminals', said to have taken refuge in the Vatican, and accusing the latter of having facilitated the escape to South America of other Yugoslav nationals, wanted by their country's police. The Pope denied these allegations, but added 'that he distinguished between those who were persecuted for political reasons, and criminals; to the former he gave every assistance in his power, without asking whence they came'.

Yugoslavia's external policy remained unshakeably based on Soviet support. 'The Slav peoples now look to Moscow as, after 1919, they looked to Paris; nothing is more natural', said a semi-official commentary on Tito's tour of Central Europe. Far from endeavouring to gain the confidence of the English and the Americans, whose co-operation a wise diplomacy would have sought, in order to bring their claims on Trieste to a successful conclusion, the Belgrade Government was continually in conflict with those powers.

Its relations with Washington were particularly chequered. On January 8, 1946, President Truman had declared: 'As regards Yugoslavia, recognition of the present Government is still subject to certain conditions'. (Moreover, he put Rumania and Bulgaria on the same footing.)

These 'conditions' were the assurance that the new Yugoslavia would recognise the existing treaties and agreements between the two countries (commercial exchanges, extraditions, naturalisations, etc.). Having obtained this assurance on April 18, he recognised Tito and appointed Mr. Richard Patterson ambassador in Belgrade. 'In granting diplomatic recognition', said the *Washington Post* next day, 'the United States are but looking unpleasant realities in the face'.

And when Sava Kosanovich, the representative of Yugoslavia, presented his credentials to President Truman, the latter said to him, with bantering courtesy: 'The United States are following, with interest and sympathy, the efforts of the Yugoslav people . . . to succeed, individually and in harmony with the United

Nations, in realising the ideals of liberty and democracy which have borne the United Nations to victory'. The history of the relations between the two Governments proves, on the one hand, that in Belgrade very little sense of diplomacy was shown, and, on the other, that Washington was completely misinformed as to the realities of Yugoslav life.

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The most serious incident was caused, in August, 1946, by attacks on American aeroplanes in the sky of Slovenia. On the 9th of that month an American plane, forced to land, had crashed; its occupants had been imprisoned by the Yugoslav authorities. On the 11th, the Belgrade Government had protested to Washington against repeated flights over its territory. On the 19th, a transport plane was attacked by a Yugoslav squadron and its five occupants were killed. Whereupon the State Department addressed to the Belgrade Government an ultimatum, demanding an explanation within forty-eight hours, failing which the Security Council would be informed of 'this offence against international law and the principles of humanity'. After having read the text of the ultimatum to the press, the American Ambassador added: 'Eighteen months ago, United States planes were awaited with impatience and greeted with enthusiasm; today they are shot down'.

The Yugoslav press insinuated that the United States had exaggerated the incident, in order to discredit the Belgrade Government in the eyes of the Peace Conference. That Government hastened, however, to release the American airmen as soon as it got wind of the ultimatum, so that this should be without motive by the time it was officially presented. It then undertook to forbid its squadrons to fire on foreign planes, in order to avoid such 'unfortunate accidents'. Nevertheless, on September 3, a fresh note from Washington expressed the surprise felt by the State Department at not receiving from the Yugoslavs either any expression of regret or any offer of indemnity. The Belgrade Government finally granted $30,000 to each of the families of the five airmen shot down on August 19, but refused indemnity for the lost plane, and maintained its attitude of non-responsibility for this 'accident'. America returned to the attack in a note dated Ocober 8, and the matter was only settled in the following month. On November 5 the dockers of the port of New York, who, as a

648 • 175 protest, had refused to load the boat carrying UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia, received instructions from their Union to proceed with the loading.

648 175 661 Hardly had this incident been settled when a fresh one arose, provoked by the American notes of July 26, August 10 and 18, and October 18, denouncing the internment in concentration camps, without any legal steps having been taken, of 165 persons entitled to claim American nationality; ten of these, it was alleged, had died as the result of ill-treatment. The Washington Government 'expressed the deep horror it felt at such practices, which are a violation of the principles of international law regarding the protection of foreign nationals, which amount to instances of unwilling or forced labour, in disregard of the natural rights of human beings, and present no feature to distinguish them from slavery'. Belgrade replied that the persons concerned were members of the German minority, were formerly affiliated to the *Kulturbund*, and had formed part of the fifth column, under cover of a borrowed nationality. The Government agreed to liberate the non-Yugoslavs whose American nationality should be recognised by the United States Embassy, on condition that they should leave the country immediately if they were *Volkdeutsche*.

Yugoslavia, in her turn, lodged a complaint against the United States, when she demanded the return of her river flotilla, detained in the upper reaches of the Danube by the American authorities. The latter recognised Yugoslavia's rights to 161 vessels, but contested ownership of sixteen others. It was not until the beginning of November, 1946, that restitution was ordered.

Another incident—omitting the arrests or charging of American nationals or members of the United States Embassy staff suspected of spying[*]—was caused by the closing, on September, 26, 1946, of the American Information Bureau in Belgrade, accused of circulating information prejudicial to the safety of the State. In this matter, the State Department appeared to disapprove of the zeal of Ambassador Patterson; after an exchange of notes, the Bureau was reopened in the following month.

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[*] Especially in January 1947 in connection with the Trifounovich case.

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These periodical misunderstandings revealed, rather than created, an unfriendly atmosphere. The truth is that the United States had never ceased to regard the established régime in Yugoslavia as a totalitarian organisation, on Russian lines, in which no civil rights or individual liberty existed. And this impression made itself felt in the peace negotiations, without—let us repeat—Tito's diplomacy making any serious effort to dispel it, thereby taking its share in responsibility for the failure of Yugoslav claims on Trieste.

The diplomatic tension between Belgrade and Washington was reflected in the recall (in March, 1947) of Mr. Patterson, United States Ambassador in Yugoslavia, when America rejected the demand for cereals formulated by Marshal Tito's Government. Mr. Patterson was replaced, but his severe judgements on the Yugoslav régime fixed the policy of the State Department towards Tito.

Although less full of incident, relations between London and Belgrade were scarcely more gracious. An English note of May 20 protested against the attitude of the Yugoslavs in Julian Venetia and the 'unfriendly policy' of their Government. British newspapers did not conceal their bitterness on finding that, despite Anglo-American sacrifices made in order to assist the populations of the new Yugoslavia to get on their feet again, the press of that country had nothing but suspicious or damaging comments to make on the Western Democracies.

Yugoslavia refused, for instance, to take part in the Victory Parade held in London on June 8, 1946, bluntly stating that the relations between the two countries did not justify such participation.

The attitude of the Yugoslav delegation at international conferences or Commissions, and in the United Nations, was not calculated to dissipate prejudice. This was fostered by exchanges of subacid notes—particularly those of January 10, 1947, in which the Yugoslav Government protested at the slowness of the British authorities in handing over war criminals of Italian nationality, and of January 29 regarding the murder of the Yugoslav consul, who had, on 25th of the same month, visited a *tchetnitsi* camp in the Naples district.

On the other hand, relations between Belgrade and the other Slav States gave rise to demonstrations of confidence and

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enthusiasm. On March 12, 1946, Marshal Tito went to Warsaw, where, on the 17th, he signed a cultural agreement and, on the 19th, a treaty of friendship and mutul aid, valid for twenty years, which was unanimously ratified by the Polish National Council on April 28. Yugoslav and Polish statesmen agreed on a joint line of action in the matter of either country's armed forces abroad, stationed in territories occupied by the Allies.

From Warsaw Tito went, on March 21, to Prague, where, after discussion with MM. Benes and Fierlinger, he announced the conclusion of a pact on similar lines, to be signed on May 10 in Belgrade by the Czech Premier, without reference to the United Nations pact. In accordance with the new line of policy, statesmen and journalists did their utmost to prove that these agreements were not to be regarded as the inception of a bloc of the Eastern European States.[7]

On May 28 Tito was in Moscow, where he remained until June 10. There he worked out the details necessary to bring Yugoslav diplomacy into close harmony with that of the Kremlin. And, as an immediate outcome, economic agreements sealed these exchanges of opinion; one of these agreements covered the arming and equipping of the Yugoslav Army by the Moscow Government.

On October 18 Tito's visit was returned by the President of the Polish Republic, Boleslaw Bierut, who toured Yugoslavia in company with the Marshal. The Premiers exchanged assurances of mutual assistance in their territorial claims. 'I promise you', said Tito, 'that the very utmost shall be done in order that your country may obtain satisfaction. If we don't succeed today, we will do so tomorrow'. President Bierutt, in his turn, undertook to back up the Yugoslav attitude in the question of Trieste and the Julian March.

This question of Trieste was for twenty months the stumbling-block in the way of peace negotiations and harmony among the Allies. It gave rise to innumerable incidents, and was the object of keen, bitter discussions. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim with more zeal than skill, threatening at one time not to attend meetings, at others, not to sign, and finally submitting to the *fait accompli*, having presumably over-estimated Russian support, or having forgotten that, for Moscow, Trieste was only one card in a game covering the whole world. It was at one time thought that Yugoslavs and Italians were going to come to a direct arrangement after the visit to Belgrade of Togliatti, the chief of the Communist Party, on November 3, 1946, and his talks with Tito. It would appear that the latter suggested exchanging Trieste (in reality already lost) for Gorizia—a proposal which the Italian Government promptly rejected. Since no arrangement was reached, the Great Powers had to arbitrate; general agreement was concluded between them on November 27. 648 175•

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[7] 'The policy of the U.S.S.R.', declared M. Fierlinger, 'succeeded happily in giving concrete expression to the idea of a community of all the Slav states, which remain entirely free and independent, but are united in a desire for common defence and work for peace in harmony with all the nations'.

In reality, it was not a question of deciding whether the Yugoslavs or the Italians should prevail in Trieste; the Russians feared that the Western Democracies would use the town as an economic and political bridge-head for their action in Eastern Europe, while the Anglo-Americans feared that the Stalin-controlled 'Slavonic bloc' would make Trieste the basis for its expansion in the Mediterranean. Such were the real factors in the dispute, notwithstanding the flux of historical, ethnographical, and economic arguments under which they seemed to be submerged. [829]

Yugoslavia abandoned Trieste, but she nevertheless obtained an important part of Istria and Julian Venetia (except the part that was to form the Free Territory of Trieste), as well as Zara and the Isles of Pelagosa and Lagosta. On the other hand, her claims to the Slovene part of Carinthia (which she had lost in the plebiscite of October 18, 1920), as well as to the 'Canalthal' to the north of Gorizia (region of Tarvisio) were rejected.

On January 14, 1946, she was elected a member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

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Bulgaria, during the pre-constitutional period, was a prey to the objurgations of the English and the Americans, who reproached her with disregarding the political conditions laid down by the Conference of Moscow in December, 1945, by refusing to call two members of the Opposition to power. Gheorgiev's Government was prepared to accept these representatives, but wanted first to see them adhere to its internal and external policy

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175 —in other words, renounce the very principles for which they would have been elected.

Pressed by solicitations or criticisms from London and Washington, M. Gheorgiev placed himself under the ægis of Moscow. He went to Russia on January 7, 1946. 'I am glad', he said on landing, 'to be within the fortress of the Slavonic peoples, which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of the whole of democratic humanity'. And to give a yet more decisive proof of the credit which he enjoyed in Moscow, his visit was immediately followed (on January 10) by that of M. Vyshinsky to Sofia.

[661] These manifestations did indeed strengthen the Bulgarian Government majority, but they disarmed neither the English nor the Americans, who protested, in diplomatic notes, against the police tactics of the régime, and the arrests of politicians.[*] In return, the Russians accused the Western Democracies of giving a false interpretation to Moscow's decisions affecting Bulgaria, and of encouraging subversive elements.

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175 In Sofia, they showed signs of anxiety over the persistence of this lack of harmony on the eve of the conclusion of the peace treaties, on which the future of Bulgaria was to depend. M. Gheorgiev hoped to clarify the situation by resigning on March 22. But the Opposition imposed, as a condition of its accepting office, the exclusion of any Communist from the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Agreement proved impossible; another Gheorgiev cabinet, restricted, like the previous one, to the parties of the Patriotic Front, was formed on March 29, 1946.

A few days later, this Government promulgated a decree convening the National Assembly, charged with revising the Constitution on Republican lines. The monarchical régime was denounced to the country as the cause of all its misfortunes—a statement which could, with greater truth, have been applied to the Treaty of San Stefano and the Macedonian psychosis it had

661 [*] For three months, the arrested men included Assen Stamboliiski, son of the famous Agrarian leader, assassinated in 1923, and a member of the Central Committee of the Agrarian Party. One of the grievances harboured by the Bulgarian Agrarians against the Communists was the attitude of neutrality maintained by the latter at the time of the *coup d'état* of June 9, 1923, which had marked the triumph of 'reaction' over Stamboliiski's régime.

engendered. For the occasion, they forgot the fact that the monarchy had, more than once, had its prerogatives disputed by dictatorships. Only by assassination did Ferdinand get rid of Stamboulov, and Boris of Stamboliiski. And M. Gheorgiev himself had been able to overthrow parliamentary government only because the army had given him a helping hand. The will of the sovereign had entered little into that event. 642 175 • [662]

However that might be, the fate of the monarchy was settled. By doing away with it, the Bulgarian people were convinced that they were clarifying their destiny. The young King Simeon II, then aged 8, was living in Vranja with his mother and his sister, in an isolation which was practically exile, while the royal duties were performed by three regents appointed by the National Front. On September 8, 1946, the Bulgarian nation, [666] by a huge majority (3,800,000 votes to 179,000), voted in favour of the republic, which was proclaimed on the 15th of the same month. The following week Simeon II, under the care of the Queen-Mother, who was dressed in deep mourning, embarked on a Turkish vessel bound for Egypt, where he was to join his maternal grandfather, ex-King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. One newspaper *Otetchestvene Front* (Homeland Front) published, by way of farewell, an article by General Hristo Stölkov, reproaching the defunct monarchy for having isolated Bulgaria from the other Slavonic peoples. 'It is no accident if, at the time of the first imperialist war, all the Slavs [*sic*] were on the side of the Allies, whilst Bulgaria alone threw in her lot with Germany'.

The convening of the electoral body for October 27[1] gave rise to a diplomatic passage of arms among the Allies. The British Government protested against the obstacles put in the way of the Opposition's campaign, and against the persecution to which the Agrarians were subjected. And Mr. Byrnes asked the Allied Control Commission, sitting in Sofia, to take adequate measures to guarantee the integrity of the poll. Russia's representative on the Commission, General Birousov, opposed the consideration of this request, which he denounced as foreign interference with Bulgarian home affairs. 648 175

The elections gave the anticipated results; the Home Front secured 346 seats (of which 277 went to the Communists) as against the Opposition's 101 seats. It would appear that this 666 175

[1] [1946 - Analyst]

666 •175 result even exceeded the expectations of M. Gheorgiev, who took fright at the excitement stirred up in the country by the Communists—hence this appeal to the population: 'Victory often intoxicates men, and defeat makes them lose their self-control. Tension resulting from elections, if not rapidly mastered, may help to foster a state of excitement prejudicial to order and tranquillity. The Government earnestly exhorts all citizens strictly to observe the laws'.

Spectacular as was the triumph of governmental coalition, it did not reach the overwhelming majorities of which Russia and Yugoslavia held the secret. In particular, the ministerial fraction belonging to the *Zveno* was beaten, so that the country had modified, to the advantage of the Communists, the relative strengths within the coalition. Now, in a nation which had neither capitalism nor trusts nor large industrial concerns nor *latifundia*, the word *Communist* had a meaning which was much more political than social.[*] It was above all the victory of the 'Russianisers', long held in check by the official policy.

[563] It must moreover be admitted that, renewing the gesture of the liberating Tsar, the Soviet Union had just saved the Bulgarian people by protecting them from the consequences of their rulers' collusion with the Axis. The question that still remained was whether Russia would not have preferred to be defended in Sofia by traditionally 'national' elements, rather than by a party too openly connected with Moscow, and whose leader, George Dimitrov, the hero of the Leipzig trial, was thought to be a tool of Russia.

642 175 As a logical consequence of the elections, a new Government was in fact formed by Dimitrov on November 23.[1] It included ten Communists, five Agrarians, two Socialists, two members of the *Zveno* and one Independent. The ex-President, Kimon Gheorgiev, held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The semi-official press saw it as 'the most democratic Government Bulgaria has ever had', whilst the Opposition emphasised the complete hold on power which the Communists had obtained.

648 175 This Government's vital tasks were to be signing the peace and voting the Constitution. On February 12, 1947, it secured

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[162] [*] The working-class strengths, on which the Communists rely, are very small; indeed, 80% of the population are engaged in agriculture, not to mention tradesmen, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions.

[1] [1946-Analyst]

from England the legal recognition which she had refused to a non-Communist Ministry. However, the Foreign Office felt bound to state that this recognition 'by no means implied that Great Britain considered the methods previously employed by the Bulgarian Government to consolidate its position, or the conditions under which the elections had been organised, as conforming to the spirit and the letter of the Yalta declaration concerning Liberated Europe'. 648 175

The Bulgarian reply dismissed these objections, but expressed the Sofia Government's satisfaction and its desire to respect the peace treaty.

The Constitution submitted to the Legislature had to reconcile the exigencies of a very Leftist democracy with the specific traits of the Bulgarian nation, and the laws of its historical development. It was not federal, like the Russian or Yugoslav constitutions, but unitary. Bulgaria was to be a parliamentary republic, in which authority belonged to the people, whose will was expressed by means of elections or a referendum. The President was elected for four years (by a two-thirds majority) by the Legislature, plus one representative from each Cantonal Council and five representatives from each Departmental Council. The Legislature was elected for four years, on the basis of one member for every 25,000 inhabitants. 642 175 [182]

The Constitution sanctioned the right to private property and the right of inheritance, but placed in the hands of the State the country's natural resources, its sub-soil, transport, marine and fluvial navigation, communications, radio, and external trade. The new Bulgarian economy was inspired by the co-operative principle as understood in the Slavonic tradition (*mir* or *zadrouga*) rather than by pure collectivism. [181]

In his ministerial declaration M. George Dimitrov had defined friendship with U.S.S.R. as 'the corner-stone of his foreign policy', but promised to endeavour to normalise relations with London and Washington. He expressed his gratitude 'to the sister nations—and particularly the new Yugoslavia[10]—for the help they had rendered to Bulgaria at the Peace Conference'. 648 175

Indeed, Bulgaria had no reason to complain of the Con-

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[10] Who, on the previous June 15, had wiped out certain Bulgarian reparations.

648 •175 ference, which, while treating her as a conquered country, nevertheless left her Southern Dobrudja which she had obtained from Rumania under a friendly agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis.

728 175 By her memoranda addressed to the Four Powers on May 7 and June 20, she had asked to be designated in the peace treaties, not as an Axis 'Satellite State' but as a 'Co-belligerent Ally'. Her delegate to the Paris Conference maintained that the moral responsibility of the Bulgarian people had not been involved in the policy of collaboration with Germany,[11] that, moreover, no Bulgarian soldier had borne arms against the Red Army, and that the country's heroic resistance, at the critical moment of the war, entitled her to the Allies' sympathetic consideration.

This request was rejected, however, as well as that which aimed at securing access to the Aegean Sea (the famous 'outlet' of Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly) or, more clearly, that part of Western Thrace which had been under Bulgarian sovereignty between 1913 (Treaty of Bucharest) and 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly) and which, at the time of which we are speaking, formed part of Greece. This request, as well as the claim for indemnity for 'investments and improvements' effected by the Bulgarian troops on Greek soil during the occupation, at the Luxembourg Conference provoked vigorous reaction on the part of the Greek Premier, M. Tsaldaris, who reproached the Bulgarians with having attacked his country three times in the space of a single generation.

[648] Much more: Messrs. Byrnes and Bevin took the opportunity of M. Kolarov's visit to Paris to intimate to him the dissatisfaction their Governments felt at the way in which the [563] Opposition was treated in Sofia. Moreover, the British delegate demanded the insertion of a special clause intended to protect Jewish minorities, although it was well known that—except in the last war, and even then, not without the exercise of great restraint[12]—the Jews had never been the object of discriminating measures.

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[11] Almost word for word, this was the thesis maintained at the end of the previous war by M. Mollov, the Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations: 'Bulgaria . . . was drawn into the war by events contrary to the manifest will of the majority of the people, and of the political parties'.

[12] The opposition of the Bulgarian people to racial laws spared the Jews the atrocities to which they were subjected in other Eastern European countries.

So the signature, on February 10, of the peace treaty which (except in Dobrudja) maintained the territorial *status quo* of 1919, was made under protest—on the part of the Government, which, in an official note, expressed its hope of a revision of the 'unjust clauses' of the treaty; on the part of the Homeland Front, which invited the population to 'roll up its sleeves' and work to surmount the difficulties inherent in the application of the treaty; on the part of the Opposition parties, which, while they considered the treaty contrary to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and to the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, yet blamed the Government for not having been willing to apply sincerely the Moscow agreements, nor to follow the advice of the 'democratic Great Powers'. 728 175•

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Poland's fundamental problem in 1946 was the reorganisation and repopulation of the western territories taken from Germany and incorporated by Poland in conformity with the decision of the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945, and with the Polish-Sovietic treaty of the following August 17. 'Our western frontiers', said Wladislaw Gomulka, Vice-President of the Council, 'are essential to the maintenance of peace in Europe. Any one who opposes us in this respect threatens our most vital interests, and must be considered as our enemy'.

Three million Poles repatriated from Russia were to be settled in the western territories, where they would be joined by a million and a half Poles from the interior, taken from the overpopulated districts, and a million and a half repatriated exiles. Out of four million Germans liable to deportation, 2,400,000 had already been settled in the Russian-occupied zone of Germany, and one million and a quarter in the British zone. So that the total movements of population affected more than seven million individuals.

Within her new frontiers Poland included 195,000 sq. miles instead of 242,875 sq. miles that she covered before the war; her population had fallen from 35,000,000 inhabitants to 23,620,000. She no longer had on her soil any national minorities; Germans, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians and Lithuanians were to be repatriated, where this had not already been done. As for the Jews, their number dropped from three and a half million to 86,000. Poland, which had six neighbours before the 131 175 [162]

131 war, now had only three—Russia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. •175 One aspect of her new position which represented an innovation was her transformation into a great maritime nation, thanks to the three ports, Stettin, Gdynia, and Danzig, and to her 312 miles of coast-line. Nevertheless, her destiny would henceforth be more closely bound to that of Central Europe, while remaining subordinate to the *entente* with Moscow.

666 The western frontiers were approved by the plebiscite of June 30, which covered not only the frontier-ratification, but also the abolition of the Senate and the economic organisation of the [471] State (Agrarian reform and nationalisation of key industries). [423] The first ballot gave 10,534,697 in favour and 995,584 against; the second gave 7,844,522 in favour and 3,686,029 against; the third, 8,896,106 in favour and 2,634,446 against.

578 648 661 175 This popular referendum did not have the tranquillising effects that had seemingly been expected. Poland continued to be a prey to 'terrorist' agitation, the repression of which, in turn, gave rise to scenes of violence and to exactions. While dissociating himself from the extremists, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, M. Mikolajczyk, himself protested against the way in which the referendum had been carried out (except in Cracow, where the 'Noes' had been in the majority). So the British Government reserved its opinion on the legitimacy which this poll conferred on the régime, and awaited the general elections before giving legal recognition to the new state of affairs. And the whole of 1946 was taken up with exchanges of subacid notes between London and Washington on the one side and Warsaw on the other. The Anglo-Americans denounced the persecution to which the Opposition was subjected, and considered that the Polish Government was failing in the undertaking given in execution of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to guarantee the liberty of elections. But the Russians interpreted quite differently both the scope of these agreements and the meaning of the word 'liberty'. And so the most obvious result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of England and the United States was to intensify Polish-Sovietic solidarity.

648 175 [642] The formation, in June, of a National Unity Government under the Presidency of M. Osubka Morawski seemed, for the time being, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Anglo-Americans, although the dissident Polish Government in London

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had refused to recognise this new Cabinet. But the truce was a short one. The preparation of the electoral law, voted on September 23, revived the controversy[13] and occasioned a fresh diplomatic assault. The Foreign Office and the State Department sent to Warsaw, on August 19, concerted notes, couched as 'warnings'. They recalled the irregularities known to have taken place on the occasion of the referendum, and suggested a series of measures calculated to prevent their repetition in connection with the elections. When handing over the American note, the United States ambassador felt the need to justify such an unusual step: 'In departing from its traditional policy', he said, 'and in assuming responsibilities in the affairs of another State, my Government is obeying a conviction that its important role in the liberation of the European peoples imposes on it very particularly the duty to assist the Polish people, so sorely tried by the Nazi occupation, to be quite free to elect the government of its choice'.

M. Osubka Morawski took this double admonition very badly. His embassy in Washington declared to the press that the American note 'constituted a violation of the sovereign rights of Poland and an interference in her internal affairs'; the Warsaw press spoke of 'vassalisation'; and the two notes received no official reply.

A few days later the Polish leaders went to Minsk, where, on August 29, they met Generalissimo Stalin, with whom they discussed the question of the elections. They received assurances which enabled them, thenceforth, to resist the Anglo-American offensive.

Meanwhile a disagreement which had arisen between London and Warsaw a few weeks previously was being settled. This concerned a protest made by the Polish Government against

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[13] A memorandum was sent, in August 1946, to the representatives of the United Nations taking part in the Peace Conference in Paris by the 'Polish Socialist and Workers' Associations Abroad'; its authors recalled the sufferings of Poland during the war, demanded the re-establishment of civic liberties, and declared that the Government had against it 'about 90% of the public opinion of the country'. The Conference was also notified of a protest on the part of the Central Union of Poles in France and of the Union of Catholic Polish Societies in France. In the following month, the Congress of Americans of Polish Origin addressed to Mr. Byrnes a memorandum suggesting that the problem of Poland should be laid before the United Nations, and asking for recognition of the western frontiers.

648 •175 certain items which had appeared in the News Bulletin published by the British Embassy in Poland, and judged by official circles to be tendentious. At the beginning of September the Foreign Office announced that the Bulletin would publish no more reports concerning Poland's internal affairs. But semi-official commentators felt obliged to emphasise that this assurance, at variance with British practice, had not been given without hesitation; it had been largely prompted by fear that the Bulletin's collaborators would be arrested by the Polish authorities. So that the settlement of the dispute, by its very nature, contained the germ of future unpleasantness.

Moreover, Warsaw cherished many other bones of contention as far as the English were concerned. The latter were first accused of wanting to keep the gold belonging to the National Bank, and then reproached with supporting the Polish 'reactionaries', with refusing to repatriate General Anders' army *en bloc,* and with lending too sympathetic an ear to the complaints and recriminations of the Peasant Party. Although it was for Poland that England had entered the war, it may be said that it was against the British cabinet that the most bitter criticisms were directed by the Polish Government and press.

The attacks reached their culminating point in the autumn, after Mr. Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart on September 6, and Mr. Bevin's declaration in the House of Commons on October 22.

648 175 728 Mr. Byrnes had said: 'As regards Silesia and the other Eastern German territories, their allocation to Poland by Russia, for administrative purposes, had taken place before the Potsdam meeting. . . . As the minutes of the Conference plainly show, the heads of the Governments did not undertake to support, on the establishment of peace, the cession of any particular territory. . . . The extent of the region to be ceded to Poland must be determined at the time when the final settlement is made'.[14]

Taken in conjunction with Mr. Bevin's speech, these words could bear the interpretation that Great Britain and America would, at the time of the final Peace Conference, make the

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[14] The relevant paragraph of the Potsdam agreement is worded as follows: 'The heads of the three Governments reaffirm the opinion that the final delimitation of Poland's western frontiers must be made at the time of the peace settlement'.

question of the Oder-Neisse frontiers dependent on that of free 648
elections. M. Molotov at once challenged Mr. Byrnes's declara- 175
tion, affirming that Russia considered the Polish-German 728
frontiers as definitive. If, on the one hand, this intervention alienated the German Communists from him, and contributed to their defeat at the municipal elections, on the other hand, it secured for him enthusiastic approbation in Polish circles. In most of the large towns popular meetings were held, and the crowds booed the name of Mr. Byrnes, and even of America.

The tension lasted right up to the elections. The arrest of 648
members of the Polish Peasant Party had its echo in the House 175
of Commons, where, on October 22, Mr. Churchill drew a 'sad picture' of the situation in Poland. 'We must', he said, 'take great care to distinguish in our minds between the present Polish Government and the feelings of the Polish nation, whose affliction and sufferings seem to be never-ending'. The Minister of State, Mr. McNeil, emphasised once more the fact that England was a joint signatory to the undertakings given by the Warsaw Government, and thereby bound to see that they were carried out.

So, when the legislative elections had been fixed for January 19, the Governments of London and Washington considered the time had come to repeat their representations on behalf of a free poll. On November 22, they handed over, through their representatives in Warsaw, two simultaneous notes (identical, as regards contents, with those which had been handed to Rumania and Bulgaria on previous occasions). These two documents referred to the previous warnings, and concluded by mentioning that it would be impossible for the Anglo-American democracies to recognise any Government which might be based on elections carried out with violence, or whose results had been falsified.

No reply was made to the American Department of State. That destined for the Foreign Office was delayed for a month. It answered Great Britain's arguments by setting out a complete accusation, intended to show that that Power had herself deliberately violated the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in seven respects, as under:—

1. Role of 'advisers to the British Government' played by Polish exiles in London.

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2. Reorganisation and re-equipment of the Anders Army.
3. Control exercised by the exiled Polish Government in London over property wrongfully left at its disposal, together with that of the Polish Consulates abroad.
4. Retention of the Polish gold deposited in London during the war.
5. Retention of the Polish battle-ships placed at the disposal of the British war-fleet during the occupation.
6. Financing by Great Britain of the campaign to dissuade Polish refugees and deportees from returning to their country.
7. Reduction of the quota of Germans from the western territories of Poland that England had undertaken to admit to her occupation zone in Germany.

This fruitless exchange of notes continued until the eve of the elections. In the end, England realised its futility, whereas, on January 5, 1947, America laid before her two major Allies a proposal for joint supervision of the electoral proceedings. Russia rejected this proposal, once again refuting its motives, and a further American note of January 9, was described by the Polish chargé d'affaires at Washington as 'very regrettable'.

[66] The elections, held on January 19,[1] resulted in 9,003,682 votes for the Governmental bloc (*i.e.*, 80.1 per cent of the voters) as against 1,154,847 for the Polish Peasant Party (*i.e.*, 10.3 per cent).

The comedy of the Anglo-American protests did not end with this poll. It had its epilogue in a note from Washington, dated January 29, affirming that the State Department neither considered the elections to have been free, nor Poland's engagements to have been kept, but did not, nevertheless, intend to break off diplomatic relations.[15] The British Under-Secretary

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[15] This did not prevent Mr. Truman from making the following statement to the new Polish ambassador, M. Winieniez, when, on February 4, the latter presented his credentials. 'We, the American people and myself, were very much upset to find that the Provisional Government of Poland had failed to fulfil its undertakings with regard to freedom of elections' —which was contrary to the conventional optimism with which these ceremonial occasions are usually surrounded. And, in the *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), the ex-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, published this violent commentary: 'The results of the elections in Poland have been even more fantastic than was to be expected. The P.S.L. (Polish Peasant Party) have been allocated one-tenth of the man-

[1] [1947--Analyst]

for Foreign Affairs spoke in similar vein in the House of 648
Commons. And the final result of all this fuss was simply that 175
England and the United States were not represented at the inaugural session of the Third Polish Republic, held on February 4. Moreover, that did not prevent those two countries from offering their congratulations, the next day, to M. Boleslaw Bierut, President of the Republic. London and Washington had never had any other concern than that of 'saving appearances'. They knew quite well that these platonic manifestations of displeasure would have no other effect than to consolidate Muscovite influence in Warsaw.

The Presidency of the new Government was entrusted to a 643
young member of the Cracow bar—M. Joseph Cyrankiewicz, 175
General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and a survivor of the Auschwitz Camp. In May, political life was gradually becoming normal. The President of the Republic compared it to a river 'which, after having been diverted from its bed by a cataclysm, was finding its true course again'.

To the new Cabinet was to fall the mission of getting the 648
Oder-Neisse frontier sanctioned by the Peace Conference. In 728
its own view, as well as that of the whole of Poland, the question 175
was settled by the fact that transfers of population had already taken place, without any protests from London or Washington. It was difficult to conceive that millions of Displaced Persons would be compelled to undergo a fresh exodus. The Anglo-Americans would therefore be obliged, in Mr. Churchill's phrase, 'to write off Eastern Europe on the Profit and Loss account'. Moreover, France supported the Polish viewpoint; on February 19, 1947, she signed a cultural agreement with Warsaw—the preface to a new political pact, it being understood that Poland would support her claims on the Saar, as she would back up those of Poland to the maintenance of her western frontier. The question of the frontiers gave rise, in April, 1947, to a bitter and sterile passage-of-arms between Americans and Russians at the Moscow Conference.

Another and no less redoubtable motive of discord between 000

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dates which fell to the Socialo-Communist bloc which backs the regime of Bierut and Osubka-Morawski. So the Moscow-controlled parties get 400 out of the 444 seats in the Polish Diet. . . . The last vestiges of Polish liberty, for which General Sikorski is still fighting, will tend to disappear'.

648 Another and no less redoubtable motive of discord between
•175 Poland and the Western Allies was the existence in Italy of an army (the former Second Polish Corps), under the orders of General Wladislaw Anders, who had not recognised the Warsaw Government—because, he said, it had not been freely chosen by the Polish people. His troops did not refuse to enter Poland, but they were not prepared to do so until the Russians had gone. On this question, as on that of the elections, a diplomatic duel took place—the initiative, this time, lying with the Warsaw Cabinet. The incident began with a note, of January, 1946, in which this Cabinet accused England of equipping and supplying these forces, and with a protest to Washington against the functioning, in the American zone, of a liaison between the Anders Army and the secret organisations of the interior. General Anders opposed a categorical denial to this assertion; according to him, it was nothing but a false scent, to divert attention from the political crisis existing in the country.

Yugoslavia intervened abruptly in this affair, by submitting to the General Secretariat of the United Nations, through M. Vyshinsky, a memorandum destined for the Security Council, claiming that the Polish Army in Italy, executing manœuvres which brought it near to the Julian March, and recruiting Yugoslavs, was considered as 'aggressive and manifestly dangerous' for the Belgrade Government.

England, quite justifiably, was surprised to find the Yugoslavs adopting this roundabout method of lodging a complaint directly aimed at her. She immediately denied the allegations.

But thereupon, a communication from the Warsaw Government, February 14, declared that, from that date onwards, it ceased to consider the Polish forces abroad as units of the national army. The Government therefore demanded that such troops should no longer be permitted to wear Polish uniform or badges, and that they should be demobilised. A few days later, Radio-Warsaw broadcast an appeal to Polish soldiers abroad, urging them to arrange for repatriation. And, on March 20, Mr. Bevin submitted to the Commons the text of an Anglo-Polish agreement for the demobilisation of these soldiers (at least 200,000 men), half of whom constituted the total strength of the Anders Army stationed in Italy. No judicial action was to be taken against the returned soldiers, unless they had served in the German Army, or in the Todt organisation. Those who were unwilling to go would not be forced to return to Poland, but their right to remain in England would be considered individually. 648 175

It goes without saying that the 'Polish Government in London' protested against this decision, on which they had not been consulted. On June 1 General Anders bade farewell to his troops. 'We must', he said, 'leave Italy on the eve of the peace treaties. We have traversed this country from South to North, waging against Germany a battle for the liberty of the nations. Polish hearts will never forget that we have fought also for the liberty of the Church. . . . Tomorrow, by an unknown road, we shall go to Poland—to a Poland for which we have fought, and which no Polish heart can imagine without Lwow and Wilno'. At the end of October he left Italy for England, where he joined the unarmed Resettlement Corps.[16] Shortly before (on September 28) and as the result of this incorporation, a decree of the Council of Polish Ministers had withdrawn his nationality, as well as that of seventy-four other officers, of or above the rank of general.

The exact figures of those who were voluntarily repatriated have never been given. But it is certain that a large number of Poles, especially among those whose home district had passed under Soviet control, preferred the risks and the misfortunes of exile to returning to their birthplace.

Relations between Warsaw and Moscow were maintained on the lines laid down for them by the Polish-Sovietic pact of August 18, 1945—of which instruments of ratification were exchanged on February 7, 1946.

But, as M. Cyrankiewicz himself had remarked, 'Many Poles still suffered from an anti-Russian complex'. This persistence of hostility towards Russia was, according to him, attributable to the memory of the Tsarist oppression and the anti-Bolshevist propaganda which had been ceaselessly carried out between the two wars. [829]

The visit of President Bierut and the Polish statesmen to

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[16] A British M.P. having asked (on February 18, 1947) why the general's salary figured on the army budget, Richard Stokes, a Labour M.P., divulged that the military authorities admitted that, without the collaboration of the Anders Army, the Italian campaign might have ended in disaster.

648 175 Moscow (May 23–26, 1946) was due to the necessity for a fresh exchange of views on the international situation, on the strengthening of the Polish Army to protect the rear of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, and on the conclusion of economic agreements. Arrangements were in fact reached. They stipulated the cancelling of the financial engagements contracted during the war for equipping the Polish Army; the supply of Russian arms and munitions; the opening of a credit and the furnishing of food supplies.[17] On August 16 the U.S.S.R. and Poland signed a frontier treaty, ceding to the Poles the region situated east of the Curzon line, between the Western Boug and the River Solokia, to the south of the town of Krilow, to a maximum depth of nineteen miles, together with a part of the Forest of Bjalowiez, likewise to the east of the Curzon line, to a maximum depth of eleven miles.

A fresh interview between Stalin and MM. Bierut and Osubka-Morawski took place in Minsk on the following August 29. It dealt principally with the Anglo-American notes relating to the elections, and with the relations, on the eve of the poll, between the Socialist Party and the Labour Party. It was a fortnight later that, replying to Mr. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, M. Molotov reaffirmed the Soviet point of view, according to which the western frontier of Poland was sacrosanct.

On February 24, 1947, M. Cyrankiewicz arrived in Moscow to confer with Stalin on the prospects opened up for Poland by the Peace Conference for Germany, convened in the Soviet capital for March 10.

648 175 457 Connected with the question of 'free elections', still further incidents arose between Poland and the Anglo-American democracies. On April 25, 1946, the Warsaw Government had obtained a loan of fifty million dollars under the following double arrangement: Forty million dollars would be supplied by the Export-Import Bank for the payment of purchases effected in the United States; surplus army material, stocked in Europe, would be supplied to the Government on credit, up to a limit of fifty million dollars. America had stipulated, as conditions of her financial aid, that the Polish Government should organise free elections, should inform the people of the terms of

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[17] It was only on November 21 that the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade disclosed the tenor of his agreements with Russia.

the agreement, and should furnish the United States with full details of treaties concluded with other Powers. 648 175• 457

Since these conditions had not been fulfilled, America announced, in the month of May, that she was reconsidering the matter. Warsaw then communicated the text of the commercial treaties concluded with the neighbouring countries. The fact that, after this, the United States restored the credit of ninety million dollars shows that they did not consider these treaties as incompatible with their collaboration in Polish economic recovery. In January, 1947, Polish assets in America—including gold—were 'de-blocked', in consideration of an agreement fixing the indemnification of American nationals who owned nationalised Polish concerns.

But the question of the elections remained as a background to the feeling of strain which hung over the relations between Washington and Warsaw. In March, 1947, it came to the fore again, when the United States ambassador, Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, resigned as an expression of the disapproval he had never ceased to exhibit towards a régime resulting from an electoral consultation which he had designated 'a farce'. Far from disowning him, Mr. Truman, in accepting his resignation, declared his regret that 'his skilful representation of the American Government's views had not attained its object'.

The financial negotiations with England experienced similar vicissitudes. The agreement of June 24, 1946, for the grant of a loan, subject to the repayment of the debts of the former London Government, was at first postponed; official Polish circles accused Great Britain of retaining the greater part of their compatriots' assets as security for her claims, and especially the 4,800,000,000 francs (gold) belonging to the Bank of Poland. On December 19, the English Embassy in Warsaw was obliged to protest against the manner in which these questions were presented by the Polish press, who took pleasure in contrasting the British claims with Russia's gesture in wiping out Poland's war debts.

We have recalled that one of the sore points in Slav solidarity was the question of the allocation of the Teschen Basin, occupied by the Poles since October 2, 1938. The question had already, between the two wars, caused a lot of ink to flow. It had grafted itself on to attacks made by the Polish press against 648 728 175

648 Prague's policy with regard to the Slovaks, and by the Czech
728 press against Warsaw's treatment of the Ukrainian minorities.
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At the end of 1945 the Polish Government had proposed a general settlement of matters outstanding. Prague had agreed in principle, but excluding territorial questions. Poland rejected this reservation. Negotiations opened in Prague on February 7, 1946. The Czechs again refused to have the question of Teschen reopened; they were anxious not to jeopardise the promise made by the Allies to restore their frontiers as they were before Munich.

So the matter was adjourned. But neither of the two Governments neglected any occasion of reaffirming their country's rights to Teschen.

'The Government of Poland' (said M. Rzymowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on March 8) 'most emphatically condemns the violence of Munich exercised by Hitler in common with Beck, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938–1939, towards Czechoslovakia, a friendly country. I cannot, however, forbear to mention the fact that Silesian Teschen is peopled by a mass of 100,000 Poles who, for some decades, and especially during the six years of the German occupation, by their attitude affirmed their desire to be reincorporated in the mother country'.

To which the President of the Czech Council, M. Fierlinger, replied, recalling that this territory contained the richest coal-mines of Czechoslovakia, that the country's industry had been particularly developed there, large capital sums having been invested, and that along the Polish-Czech frontier passed the most important of the railways joining Bohemia and Moravia to Slovakia. 'So', he concluded, 'any cession of the territory of Teschen to the Poles would prejudice the most vital interests of our country. For these motives, as well as for ethnical reasons, we cannot discuss with the Polish Government the cession of any of these territories. Naturally, we are ready to come to an agreement with the Poles on the most friendly basis, regarding any other arrangement which would suit them, particularly for a reciprocal exchange of population which might finally settle this very complicated problem, to the interest of both countries'.

The most curious part was that the two Governments, equally intractable on this point, showed themselves none the less disposed to conclude an alliance, even a federal pact. Poland would have seen in this a way of submerging the importance of

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the Teschen affair. But Czechoslovakia kept the two matters distinct, and was not prepared to raise the question of the pact until the frontier dispute had been settled.

Marshal Tito was either asked, or was tempted, to offer his mediation. He met with no better success than M. Benes had encountered when, immediately after the previous war, he had tried to intervene between Belgrade and Sofia to appease the Macedonian quarrel. It was obvious, moreover, that the real arbitrator of the dispute could be none other than Stalin. And so the question of Teschen headed the agenda of the conversations that took place in Moscow, in June, 1946, between M. Fierlinger and the Russian and Polish chiefs. The last-named maintained that the territorial sacrifices they had made to Russia should be compensated with the territories partly populated by Poles. The Czechs showed themselves adamant. Had not they, too, ceded Sub-Carpathia to the Russians, and without any compensation? They formulated, or allowed to be formulated, other demands—a frontier-rectification, to do away with the two salients of Glatz and Ratibor, the incorporation of Lusatia with Bautzen, Loebau and Cottbus, and the incorporation of the Austrian town of Gmünd (already occupied).

The Soviet representatives dismissed both parties non-suited. Probably they were not sorry to preserve a possible means of bringing pressure to bear on both sides. They did, however, assure the Czechs that the question would not be settled by Moscow without their consent. As for the Poles, they saw in the Czech claims to Glatz a move to give them a possible basis for bargaining.

The Western Allies prudently refrained from intervening in this dispute, although it affected both the political and the economic balance of the Continent.

Eventually on March 10, 1947, Poles and Czechs concluded a treaty of alliance that stabilised their relations, but, trusting to the effects of time, left them until 1949 to settle the matter of Teschen—the very one whose settlement was of paramount importance for those relations!

The Polish delegation to the Peace Conference expressed very precise views on the fate of Austria and Germany. They demanded guarantees against a fresh Anschluss, the unity of the Reich to be subject to effective demilitarisation and denazifica-

648 728 •175 tion, and the reconstruction of German economic life subordinated to the reconstruction of the devastated countries.

648 175 On the United Nations' Security Council the Polish delegation fastened on the Spanish problem, displaying all the more energy, inasmuch as none of their positive interests was at stake. They backed the views supported by France and the Soviet Union on rupture with Franco, and decided, on April 5, 1946, to recognise the Giral Government--an eminently platonic gesture, for Franco's Spain and Poland had no diplomatic relations.

*186 659 [798] The religious question, too, was a serious preoccupation of the Government, which refuted the widespread accusation of wishing to persecute the Catholic Church. It had, moreover, always included 'practising' Catholics among its members, for Poland is certainly one of the few countries where 'Leftists' are just as good Catholics as 'Rightists'. Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland and Archbishop of Warsaw, himself declared that, in spite of the denunciation of the Concordat of 1925, and the absence of relations between Chruch and State, there was no question of a Kulturkampf in Poland.

[586] There is no doubt; however, that the law (which came into force on January 1, 1946) rendering civil marriage compulsory and authorising divorce conflicted with the consciences of a large section of the population. The education reforms had dealt a death-blow to the religious schools. In the face of these measures, the Church adopted an attitude of restrained disapproval, in order not to make the situation worse; moreover, she had her 'Red Bishops', such as Mgr. Adamski, Bishop Katowice, whose sympathies were known to lie with the Soviet Union.

One of the reasons why the hierarchy avoided clashes was the fear of reviving accusations brought against certain of their members as the result of their attitude during the occupation; this in spite of the courageous conduct of the enormous majority of the prelates, and the murder by the Germans of four bishops and two thousand priests.

*186 659 798 It was, moreover, evident that the Warsaw Government's hostility was directed less against the Polish Church than against the Vatican, which they reproached with its policy during the war and its attitude in certain actions brought against agents of the occupying authorities. Yet M. Osubka-Morawski likewise

accused the hierarchy, in connection with the Kielce pogrom,[18] 186*
of not having adopted a sufficiently bold attitude towards anti- 659
Semitism, and of having refused to sign the declaration of all 798
political parties, condemning this racial crime.

The Cardinal addressed to the foreign press declarations in which, while deploring the acts of violence, he attributed them largely 'to the dominant position assumed by the Jews in the Polish Government, and to the efforts made to give Poland a governmental structure that the majority of the country did not desire'. As may be imagined, these words aroused passionate comments. The same remark applies to the pastoral letter addressed to the faithful on the eve of the elections, asking them to vote only 'for persons, lists or programmes in favour of Catholic teaching and morals'. Without mentioning the Marxist Parties by name, the pastoral reminded Catholics that they must not belong to 'organisations whose principles are contrary to this teaching and this morality'. The Cardinal was anxious, he said, to 'reconcile the Christian faith with a sound revolutionary movement'.

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It was in Czechoslovakia that the adaptation of political and 642
social life to the new state of affairs was achieved with the 563
minimum of clashes and the maximum of realism. The Second 175•
Republic was stabilised under the form of a 'Socialising Democracy' (according to President Benes's term), half-way between Communism and the Bourgeois State. It no longer had the same exterior structure as Masaryk's republic, having adopted a *sui generis* type of bi-national community, with equal rights for Czechs and Slovaks. There was another innovation—a still more vital one—the elimination of minorities, whose presence and militancy had hindered its development, before contributing to its dislocation under the Hitlerian onrush.

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[18] In this locality,[1] on July 4, 1946, there was a pogrom, arising out of a trifling cause, in the course of which 45 Jews were massacred. Nine of the presumed authors of this massacre were condemned to death. The clandestine organisations were accused of having fomented anti-Semite passions, whereas, in reality, the latter had remained very much alive in Poland—as witness the testimony of Dr. Shoskes, South America's representative in the Society for Assistance to Jewish Immigrants, and M. Segal, delegate to the World Jewish Congress of New York. Despite the frightful losses they suffered during the occupation, which reduced them to an insignificant minority, the Polish Jews, for the most part, aspire to leave the country. This is one of the indirect aspects of the Palestinian problem. 798

1 [in Kielce - Analyst]

578 •175 The problem of the relations between Prague and Bratislava was difficult to settle. It had handicapped the political development of the country from 1919 to 1938, and six years of separate life (from 1938 to 1944) had not failed to add fresh grievances to the old ones. In addition to all this, Slovakia herself suffered from an internal crisis—antagonism between a heterogeneous Catholic majority and a united, combative, Communist minority. The Democratic Party, which comprised the Catholics, presented a front only in the struggle against Marxism, the Soviet stranglehold, and Czech Centralism. In the face of constructive problems it was divided. It suffered, moreover, under the suspicion of having owed its electoral triumph only to the Autonomists and to the former 'collaborators'. Here, as elsewhere, the Communist Party sought to monopolise all the merit of the Resistance.

And Slovak particularism had not disarmed. This was made clear when, in the summer of 1946, the central Government ordered exchanges between Czech and Slovak military units; this order met with violent resistance.

However, that is a problem which the Czechs have had time to study, and in which they have acquired bitter, but profound, experience. It is a psychological rather than a political problem, affected by social and religious reactions, not to mention the campaign against the régime carried on by Slovak exiles in America, under the leadership of M. Stephan Osusky, former Czechoslovak Minister in Paris. It is possible that the fundamental difference between the two peoples may lie in the fact that one was under the heel of the German, the other of the Magyar.

642 175 On June 24[1] was concluded an agreement destined to become the foundation of the new Czechoslovak community, based on a formula which lies half-way between decentralisation and autonomy. This is how it works. Apart from the three reserved departments (Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and Foreign Trade), Slovakia has her own organs of representation and government: a National Council of one hundred members, drawn from the parties, empowered to settle purely Slovak questions; an Executive Council composed of fifteen Commissars appointed by the Czech Government on the nomination of the Slovak National Council. These Commissars are, at one and the same time, real Ministers as far as Slovak affairs are

[1. 1946 - Analyst]

concerned, and executive agents for Prague for Czechoslovak affairs. This was the solution found for the dualism previously existing in Czechoslovakia. 642 175•

In virtue of this system the Slovaks have institutions which enable them to settle their own problems, while at the same time participating in the general control of the country. Hence the current joke about the 'Slovakisation of Czechoslovakia'.

Thus did President Benes succeed in adapting the spiritual heritage of Masaryk, and his own tendencies, to an internal and external situation very different from that which, in 1918, had shaped the rebirth of the Czech nation. And yet Benes took pains to safeguard signs of independence, and to maintain bonds of spiritual solidarity with the West, in order to attest his faith in his country's mission as a mediatrix, her role as a stabilising factor between the East and the West of the Continent. But the new Czechoslovakia no longer reflected the image that Masaryk had popularised—that of a European Slavism formed in the school of the Liberal Democracies. [186] [829]

The first elections carried out after the liberation—those of May 26, 1946—gave a slight majority to the Marxists, who had 153 seats out of the 300 of which the National Assembly was composed.[19] 666 175

This shift in the majority had little practical effect. The internal policy, based on nationalisation,[20] and the realisation of a very advanced social programme, underwent the fewer modifications, inasmuch as the Communists, anticipating their electoral victory, had already secured possession of the principal control levers.

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[19] The results were as follows:—

	Votes	Percentage
Bohemia-Moravia		
Communists	2,205,658	40.17
National-Socialists	1,298,967	23.66
Populars	1,010,920	20.23
Social-Democrats	855,771	15.59
Slovakia		
Democrats (Christian)	988,275	61.43
Communists	490,257	30.48
Liberty Party	67,575	4.20
Labour Party	49,983	3.11

As will be seen, the majority was reversed in Bohemia and in Slovakia. 471

[20] The nationalisation programme which took effect on March 13, 1946, placed the majority of the key-industries under State control. Commenting on this event, the Minister of Industry declared: 'This day marks a date in the history of the world's industry'. 175

186* •175 From the external point of view, Czechoslovakia remained within the orbit of the Soviet power, on which, henceforth, depended her security and her conception of the balance of power in Europe.

But the maintenance of national unity, the agreement of parties, the conciliatory realism which they brought to the control of the State, revealed a spirit of discipline and a maturity such as could not, at that time, have been found in any other Slavonic State. Perhaps we must give equal praise to the clearsightedness with which M. Benes, in his Christmas message for 1946, denounced the weaknesses and the blemishes which still remained to be eliminated from the régime; how many other countries might have profited by his warning!

'In all political parties there lurk elements that are bad, morally tainted; products of the great wars and of the revolutionary periods. Such individuals must disappear from our political life. We must wean our young people from tendencies to indiscipline, to idleness, to immorality in relations between the sexes. We must combat the growing scourge of alcoholism, the black market, and clandestine trade. We must encourage a [163] family policy; whereas, in 1938, the excess of births over deaths was 80,000, in 1945 it is only 7,828'.

642 175 Elected for two years, the new Constituent Assembly met for the first time on June 18.[1] The next day it acclaimed Edward Benes as President of the Republic, in that same Vladislas Hall where he had been elected for the first time, in 1935. The Government, constituted on the following July 2, was presided over by M. Clement Gottwald, Leader of the Czech Communist Party. It included six Czech Communists, three Czech Social Democrats, four Socialists of the Benes Party, four Czech Catholics, five Slovak Democrats.

648 In the next chapter the reader will find an outline of the religious problem, seen from the angle of the Orthodox offensive. Faithful to their pre-war tradition, Czechoslovak official circles renewed with the Vatican relations which they did their utmost to render as trusting as possible, in spite of the agnosticism of the régime and its Hussite sympathies. The first chargé d'affaires to the Holy See, Dr. Schwarzenberg, was appointed in January, 1946. Since the previous autumn, the Vatican had already been represented in Prague; in March, Mgr. Ritter was

[1] [1946 -- Analyst]

sent as Papal Nuncio. In November, Mgr. Joseph Beran, a 648
Dachau deportee, was appointed Archbishop of Prague. Czechoslovakia was then the only Slav State having accredited diplomatic representation with the Holy See.

In Slovakia the clergy had to suffer from the fact that a 798
priest, Joseph Tiso,[21] who succeeded Father Hlinka as Leader of a Peoples' Party, had controlled the so-called 'Independent' State under the Nazi occupation. In some cases, proceedings against 'collaborators' took on the aspect of an anti-Catholic drive; some Associations, and even some religious communities, were dissolved.

As regards foreign policy during this period, it was dominated 648
by two questions, the claim on Teschen and the 'liquidation' 563
of the Hungarian minorities. The Teschen problem has been 728
dealt with above, in connection with Poland; we will simply 175●
remind the reader that the Prague Government was adamant in its claim. 'Czechoslovakia will not give up one scrap of Teschen', declared President Benes on July 18, 1946. The treaty of alliance of March 10 left the matter in suspense until 1949.

The evacuation of the Hungarian populations raised a bitter and prolonged dispute between Prague and Budapest.

An agreement concluded on February 27, 1946 provided for an exchange between Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary, on a parity basis, to the number of 150,000 persons. The Government of Budapest was to make this agreement widely known amongst the Slovaks placed under its jurisdiction.

But the intention of the Czechs was to expel from their territory the whole of the Hungarian minority, which was far more numerous than the Slovak minority in Hungary.[22] And so they asked that country to take over 200,000 other members of the Magyar minority, and a further 60,000 Hungarian minority subjects, expelled as war criminals or political offenders. The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who might escape these various transfers would be 're-Slovacised', and would cease to enjoy any minority privileges. Prague emphatically insisted that

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[21] His trial opened on December 2, 194(5?) before the High Court of Bratislava.

[22] Out of the 645,000 Magyars who lived in Czechoslovakia in 1939, 110,000 were in Carpathian Ruthenia, ceded to the Russians. There remained 435,000, more than half of whom were considered to be 'inassimilable'. [728]

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the minorities had been the instrument which had upset and dismembered Czechoslovakia, and that their complete elimination was an essential condition for the security of the new State.

Hungary resisted this claim. Apart from general humanitarian considerations, she maintained that it was economically impossible for her to meet the needs of such an increased population. First she asked for a frontier revision, which was categorically refused by Prague. Later on, the two Governments accused each other of sabotaging the February agreements. A joint commission was set up, to accelerate the exchange. Its work was interrupted in September, when the Czechs presented a demand for the expulsion of a further 70,000 persons. In that same month the matter was taken before the Political and Territorial Commission, charged by the Peace Conference with the preparation of the treaty with Hungary; it was connected with a Czech request for frontier rectification (extension of Bratislava on the right bank of the Danube)—a request which was naturally resisted by the Hungarians. The Commission, setting aside forcible solutions, urged the two countries to come to a direct understanding on the problems of the minorities; should such an agreement not be reached within six months, Czechoslovakia would be authorised to lay the matter before the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[23]

The dispute broke out again in November, when the Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia were requisitioned and transferred, for the most part, to the Sudetenland, in virtue of the law for the mobilisation of man-power. A demand from Budapest for an explanation, dated March 23, was left unanswered by Prague, where it was considered that a general measure needed no justification. On November 21 the Hungarian National Assembly registered a solemn protest against these forcible displacements. This protest was echoed abroad, particularly in London, in the House of Lords, and in a section of the English and American press, which felt obliged to remind

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[23] The *Magyar Hirlap*, the organ of the Prime Minister, Nagy, published an article on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations containing the following remarks: 'Between the two World Wars, the Government of Hungary considered that it ought to be the ally of the power which was the enemy of Czechoslovakia; but later on, it was realised that this power was the common enemy, and had enslaved Hungary as well as Czechoslovakia'.

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 [redacted] E16

the Prague Government that the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarians did not compensate for those the Slovaks had endured; they simply increased the total amount of suffering.

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Negotiations between the two Governments were resumed in January, 1947, following the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gyöngyösy, to Bratislava, where he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Clementis, and had with him a preliminary discussion in view of a general settlement of the problem. At that time a total of 11,655 Slovaks (as against the agreed figure of 40,000) had returned to Slovakia from Hungary; of these 3,535 had not been officially transferred, but had simply fled.

Exchanges of population were resumed from April 11 to 18, but on a very small scale, while settlement was taking place, in Bratislava, of the financial problems raised by these operations.

In the whole matter, Czechoslovakia had had Russia behind her. 'We have the support of the Soviet Union in the question of the minorities', said M. Gottwald. But we should fall short of the truth were we to omit to mention that Czechoslovakia's conduct was rather severely judged in the Anglo-American countries, where people were not very familiar with minority disputes, and attached too much importance to respect for the individual, to approve of these mass exoduses—at least in Europe. [829]

The case of the German minority had been the object of Czechoslovak declarations, even before the end of the war, and on this point the Potsdam agreements had merely had to sanction the decision taken by M. Benes and his Ministers to create a homogeneous national State. Consequently, the expulsion of the Germans from the Sudetenland did not give rise to any disputes —eliciting, at the most, humanitarian recommendations on the part of the Western Allies. The 'ceiling' for the expulsions had been fixed at 2,500,000 by the Potsdam agreements; in October, 1946, 750,000 had been sent into the Russian zone, 1,415,135 into the American zone, and 310,000 were authorised to remain on Czech territory; these were skilled workmen, miners, anti-Fascists, relatives of Czechs, old or sick people.[24] There is no

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[24] It should be noted that Czechoslovakia adopted a special treatment for Germans of Austrian nationality residing or temporarily domiciled in her territory. She did not class them with the Sudeten Germans as necessarily to be expulsed, unless they had been members of the Nazi Party.

648 563 728 • 176 doubt that, although their departure corresponded to a legitimate policy of internal peace and security, yet it created in Czech economic life a void that was difficult to fill.

648 457 175 The Americans' remarks on the subject of the deportations were not the only cause (and, in any case, they were passing ones) of the frigid relations between themselves and the Prague Government. The latter had negotiated and obtained a loan of fifty million dollars from the Export-Import Bank—a loan which was to help to finance the 'two-year plan' for Czechoslovakia's economic reconstruction. On October 16 the State Department notified that they had blocked this credit for an indefinite period, because the borrowing country had not provided any compensation for American nationals dispossessed by nationalisation. Another argument advanced was the cutting and, at the very least, injudicious tone adopted by certain Czech newspapers which, at the very moment when their Government was seeking financial aid, accused the United States of using credits as an instrument of economic imperialism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed the Russians for the latter accusation and expressed regret at Washington's decision.

On the other hand, in November, 1946, England granted a loan of two and a half million sterling, spread over four years, to enable Czechoslovakia to buy surplus British materials. So that Prague's fears of a synchronised Anglo-American policy in the matter of loans were allayed.

[186] Like those of Poland, Czechoslovakia's aims in the discussion on the German treaty were chiefly directed towards disarmament and denazification of the Reich. For the Czechs, the problem of their security was partly settled by the presence of Soviet Russia in the Danube Basin. The dream of one of their thinkers had come true: 'The lime, our Slavonic emblem,[25] is supported by the powerful Russian oak'. And, celebrating the anniversary of the pact of December 12, 1943, between Stalin and Benes, the *Nurodni Ozvobozeni* declared: 'Treaties are usually entered into for a fixed period. Afterwards, they are extended, or they lapse. This one must stand for eternity'.

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[25] The lime was the emblem of the Slavs. At the time of the riots which took place in Ljubljana at the beginning of this century between German and Slovene students, the former sported a cornflower and the latter a lime-leaf.

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Relations between the two countries, intimate in the political domain, developed mainly in the direction of a closer economic collaboration. To this end, commercial agreements were signed at Moscow in April, and especially in July, 1946, between Gottwald, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin. It was during this interview that the Czech statesmen communicated the text of their proposals for the Peace Conference.

These proposals included demands for frontier rectifications, already formulated on May 31, 1945, and reproduced in a memorandum of January 20, 1947, especially as regards the German districts of Glatz and Ratibor, occupied by the Poles. It was an attempt to do away with the two 'notches' formed in the frontier by the upper valley of the Oder (Moravian Gate) and that of the Neisse (Nahod Gap) which had been used in 1866 by von Moltke's army. Thus the roads of approach from Prussian Silesia towards Moravia would be closed. As seen above, these claims had aroused unfavourable reaction in Warsaw.

A few words on the relations between Prague and Paris. As early as October 7, the Czech Government had been in touch with General de Gaulle, who declared the Munich agreements void . . . on the following September 29. On August 22, 1944, the French and the Czech Governments agreed that, when the time was ripe, they would adapt their former pact of alliance to the needs of the existing situation. A 'joint declaration', communicated to the press on February 14, 1947, announced the early conclusion of the new pact.

The peace treaties signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, established a fresh balance of forces on the Continent.

If, treating the territorial alterations occurring between 1938 and 1944 as accidents, we superimpose the 1947 map on that of 1938 (which resulted from the treaties that settled the First World War), we find that this new balance results much less from territorial changes than from a reconstitution of influence.

The territorial changes are indeed unimportant, in comparison with the transformations which the treaties of 1919–1920 made in the map, when the dislocation of Austria-Hungary resuscitated two historic States in the heart of Europe. It is not impossible that, in times to come, the short period between the

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two wars may be regarded as the golden age of the nationalities —the brief realisation of an age-long dream.

If we take the Continent as a whole, although one independent State (Montenegro) then disappeared, eight new nationalities acquired their sovereignty—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary. And Yugoslavia formed a unitary monarchy around Serbia.

In 1947 the Baltics disappeared from the map as independent States. No fresh creation arose from the treaties, which were limited, as far as Austria and Hungary were concerned, to restoring the *status quo*.

So we might perceive, cast over the new state of affairs, the shadow of Munich and of the decisions taken at the time when the Axis was all-powerful; the amputation of Poland was provided for by the Moscow Treaty of August 21, 1939, that of Rumania stipulated in the ultimatum of June 26, 1940, and in the Treaty of Craïova of September 7, 1940; Poland had been established in the Teschen Basin since October, 1938.

The only countries to come out of these treaties with enlarged territory were Yugoslavia, who advanced in Istria and in Julian Venetia, and Bulgaria, who, getting out of an unlucky adventure very well for once, annexed Southern Dobrudja.

The other nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe were seriously amputated. Rumania lost, with the Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Moldavian district of Herzea—at least one-fifth of her territory. She could, it is true, console herself with the thought that Poland—for whom the Allies went to war—lost just as much (her area was reduced from 242,875 sq. miles to 195,000 sq. miles) and that Czechoslovakia, the victim of Munich, found herself, by the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia, reduced by one-tenth of her pre-war surface.

So that, out of five Slavonic States, three (counting Russia) were enlarged, two others amputated.

In flagrant violation of Article 2 of the Atlantic Charter, no referendum preceded these transfers of sovereignty. In cases where the new state of affairs created or maintained, ethnical pockets, this was remedied by transfers of population. So, hundreds of thousands of persons were 'displaced', in order to achieve a racial unity within the framework of the new frontiers.

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Human exoduses afforded the solution of the minority problems, which the 1919–1920 treaties had endeavoured to settle by the establishment of *ad hoc* international law. In short, it was a return to the policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In this conception of European statics lay the sole innovation brought about by the latest peace treaties. Is it progress or the reverse? Whatever we may think, from the humane point of view, of this over-simplified settlement of a complex problem, we are obliged to admit that, as time goes on, it will consolidate the physical bases of the new order and ensure its duration.

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Let us hasten to add, however, that scarcely were the treaties signed, when a campaign for their revision was launched. For perhaps the first time in history, this campaign included victors and vanquished, victims and beneficiaries of the new state of affairs. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim to Julian Venetia, Carinthia, and, more discreetly (at least before the international forum), to Aegean or Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians returned to the attack, with a view to obtaining a territorial outlet on the Aegean—a claim they had relentlessly pressed between the two wars. Hungary, who again saw Eastern Transylvania eluding her grasp, maintained her traditional attitude on revision. It was difficult for Rumania to forget that, after Germany, she was the chief victim of the war. If Polish official circles, for reasons easily understood, did not raise their voices, it was not because that country willingly accepted the loss of her Eastern Marches, whose inhabitants had been 'invited' to settle on the evacuated borders of Prussia and Silesia.

The 1947 treaties settled the two problems on which formerly depended the peace of Europe—the relative strengths of the Germany-Poland-Russia trinomial, and Balkan equilibrium.

Both these problems were settled, without right of appeal, by Russia, the victorious liberator. The axiom formulated by M. Gyöngösy, a Hungarian Minister, applies here: 'In crucial periods of her history, a small nation has no liberty of choice'.

The first of these problems was solved in such a way as to ensure security for Poland, at the price of her diplomatic liberty. It used to be maintained in Warsaw that the Poles could be fully masters of their fate only on condition that Germany and Russia should be neither allies nor enemies—a formula which was as

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illogical as it was precarious. Looked at from the historical point of view, Poland's present situation contradicts all the data of her national evolution—which is not to say that it does not offer prospects of stabilisation and duration.

As for the Balkan world, its equilibrium was, for nearly a century, regarded as an essential condition for continental peace. Yet in actual fact, this equilibrium depended far less on inter-Balkan relations than on the balance of strength among the Great Powers in Eastern Europe.

It was first a factor in Russo-Turkish rivalry, then in the antagonism between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Balkan States only enjoyed real independence after the First World War, when the triumph of the principle of the nationalities ensured for them all the conditions for autonomous development.

With the 1947 treaties, these States entered upon a fresh phase of their history.

186* From the specifically Balkan point of view, this phase is characterised by the abandoning of the ideal of solidarity in which the nations of the peninsula formerly saw the pledge of their liberty, and which used to be expressed in a famous slogan—'The Balkans for the Balkan nations'.

Doubtless this solidarity was never complete. In 1934, Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks had concluded an alliance which neither Bulgaria nor Albania had joined. But, in this district, where the diversity of races encourages so many prejudices and atavistic hatreds, it was nevertheless a remarkable progress to find four nations, belonging to four different ethnical stocks, achieving a political and economic *entente*.

Nothing comparable exists today. If Bulgaria and Yugoslavia side with each other, this is obviously the result of similar submission to Russian domination, and we have seen above that their agreement on the Macedonian question was less genuine than was believed. The same may be said of their solidarity with Albania, the main object of which is to make things difficult for Greece.

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Rumania stands aloof from this temporary community of interests. As for Greece and Turkey, they have not relaxed the ties which have bound them since their treaty of friendship of 1932. And their *entente* is the last bulwark of Anglo-American

influence in Eastern Europe. President Truman's resounding message to Congress on March 12, 1947, marked, in this respect, a decisive attitude in connection with American politics in Europe. This message announced material and moral assistance to the two Balkan countries which eluded Moscow's ascendancy. 648 175•

This simple outline of the new situation in the Balkans shows that the peninsula has, in fact, again fallen under the régime of spheres of influence which was its customary status between the Peace of Berlin and the Treaty of Versailles.

Between the Balkan nations and the Slavs of the West, Hungary and Austria gravitate in the political orbit of Russia (Hungary's neighbour for the first time in modern history), but nevertheless see the West as the supreme defence of their historic and cultural individuality, not to mention the opposition movements discernible among the Croats, in whose ears still ring the words of Sufflay, one of their political philosophers—*Occidentem appello!* 186* 829

But it is not from this territorial reshuffling that there emerges the real physiognomy of the Europe of tomorrow.

This results essentially from the division of the Continent into three sectors—the Western world, the Teutonic world, the Slavonic world; the second being doomed to oscillate between the first and the third until it feels it has attained the conditions of its own development.

Assuredly, all the official manifestations of the Slavonic world avoid the words 'race' and 'bloc'. But facts speak more eloquently than men. On the diplomatic plane Slav solidarity is a reality of international life, though on the psychological plane its outline is less clearly defined. In Yugoslavia, the official press regards the new state of affairs as a complete emancipation, and the very role of France in the Balkans, so long considered as liberating and humane, is often referred to simply under the aspect of a defunct 'colonising' enterprise. Yet in Czechoslovakia they take pains to maintain, with the West, those spiritual connections calculated to preserve for the country its role of intermediary between two civilisations. Poland remains bound to the West by powerful historical and sentimental affinities, strengthened by the desire to safeguard her ancient faith. Bulgaria, more subtle in her politics than Yugoslavia, likewise takes great care not to give the impression of a definite rupture with the West.

186* with Bulgarian national life to be neglected by the new régime,
659 which will continue to subsidise it, and counts upon its co-operation in rallying the masses; in which, moreover, it is assured of the goodwill of Mgr. Stephan and his clergy. On August 28, at the Bachkovo pilgrimage, Mgr. Cyrille, Metropolitan of Plovdiv, made a speech urging the faithful to vote, at the referendum, for the Republic and against 'the abhorred monarchy, whose role', he said, 'has been as fatal in the history of the country as in that of the Church'.

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185 Whereas, in the Balkan countries, the religious problem lay in getting the clergy to forget that they had, for some centuries, been the support of the monarchical institution, it had a quite different aspect among the Western Slavs, where the problem was, first and foremost, the liquidation of Uniatism.

•175 As the reader will know, the 'Act of Union' (hence the word
795 'Uniat') was concluded three and a half centuries ago, in 1596,
648 at Brest-Litowsk, where the Metropolitan of Kiev acclaimed the renewal with Rome of the Union of Florence. As a result, since that date there had been flourishing communities 'of the Oriental rite', which recognised Papal supremacy while keeping their national liturgy and their discipline—which, among other regulations, permits (as the Orthodox Church does) the clergy to marry. These communities today number in all about two million followers, especially in territories formerly incorporated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[829] Uniatism had always been regarded by the Russians as a 'turning movement' on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, supported first by Poland, then by Austria-Hungary, to detach the Orthodox from their traditional faith. Urban VII's apostrophe: 'Ruthenians, the East will be conquered by you!' has obsessed the Muscovite Church, which has never ceased to endeavour to recapture its positions.

After the fall of the Tsarist régime this Church's efforts were paralysed by the crisis she was herself experiencing, and by the official atheism professed by the Soviet State. The Holy See sought to take advantage of this crisis to restore the 'seamless robe of Christ'. It gave repeated proofs of solicitude, placing the Uniats on a footing of complete equality with their brethren of the Latin rite. It cherished the hope, thanks to these Uniats,

of one day seeing Slavonic Christianity return to Catholic unity, 175●
and the immense flock of all the Russians come back to the 795
Roman fold. As is well known, the critical point in dogma is 648
the divergence between the two Churches regarding the proces- [771]
sion of the Holy Ghost. It is the famous 'Filioque' quarrel. Now, in the Liturgy published by the Holy See in June, 1943, for the use of the Russians and Ruthenians, the *Credo* is given according to the version of the early centuries, without reference to the 'Filioque'—in other words, ignoring the chief dispute which separated the Orthodox from the 'Romans'.

In spite of these concessions, Orthodoxy has never given up. In Carpatho-Ruthenia the number of its followers doubled from 1921 to 1930. Moscow had nothing to do with this; at that time it was the Serbian Patriarchate which presided over the destinies of the Russo-Carpathian Orthodox Church.[1]

And, after the incorporation of the Eastern Marches of 795
Poland and of Carpatho-Ruthenia in the Soviet Union, a 185
counter-offensive for the return of the Uniats to Orthodoxy 648
was organised, using the customary resources of Russian political power. On June 18, 1945, a Committee of Initiative was formed, with a view to winning over these Catholics to Pravoslav unity. A 'Council' of the Uniat Church of the Western Ukraine was held in Lwow on March 8, 1946; it proclaimed the dissolution of ties which, for 350 years, had bound that Church to the Vatican,[2] and its submission to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the name of the delegates of the three Uniat Eparchies which were represented at the Council, a message was sent to Stalin announcing this decision, and the breaking of the spiritual bond between the Eastern Catholics and Rome.

The Bulletin of the Moscow Patriarchate[3] commented on this event as follows: 'So, gradually, day by day, in union and in united prayer, will the breach opened by Rome within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy be closed; the time is not far distant beyond the territories placed within its traditional sphere of influence, and especially in Czechoslovakia.

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[1] In 1921 the figures for Ruthenia were: Catholics 55,000; Uniats 332,500, and Orthodox 60,997. [162]

[2] The anniversary of the connection was commemorated by the encyclical letter *Orientales omnes ecclesias*, published on January 19, 1946, in which the Pope accused the Russians of treating the Catholic Ruthenians as enemies of the State and encouraged the latter to persevere in their traditional faith.

[3] February 6, 1947.

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It is true that the saints given to the Church by the Czech nation in the tenth century appear both in the Orthodox and in the Roman calendars, but Orthodoxy disappeared as an official religion in the twelfth century. However, its influence did not completely disappear; it still had a latent existence in the time of John Huss and his disciples, who established relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1451—which relations were interrupted by the capture of the city by the Turks two years later.

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With Joseph II's Edict of Tolerance in 1781, Orthodoxy, previously eliminated by the religious reaction known as the Counter-Reformation, re-established itself in Bohemia. We have related above (p. 24) the enthusiasm with which the people of Prague heard a Serbian prelate conduct an Orthodox service and pray for the soul of John Huss on the Wenceslas Square, on the occasion of the 1848 Slav Congress. In 1874 the use of the Catholic Church of Saint Nicholas was granted to the Orthodox cult, which thereafter worshipped in it concurrently with the National Church. After the Vatican Council, and in spite of the hostility of the Austrian authorities, conversions which created a great stir took place. But it was only after the First World War that the Orthodox Church was organised in Bohemia. Not being able, at that time, to attach itself to Moscow, it placed itself under obedience to the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlovtsi, which, in September, 1921, consecrated the first bishop. This Czech Orthodox Church was itself torn by the current of dissidence created by the 'Czechoslovak National Church', which claimed to be based on the ideas of John Huss, but was in reality far from being so. In 1929 the Patriarchate of Belgrade approved the constitution of an Orthodox Eparchy (Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia) in which divine worship was offered in liturgical Slavon and in Czech.

When the two Resistance heroes who were parachuted to deliver Bohemia from her torturer, the 'Protector', Reinhard Heydrich, had executed the latter,[*] they hid in the crypt of the

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[*] The execution took place on May 27, 1942, on the outskirts of Prague, in a street which bore the symbolical name of Strossmayer. The practical details of the murder curiously resembled those connected with the

•175 779 795 Church of St. Charles Borromeo, assigned to the Orthodox cult. They were discovered, and, after a regular siege, killed themselves rather than fall into the enemy's hands. The Orthodox Bishop Gorazd and his assistants, who had hidden them, were executed. And their church, which had just given marytrs to the national cause, was dissolved, and the cathedral turned into a shop.

After the liberation this church was restored to its rights and transferred (in April, 1946) from the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate to that of the Moscow Patriarchate, which raised Prague to the rank of an Archbishopric. On the following May 19 there arrived in the capital Mgr. Jelevferij, Exarch of the Patriarch of Moscow and Archbishop of Prague, who was received by the members of the Government and the Russian Orthodox Archbishop, Mgr. Sergej. The first service celebrated by the prelate was offered in memory of Bishop Gorazd.

[659] In the following June Karpov, President of the Soviet's Council of State for Orthodox Affairs, gave a talk on 'Religion in Russia' to officers of the Czechoslovak Army, to emphasise the liberty of divine worship permitted under the Soviet régime, and the clergy's loyalty to the State.[7]

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186* 779 659 As in the time of the Tsars, Catholicism has again become the 'sore point' of the Slavonic community. Soviet Russia, which had so ostentatiously dissociated itself from the religious tradition of the Slavophiles, has rediscovered the latter on its line of expansion. The Kremlin has, by the force of circumstances, been obliged to play the Orthodox card in the regions placed within its sphere of influence. But action is followed by reaction. If Uniatism is retreating before Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism represents, in Poland, in Slovakia, in Croatia, in Slovenia, a basis of resistance to Russian penetration in its twofold aspect of Marxism and schism. With the result that one would need the gift of prophecy to be able to say, today,

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assassination of Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Bishop Gorazd, Cikli, a parish priest, and Petzek, a curate, who sheltered the two heroes, were discovered on June 18.

[7] The reconstituted Hussite Church aspired to the role of an official Church; it held a Congress at the beginning of January 1946, and its Primate, M. Kovar, presented the new bishops to M. Benes on the 23rd of that month. The President advised him to co-operate with the other Churches of the West and the East, taking care, however, not to mix politics and religion. The Church numbers 850,000 members.

Chapter Eight

SLAV SOLIDARITY BREAKS UP

186* WE have already spoken of the resurrection of the Slavonic idea during the Second World War—the only European conflict in history which found all the Slavs on the same side of the fence. We reviewed the congresses of 1942–1945 which restated the old themes of Slav solidarity, based on the liberating rôle of Soviet Russia. Never had such unanimity been shown within the Slav community. For the first time 'Panslavism' could be spoken of as a reality in international life.

186 This 'Panslavism', uniting the oppressed, occupied peoples
728 against Hitler's Reich, was not to last long. It made itself felt
•176 again in 1946 and 1947, but in a purely oratorical form, and exclusively in justification of Russian ascendancy over the countries of Eastern Europe. In reality, it was again the Slavs who benefited least from the victory. While it is true that Bulgaria came out of the war with enlarged territory, this was due to an agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis Powers. Czechoslovakia and Poland suffered the loss of a large part of their eastern territories. Yugoslavia recovered part of Istria, but her claims to Trieste and Southern Carinthia met with opposition from the Western powers, and were backed by the Russians only within the limits of their own interests. The state of affairs created by the Sovjet Union within the area subject to its influence failed to reflect any Slavonic trend, or any preferential treatment for the 'sister nations'.

177 The Kremlin is aware that the Slavonic world is an object of
•18 aversion to the Rumanians and the Hungarians. It can retain
186 these in its orbit (into which it will try to attract Greece) only
648 by lulling to sleep the old Slavophile ideology, or by relegating it
175 to the rank of 'romantic values'. It is to the collaboration of Slavs and non-Slavs on the basis of Lenin-Stalinist Marxism that the Kremlin looks, for the creation of an eastern community modelled on its own institutions and obedient to its watchwords. From 1946 onwards its whole policy, in this part of Europe, aimed at directing the guidance of the satellite States more and more into the hands of the Communists. This policy was to be

pursued on parallel lines, in Slav and non-Slav countries alike. 177 178

On the instigation of Moscow, these countries entered into 186
treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. These were so 648
worded as to give the impression, at first, of being designed to 175
wipe out long-standing heritages of hatred or distrust between
peoples hitherto antagonistic to one another. Passed for a period
of twenty years, and all on the same lines, these treaties were
signed on the following dates:—

November 27, 1947: between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
December 8: between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
December 16: between Bulgaria and Albania.
December 19: between Yugoslavia and Rumania.
January 16, 1948: between Bulgaria and Rumania.
January 24: between Hungary and Rumania.
February 4: between the Soviet Union and Rumania.
March 18: between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
April 23: between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

The commentaries which accompanied the signing of these [829] agreements spoke, with ever-growing emphasis, of the 'peril' to the peace of Europe involved in the attitude of the Western powers. Centred at first on the German menace, they subsequently referred to fresh risks, clearly indicated. Thus the Soviet radio declared that the pact between Bulgaria and Moscow acquired significance from the fact that 'certain Western powers have, under the patronage of the United States, taken the creation of military blocs as the basis of their policy'.

Even the idea of a 'Balkan Federation', which in 1944 had found partisans in Moscow, was gradually pushed into the background, for fear that the essential core of this federation, the Bulgarian-Yugoslav bloc, might create a Slav community, which should one day grow strong enough to adopt an attitude of independence in regard to the Soviet Union. So, although it was originally inspired by Russia, this project for a union was later to be denounced by the Kremlin as a ruse of 'Western imperialism', and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Premier, was to be disavowed by Moscow, in January, 1948, for having made an untimely allusion to it.

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The standardisation of Soviet policy in Europe was to take 177 648
its definite shape in the conference held in Warsaw in September, 665 175

177 648 665 •175 1947, by the delegates of the Communist Parties of nine European nations. It was then decided to set up a 'Joint Information Bureau' (*Kominform*), whose function would be to ensure organic liaison between these different parties, with a view to co-ordinating their activities and pooling their experience. A communiqué was broadcast on October 9 by the delegate of the Russian Communist Party, Idanov, a member of the Soviet Politburo. He contrasted the 'war-mongering' of the Western States with the 'pacifism' of the 'popular democracies' placed [185] under the influence of the Soviet Union. He affirmed the mission of the Communist Parties to combat 'attempts at enslavement', the most dangerous form of which was, in Moscow's view, the Marshall Plan.

The seat of the new organisation, which was to publish a bi-mensual organ, was fixed in Belgrade. Its activities, in conformity with policy dictated by the Kremlin, aggravated the crisis in relations between East and West, and opened the period of tension to which the name of 'cold war' has been applied.

The Kominform is not a resurrection of the Komintern, dissolved in 1943. It is based, indeed, on the idea that the 'national' Communist Parties have reached a state of maturity and power which enables them to be henceforth regarded as autonomous on the plane of the common struggle against capitalist régimes.

The signatories to the Kominform's declaration were: Idanov and Malenkov (U.S.S.R.), Kardelj and Djilas (Yugoslavia), Tchervenkov and Poptomov (Bulgaria), Gheorghiu Dej and Anna Pauker (Rumania), Farkas and Revai (Hungary), Gomulka (Poland), Duclos and Fajon (France), Slanski and Bastovanski (Czechoslovakia), Longo and Reale (Italy).

The Kominform, controlled from Moscow, was rapidly to exert its activities in a domain which its promoters had not foreseen.

186* 665 648 175 Indeed, Slav solidarity, already overtaken and superseded by the watchword of Marxist unity, was to suffer a still more serious set-back from the rupture between Tito and Moscow. It was in Belgrade that the Kominform had set up its seat; from Belgrade came the blow which was to shake its authority, and the dogma of Muscovite infallibility, in the whole of Eastern Europe.

1 [Delegate of Russian Communist Party, Idanov--Analyst]

In a motion published on June 28, 1948, the Kominform, 186*
which met in Bucharest from June 16–24, approved the 665
sensational resolution of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party, 648
denouncing the policy of the Yugoslav Communists and the 175●
errors of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovitch, 'who have embarked on a road leading to treachery towards the international solidarity of the working classes'.

Thereupon began the struggle between Moscow and Belgrade, which was to grow more acute as the months went by. And the organisation of the offensive against Tito and the progress of 'Titoism'—in other words, 'national Marxism'—in the popular democracies, headed the agenda of all the meetings of the Kominform, especially the one held in Hungary in November, 1949, when a resolution passed at the conference invited even the Yugoslav Communist Party to get rid of the 'spies' and the 'assassins' who were governing the country.

One of the consequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture has been the revival of the old Bulgaro-Serbian quarrel over Macedonia: the Balkans are again being plunged into hatred and irredentism, as we saw them at the end of the nineteenth century, during the Balkan Wars, and in the First World War.

Such were the events which, between 1946 and 1948, transformed the general physiognomy of the Slavonic world. A rapid review of the internal policies of the different countries concerned will show how they evolved.

* * *

Until 1947 the Belgrade Government's policy remained based 648
on complete solidarity with the Soviet Union. The agreements 175
reached on June 10, 1946, during the Stalin-Tito interview, formed the basis for the commercial agreements of July 25, 1947.

The starting-point of the rupture between Stalin and Tito [665]
is to be found in an exchange of letters (in March, 1948), between the (Russian) Bolchevik Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party, regarding the conduct of Soviet officers in Yugoslavia.

But that was only a pretext. In reality, the Soviets could 186*
not forgive Tito for being the only head of an Eastern European 648
829
Government to pride himself on having been an armed leader 175

186* 648 829 •175

in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

565 423 175

On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

186* 665 648 175 687

It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

175 648 [439]

Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

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[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.

September) the role played by the Soviet Union in international 175 conferences regarding Yugoslav claims to Southern Carinthia. 648 In one of these notes (August 11) Moscow accused the Belgrade [186] Government of acting 'not as an ally, but as an enemy of the Soviet Union'.

'We can establish Socialism without the U.S.S.R.', Tito 186* had declared. 175

648 For a few months the Belgrade press attacked the Kominform, [665] without going so far as to mention its real promoters. On May 30, 1949, for the first time, *Borba*, the organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, openly attacked the Soviet Union, which it accused of seeking to foment the Yugoslav people against the Government. And Pijade denounced 'Russian nationalism', cloaked under the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, 'which does not allow any other Communist Party to consider itself the equal of the Bolchevik Party, or any other State to raise itself above the level fixed for it by Moscow'. He accused the Soviet Union of recruiting traitors to form a 'pro-Stalin, anti-Tito front' in Yugoslavia.

The friendship and mutual assistance pacts concluded by the [829] other popular democracies with the Belgrade Government were denounced during the same week: on September 28, 1949, the Kremlin gave the signal for these notices of termination. On October 1 Bulgaria annulled the pact of November 27, 1947, and was followed by Rumania in respect of the pact of December 19, 1947, and by Czechoslovakia (on October 4) in respect of the treaty of friendship of May 9, 1946, and the cultural agreement of April 27, 1947. The Warsaw Government had anticipated matters by declaring, as far back as September 8, 1949, that Tito's Government had 'trampled on and destroyed' the Polish-Yugoslav pact of March 18, 1946.

The heads of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Moscow, 648 and of the Soviet mission in Belgrade, were recalled during the 687 autumn of 1949, and the majority of their collaborators declared 175 'undesirable', on charges of espionage or sabotage. The cases brought, in Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, against Rajk, ex-minister (September) and Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council (December)—cases involving Yugoslavs—were so arranged as to bolster up the Soviet accusations against Tito and his role in the Balkans.

648 The Yugoslav Government replied by trying, in Sarajevo,
•175 some White Russians, naturalised Soviet citizens, who, after
687 having served the occupying authorities during the war, were said to have become agents for anti-Tito propaganda; on December 9 they were condemned to imprisonment for a term of years.

648 In the shade of Soviet-Yugoslav antagonism, the old quarrel
175 between Belgrade and Sofia over Macedonia was reawakened.

Early in August, 1947, Tito and Dimitrov met at Bled and signed a protocol providing for closer collaboration between the two Governments: this protocol was to find its application in the 'pact of collaboration and mutual assistance' concluded on November 27 following, at Euxinograd.

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563 Yet, at Bled, there were signs of disagreement. Tito would
175 have liked to see the formation of a Federation of Southern
[086] Slavs. But such a federation would imply the inclusion of Bulgarian Macedonia in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—which would have the effect of committing the Macedonians in Bulgaria to a policy for the future, on the lines of the old Serbian aspirations. Dimitrov shelved the solution of the Macedonian problem until the federal pact should be concluded. The Yugoslavs then insisted that psychological conditioning for the union should be ensured by the granting of 'cultural rights' to the Macedonians in Bulgaria. Now the Sofia Government refused to consider the latter as a minority, and therein lay the germ of the new Bulgarian-Yugoslav crisis.

Later, on December 20, 1948, after the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, Blagoje Neskovitch, Vice-President of the Belgrade Government, was to claim that the quarrel unleashed by the Kominform arose simply out of the pressure brought to bear by the Bulgarian leaders, with a view to securing recognition of their territorial claims on Vardar Macedonia.

Then Belgrade reproached the Bulgarian Popular Republic with having refused a statute of autonomy and the designation of a 'nationality' to the Pirine Macedonians.

648 Thereafter the Macedonian Question remained in the fore-
175 front of Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations: a Macedonian, Poptomov, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sofia and, when Bulgaria denounced the pact of November 27, 1947, Yugoslavia accused her of violating the peace treaty by refusing to pay the repara-

tions due for the exactions made by Bulgarian troops who occupied Serbian Macedonia during the war. 648 175

Yugoslavia's relations with the other Slav States followed the same lines as her relations with the Soviet Union. In June, 1949, negotiations in view of commercial exchanges with Czechoslovakia came to a standstill. In July, the two Governments exchanged subacid notes: Belgrade accused the Czechs of inspiring a campaign of press hostility towards Tito; Prague replied that any criticism tending to unmask Titoist treachery was 'a mark of appreciation and friendship towards the Yugoslav people'. Such arguments prepared the way for the formal denunciation of the pact of friendship and assistance. The Czechs, like the Poles, accused the Yugoslav diplomats of carrying on subversive activities: there were numerous recalls of diplomatic or consular agents, on the now customary charge of espionage on behalf of the 'capitalist powers'.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia endeavoured to renew commercial ties with the West. Her negotiations with Washington resulted in the agreement of July 19, 1947, liberating 47,000,000 gold-dollars and 220,000 dollars accruing from other Yugoslav credits in America, subject to the settlement of various arrears and repayments under Lend-Lease. The United States granted Yugoslavia the necessary licences for the delivery of materials destined for the equipment of a steel-plate factory; on November 3 they removed the prohibition on the supply of military equipment to that country. 648 457 439 175

And, on December 22, 1949, President Truman, confirming an assurance given by George Allen, his ambassador in Belgrade, declared: 'An act of aggression against Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia would be regarded by the Government of the United States as being just as serious as any act of aggression elsewhere'. [829]

This change of attitude shows the road travelled in Washington since the declarations made, on November 1, 1945, by Secretary of State James Byrne, recognising 'the special security interests' of Russia in Eastern Europe, and affirming that the United States 'would never associate themselves with an intrigue directed against the Soviet Union . . .'.

Indeed, the United States and Great Britain decided to grant economic aid to Communist countries which were 'really independent', and resolved to fight the Kominform. In London, 648 457 439 • 175 in August, 1947, a Yugoslav delegation opened negotiations for a commercial agreement. These negotiations were prolonged, but in September, 1949, the British Cabinet decided to open a credit of £9,000,000 for Yugoslavia.[2]

A parallel change of attitude was shown in the relations between Belgrade and Rome: after rather lively incidents in Julian Venetia, the two Governments drafted, in December, 1948, a reconciliation, which was to be recognised by the commercial agreement of August 4, 1949, in which press commentators saw a political significance. The question of Trieste, which had been settled by the agreement of April 27, 1947, between France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, henceforth became of secondary importance, although Yugoslav claims to the Trieste zone (as to Slovene Carpathia) were never formally renounced.

On October 20, 1949, Yugoslavia was admitted to the Security Council by thirty-nine votes (out of fifty-eight voters) to nineteen for Czechoslovakia.

To sum up: Yugoslavia is seeking to reconcile her fidelity to Marxism with economic collaboration, on a footing of equality, with the Western States. Her attitude is defined in these two declarations made by Tito: 'While remaining solidly in the Socialist camp, Yugoslavia will regard as her enemy any one who interferes with her Socialist construction'. 'With the East we maintain economic relations, without any political set-off. When we sell copper to buy machinery, it is the copper we sell, not our conscience'.

* * *

648 696 829 175 As for Bulgaria, she has maintained with the Soviet Union ties which the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis only served to strengthen. The Government dealt the opposition a mortal blow by condemning to death the Agrarian leader, Nicolas Petkov, who was executed on September 23, 1947. This execution called forth a declaration of disapproval from the American State Department; on September 29 a speaker on behalf of the Foreign Office

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[2] On July 2, 1949, General Ivan Gochniak, Vice-Minister for Defence, affirmed that, in 1944, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed upon their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans: the Russians were to have a 75 per cent predominance in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania; in Yugoslavia they were to be on an equal footing with the English, in whose sphere of influence Greece was left.

described it as a 'crime against European civilisation', and on 648
October 1 it was brought up at the Security Council by the 696
French delegate, Parodi, during a discussion on Bulgaria's 829
candidature for the United Nations. 175

In January, 1948, on the occasion of the signing of a treaty [185]
of mutual assistance with Rumania, the Bulgarian Premier, Dimitrov, risked an allusion to a project for the federation of the Balkan States, but this was immediately disavowed by the Kremlin.

Dimitrov died on July 1, 1949; he was replaced as leader of the Government by Kolarov, and at the head of the Bulgarian Communist Party by his brother-in-law, Valko Tchervenkov.

The sentencing (March 8, 1949) of four Protestant pastors, accused of espionage, to life imprisonment, and the imprisonment of eleven others for a term of years, called forth vehement protests in the Christian world, and justified the sending of a diplomatic note by Great Britain, on March 12, in which these proceedings were described as a violation of Art. 2 of the peace treaty concerning 'fundamental liberties'.

The year 1949 was marked by progressive tension in the 648
relations between Belgrade and Sofia. In September the 687
Bulgarian Government denounced the treaty of friendship and, 175
on October 6, the frontier agreement with Yugoslavia. This antagonism, which revived the Macedonian Question, reached a crisis at the trial of Traitcho Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council. Accused in March, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of 'flagrant errors' (the most serious accusation being that of having invoked the principle of State secrecy in order to withhold information of a commercial nature from representatives of the Soviet Union), Kostov found the charges gradually extended, until he was involved in a plot against the safety of the State, with the complicity of the Anglo-Americans and the agents of Tito. He was condemned to death, and
executed on December 16. The Yugoslav press considered this [208]
charge as having been trumped up entirely with a view to compromising and discrediting Tito.

The municipal elections of May 15, 1949, gave the Com- 666
munist-controlled Government of the 'Homeland Front' 175
92.1 per cent of the votes cast (370,000 blank votes); the legislative elections of December 18 raised this percentage to

666 •175 98.89 per cent (110,180 blank votes), the electors having no other option than to vote for the 'Front' or to register a blank vote.

185 175 Faithful to the guidance of Benes, Jean Masaryk and Ripka, the Third National Front Government, presided over by Gottwald, endeavoured to secure the triumph of a policy of equilibrium between East and West, between Liberalism and Marxism. 'In our country', declared Benes, 'under the pressure of the masses, Communism has become national.'

648 175 The first signs of Soviet pressure were seen when, after the Czech Cabinet had decided, in July, 1947, to accept an invitation to attend the Paris Conference for the application of the Marshall Plan, it was forced, on orders from Moscow, to withdraw its acceptance.

[578] The final crisis was reached in February, 1948. An exceedingly violent press campaign was launched against Vaclav Nosek, Minister of the Interior, as the result of a purge which followed the discovery of illegal arms deposits. The Communist Party accused the National Socialists (Benes Party), the Popular Democrats and the Slovak Democrats of attempting to constitute an 'anti-Communist bloc' within the Government, and of paralysing the legislative power of the National Assembly. Tension reached its peak with the approach of the elections, then fixed for April 11, 1948.

668 642 175 The partisans of obedience to Moscow centred their efforts around the nucleus of the police and the trade union organisations. A 'Central Action Committee' was established, to back up, by mass movements, the offensive led by President Gottwald and his Communist colleagues against the moderate section of the Government. On February 20, 1948, the Ministers belonging to the three incriminated parties resigned. The Marxists held demonstrations in the streets; a political strike was declared on February 4, and the Congress of Works' Committees demanded the removal of the 'reactionaries'. President Benes, taken unawares by the suddenness of this attack, rejected the idea of a Government of Civil Servants and, on February 25, he formed a new National Front Ministry, with Gottwald as President, Gapotocki as Vice-President, Jean Masaryk at the head of Foreign Affairs. The Communists secured entire control of this Cabinet, which was in favour of unconditional collaboration with the Soviet Union. The opposition was reduced to

helplessness; Benes capitulated before Gottwald's ultimatum. 668
It was the end of the Putsch which Hubert Ripka later described 642
as a 'prefabricated revolution'. On March 9[1] Jean Masaryk, 175 •
Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in [56]
which he denounced the intervention of Zorine, the Soviet [186]
Ambassador, in the events of February: 'When a time of mortal
danger for the country, and for all Slavs, comes, you will have
in Prague nothing but a Government hated by the country,
despised by the *élite,* and relying entirely on the bayonets of its
police organisations'. The next day Masaryk committed suicide:
contradictory versions of his death were circulated, although the
above-mentioned letter had made clear his intention of ending
his life.

Thus the inspirer of two Czech liberations, heir to the 186*
thought of Thomas Masaryk, disappeared in shameful oblivion;
the commentaries in the Communist press, in which he was later
accused of having betrayed the interests of the country, lead us
to wonder whether his inglorious end did not save him from an
even more tragic fate. Posterity will pronounce a mixed
judgment on his political achievement. His tomb might
fittingly have been engraved with this epitaph, taken from
one of his books (*Whither the Slavs?*): 'The existence and the
prosperity of all the Slav States is inseparably bound up with a
régime of true democracy, that is to say, a régime in which the
elementary principles of individual liberty, liberty of conviction,
liberty of religion, liberty of political expression and liberty of
public opinion, are guaranteed and fully respected'.

As for Benes, whose authority was henceforth without scope, 175
on June 7, 'for health reasons', he resigned his presidential [643].
office, which he had held since June 19, 1946, in a message by
which he invited his fellow-citizens 'to encourage liberty and
consciously enjoy it'. He died a few months later, on
September 3, 1948.

The events of February were to be mentioned at the United Nations Security Council, with a view to appointing a commission of inquiry—which was opposed by a Soviet veto (May 24).

On March 9, 1948, was voted the Constitution which made 642
Czechoslovakia a 'democratic peoples' republic'. It instituted a 175
Single House system, and proclaimed the equality of Czechs 563
and Slovaks: the republic was to be a bi-national State. Unlike

[1] [1948 - Analyst]

642 175 563 the preceding Constitutions, this one contained no clause designed to protect minorities.

[666] The elections, postponed until May 30,[1] gave 88 per cent of the votes (6,429,145) to the National Front, but the figure of 770,100 blank voting slips exceeded that anticipated by the Government. The latter was, however, fully master of the situation. On June 14 Clement Gottwald was elected President of the Republic, on the unanimous vote of the 296 deputies present. Under the chairmanship of Zapotocki, he formed a Cabinet on the lines of the previous one (sixteen Communists or supporters, and six non-Communists); the portfolio of Foreign Affairs remained in the hands of Klementis, who replaced Masaryk. The new Head of the Government announced implacable repressive action against 'those guilty of disorder or confusion, who seek to hinder the reconstruction of the country'.

[661] 659 798 175 Indeed, during the months that followed, there was a vigorous purging of diplomacy, the army, the police. But, in 1949, it was the religious question which was to dominate political life, owing to an offensive conducted against the Roman Church, opposing the old Czech Hussite spirit to Catholicism, the dominant trait in the Slovak national character.

Gottwald and his ministers, relying on this 'religious geography' peculiar to Czechoslovakia, embarked upon a struggle with the clergy in the domain of monopoly of the schools. They pursued the contest by seeking to alienate the Catholic Church from her natural hierarchy, and by encouraging the 'schism' of the Czech 'National' Church. To protest against the obstacles put in the way of the exercise of the cult, the bishops drew up a pastoral letter, setting forth the conditions required in order to regularise relations between the Church and the State. The Government forbade the distribution of the pastoral; infringements of this decree, specially numerous in Slovakia, were sternly repressed. Mgr. Beran, Archbishop of Prague, was detained in his palace; the civil authority created 'Catholic Action', an official organisation placed under the control of priests with Communist leanings. At the head of this movement was the Minister of Public Health, Father Plojhar, suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities for having sought a legislative mandate without his bishop's permission.

Tension rose with the 'resolutions' passed on June 28 by the

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[1] [1948-- Analyst]

659 798 175 Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

648 829 659 So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17[1] the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

661 175 The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

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178 659 686 175 During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

648 728 175 The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

177 164 175 The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[2] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish

[1] [1949--Analyst]

[2] [1949--Analyst]

177 origin), as Minister of Defence in the Warsaw Cabinet; he took
.64 as his deputy General Wladislaw Korczye, Chief of Staff of the
• 175 Polish Army. This appointment was naturally interpreted as a
further step in the subordination of Poland to the Soviet
interests.

648 And the Polish-Sovietic *rapprochement* (at governmental
175 level) had an unexpected result: the expulsion or the trial, on the
696 ritual charge of spying, of French diplomats and nationals
(Wroclaw case), thus creating a state of tension between two
countries whose friendship had historic and spiritual roots of
such strength that no political vicissitudes had hitherto been able
to affect them.

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186* Thus the events of 1948–1949 once more disturbed that
648 'Slav solidarity' which had been revived by the Second World
578 War. It cannot be said that there exist, between the Soviet
175 Union on the one side, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
on the other, ties which are stronger than, or of any different
nature from, those which unite Moscow to Budapest or to
Bucharest. The 'collaboration' operates exclusively on the basis
of Stalin-Marxism and obedience to Moscow.

On the contrary, the Soviet Union's Enemy Number One is Tito's Yugoslavia. There is violent and complete rupture between the Southern Slavs for the one part, the Bulgarians, Eastern and Northern Slavs for the other.

The historic current which has, periodically, split up the world of the Slavs, has reasserted its mysterious disintegrating force.

Two small but typical facts may serve as a postscript to this study. On Stalin's seventieth birthday the only country which sent no 'homage' to the master of the Kremlin was Yugoslavia. And the President of the Panslav Congress in the United States, George Pirinsky, was imprisoned in Chicago as belonging to an organisation aiming at the overthrow of the American Government by force.

slavism are well-known in central Europe—a doctrine which could 186* not better have corresponded to its aims."[1] 829

Engels and Marx, to whom I shall have occasion to refer later, 186* fought against this doctrine, led by a clear knowledge of prob- 175 ● lems connected with international policy. And indeed the time of the Crimean War—the period when Marx wrote his brilliant articles devoted to the Eastern Question—was a time when the Panslavic conceptions became particularly timely. In the definition quoted above one finds the most important characteristics of the Panslavic doctrine. However, this definition does not exhaust the whole of it, and simply in order to be faithful to what we call an objective approach I should like, before showing the actuality of Engels' and Marx's opinions in the light of the Panslavistic trends of our days, to present the genealogy of this movement and some of its most important aspects.

Without going as far as Thucydides who, when speaking about the Slavs, whom he designated generally under the name of Scythians, said that "if these peoples ever unite under one chief and one idea, no power neither of Europe nor of Asia will be able to resist them," one may say that, in general, the historians of Panslavism consider the Croatian Jury Križanić (1617-1683) the creator of this doctrine. Whether or not this genealogy is correct is a question in itself, but what remains doubtless is the fact that the Križanić episode has its special picturesqueness and flavor. Indeed that zealous Catholic, carried away by his Slavic sympathies, by the idea of the re-establishment of religious unity, and by admiration for the power of the Muscovite tsar, made his way from Italy via Poland to Moscow. There he tried in vain to organize the Muscovite tsardom against two foreign influences—Greek and German—and to incite Moscow to a struggle for the liberation of the Slavs from under a foreign yoke—a struggle which would unite the Slavic nations under the Muscovite scepter. The enthusiastic propaganda of the learned Croatian did not

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[1] Quoted by Vasily Gippius: cf. F. E. Tyutchev, *Polnoe Sobranie Stikhotvorenii*, Leningrad, 1939, pp. 10-11.

186* succeed in convincing the suspicious Muscovites — they felt a
● 175 Latin and a Catholic in him, and in accordance with an already well-established tradition they deported him to Siberia. However, that poor Panslavic enthusiast somehow escaped from Siberia and reached the more comfortable Wilno, traveled farther in order to volunteer in the army of Jan Sobieski and to die for the defense of Austria in the Battle of Vienna under the Polish banners which he had vehemently insulted during his Muscovite sojourn.[2]

Indeed, in the Križanić *Politica*, a work written in Siberia, it is possible to find several elements which some 200 years later were crystallized in the Slavophil and Panslavistic systems. As I suggested above, it would be possible to find some even earlier manifestations of Panslavic trends. But first of all we should indeed try to define at least in a general form the essence of this
[648] doctrine. I think that by and large Panslavism is a conception which embraces two main, divergent currents: one was connected with the movements of and hopes for regeneration and liberation among the oppressed Slavs; and as such this movement was directed against the two main oppressors of these nations — the Turks and the Germans. Since the Germanization of Bohemia and the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe there has remained only one independent and powerful Slavic nation—Russia. Therefore one could see quite strong tendencies among Bulgarians, Serbs, some Croatians and Czechs, and a few Poles toward Russia as a possible liberator of the Slavs. On the other hand, among the same nations there developed at certain periods, especially in the nineteenth century, conceptions of a Federation of Slavs around Austria and without Russia.

The other expression of the Panslavic movement is the Russian one. The oppressed Slavic nations were looking for liberation, and their Panslavistic conceptions represented their hopes for freedom. Russia had, of course, a different approach to the

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[2] Cf. P. N. Milyukov, *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 135-155.

same problem—she was to become eventually *the* liberator, *the* 186
protector, *the* unifier. For this reason these two expressions of the 175 ●
Panslavistic idea differ not only in their aims but also in their
historical origins.

From the modern point of view—from the point of view of the political implications which the Panslavistic doctrine contains—the Russian aspect is, of course, much more important. Let us, therefore, devote our attention first of all to Russian Panslavism.

The direct ancestor of the Russian Panslavistic conceptions be- 186
longing to the second part of the nineteenth century is to be found 829
in the famous school of the Muscovite Slavophils and Messianists. 812
The formation of this school resulted from different sources, and
here again one finds interweaving ramifications of Slavic and
Western European thought.

If one were to enumerate the different germs of ideas, programs, currents of thought, sometimes divergent and contradictory, which brought about the actual birth of the Slavophil idea in different Slavic countries, one would be obliged first of all to stress the fact that it took place in the nineteenth century and that it was in harmony with the political atmosphere of the rest of Europe. We find its ultimate sources in a variety of places. There was, for instance, the tenet of universal brotherhood which the Masonic Societies in particular had spread at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. To the same period belong the works of the German-Russian scholar August L. von Schloezer, the philosophies of Herder, Rousseau, and the Romantics. From the Christian standpoint a kind of Messianism came to the fore with the sentimental attachment of the Romantics to the Bible and with Bossuet's reliance upon the Hebrew prophets. Mention must also be made of the German philosophers Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. Along with the conception of the unity of the Slav world which arose out of the studies of the European ethnographers and philologists, went the demand for the freedom of the oppressed nations—a demand proclaimed and strengthened by the French Revolution. The movement toward

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186* a Slavophil philosophy was fostered by the propaganda of Czechs
829 like Dobrovský, Kollár, and others who championed the claims of
812 freedom for people of good will—propaganda based on affection for the national past and on Catholic conservatism which saw in the Slav world, and particularly in Orthodox Russia, a bulwark against Western Jacobinism. Finally there were many political factors to be taken into account: on one hand, the role of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars and the growing political power of Russia, which was held to be the only power able to win freedom for the Slavic nations; and on the other, the anti-Russian tendencies voiced in the Polish risings, the leaders of which considered the enemy a nest of political reactionaries and a stronghold of violence. All these elements, various and even contradictory though they were, contributed to the establishment of the Slavophil doctrine and at the same time indicated the goal which it might ultimately attain.[3] As far as the purely Russian Slavophil and hence Panslavistic doctrine is concerned, some other factors must also be taken into consideration.

186* I must start *ab ovo*. For several very important historical rea-
● 175 sons the Byzantine political influence in Moscow, in the Muscovite ideology, became particularly potent. I have in mind the fall of Byzantium and some other events bound up with this great
[648] catastrophe. In connection with the more and more imminent Turkish menace, in order to save Byzantium, in order to organize a coalition against the Turks, men in the Roman Church began to consider with even more urgency the already existing concept of a possible union of the two churches; and at the Council of Florence in 1439 the union of the churches was accomplished. The whole Greek world accepted this union. The representative of the Muscovite Church at the Council, the Metropolitan Isidor, also adhered to the union; but unfortunately his adherence did not conform to sentiments at home. And when he reached Moscow, after celebrating masses in Cracow, he was confronted by com-

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[3] This follows my articles, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea" published in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. London. 1928 29.

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plete disaster. He was imprisoned, and Moscow declined the union. 186* 175

Ever since that time Moscow considered herself as the new and unique center of pure orthodoxy, of pure Christianity. When in 1453 Byzantium was invaded, Moscow's prestige became even greater in her own mind. The Muscovite monks, working out a sort of Muscovite historiosophy and formulating the Muscovite political program, gave a very significant interpretation of that catastrophe: Byzantium had been punished by God for the sin of the Union of Florence. And then came the establishment of the theory of the "Third Rome": "Two Romes have fallen, but the third still remains." This third Rome was Moscow.

Thus was established a Muscovite eastern Messianism. This Messianism became more and more universalistic in its scope. The Muscovite tsars began to consider themselves the representatives not only of their own Orthodox world but of the whole Orthodox community in the world and, even more, of pure, unsoiled Christianity in general. Very soon after the fall of Byzantium and the spread of the Turkish invasion in the Balkans, many Serbian and Bulgarian émigrés, intellectuals of those times, arrived in Moscow with all sorts of Bulgarian and Serbian Messianic and imperialistic conceptions and theories, modeled on Byzantium and on Greek and Hebrew texts. Messianistic honey was collected from these Bulgarian-Serbian-Hebraic-Byzantine hives by various monks and old men like Philotheus. There were fantastic genealogies, orthographical mistakes — consciously or unconsciously committed—daring eschatological solutions of such problems as why the world did not come to an end on March 25, 1492, which escape it was supposed to owe to Moscow for not having acceded to the Florentine union. Greek prophetic legends, exploited by Bulgars as well as by Serbs, legends promising victory for the *rusy* (reddish) race, *xanthos genos*, became *russky* (Russian) race; and so, as Professor Milyukov stressed, "an orthographical mistake became a source of the Russian imperialistic dreams about Constantinople and the Straits." In a word, ortho- 186* 175 668 795

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186 175 668 795

graphical errors and boundless imagination, fed on Byzantine and autocratic Imperial doctrines, decided for a long time the style of Russian political thought. Hence, practically, the Moscow Tsar and later the St. Petersburg Emperor became the head of the church of a Byzantine Caesaro-Papist type and assumed the position of a Byzantine theocrat. The conception of absolute power coming from God, absolute in the universalistic sense, meaning that the monarch was the ruler of all material goods as well as of human souls, became established in Russia particularly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after the period of the Mongolian yoke had excellently prepared the ground for such a conception of monarchical power. As the ultimate result of these events Moscow represented the type of an Oriental despotism with a tendency toward state control characteristic of these organizations (especially at the time of the *oprichnina* of Ivan the Terrible and later) and the equally characteristic tendency towards imperialism based on Byzantine religious and historical premises.

175 643

These bonds with Byzantium became particularly strong after, and in connection with, the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleologus, the Byzantine princess in exile whom Ivan III received from Italy. This marriage is also an interesting story. Both Rome and Venice were still meditating a war against the Turks in order to liberate Byzantium. For the realization of this new, grandiose enterprise the help of the already developed might of Moscow appeared very desirable. Moscow had succeeded at that time through all sorts of belligerent activities and political manoeuvres in establishing its predominance among Russian princes and was on the eve of liberating Muscovy from the Tartar yoke. Led by western political conceptions, Rome and Venice thought that the good will of Ivan III could be bought by the offer of the title of *king*, and on the other hand by a marriage with a Byzantine princess who after the death of the legitimate heir to the Byzantine Empire would become vested with the right to the Byzantine throne.

175 643 Ivan III was not very much interested in the European title of *king*, which did not mean very much to him. Moscow was so far away from the habits, manners, and international hierarchy of Europe that European distinctions and collaboration with Europe could not awake real interest in the exotic Muscovite state. On the other hand, Sophia Paleologus was considered by the Pope as a zealous Catholic; Ivan III needed a pure Orthodox fiancée. This last thing, however, was settled, and in 1472 Sophia Paleologus, the princess of Byzantium, the presumably zealous Catholic girl, became the Tsarina of Moscow and the most zealous of Orthodox ladies. The offers of the title of *king* interested Ivan, however, from one special point of view, from the very one which caused great discomfort in Cracow. Ivan III was supposed to become king or even emperor of the whole Russian nation *(in tota Ruthenica natione)*. As I have said, Ivan III was not interested in the title, as he was not even very anxious to buy from the direct heir of the Byzantine throne the rights to the throne, and Andrew Paleologus had to sell them elsewhere. But the formula in *tota Ruthenica natione* awakened some interest, curiosity, and appetite in Moscow.

Ivan III had two reasons for being interested in this suggestion. The first one was connected with the fact that some of the lands which belonged to the Polish King and Grand Duke of Lithuania (in one person, as the King of Poland was at the same time the Grand Duke of Lithuania from the time of the union between Poland and Lithuania) represented ancient *votchinas*, appanages, of the Rurikoviches, that is, of the ancestors of Ivan III. Moscow viewed this circumstance as making possible the expansion of the Muscovite Tsardom, and it opened the door to Russian, Muscovite territorial pretensions and demands.

175 795 On the other hand the Ruthenians who populated these lands were descendants of people who had been Christianized from the eastern source; therefore, they were Orthodox. The Union of Florence included them, but not to Moscow's thinking. Therefore Moscow saw in them the object of a religious mission, and that

: 75 was the beginning of the Muscovite tendency to establish a pro-
7 95 tection extending to a great part of the citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian commonwealth, which meant an interference in the domestic affairs of the Polish state. This state of affairs led in Poland to the Union of Brześć (Brest) in the year 1596, the purpose of which was to assure the Ruthenian church of Poland an independence of Moscow, which had become especially menacing since 1589 when a patriarchate dependent on the tsar was established in Moscow. However the Act of Brest did not settle this problem, because of disagreements among the Ruthenians and mistakes of the Polish policy. (The marriage of Alexander of Poland and Lithuania with Helen, daughter of Ivan III—she was Orthodox—reinforced the Orthodox feelings among the Ruthenians).

1 75 Poland was powerful enough in the era of Ivan III to stop the inappropriate Roman schemes connected with the problem of unifying all the lands that could be called Ruthenian. And the court of Cracow received satisfactory excuses from Rome in the matter. But Moscow did not give up, and in spite of the fact that the daughter of Ivan III, Helen, was married to the Polish King and Lithuanian Grand Duke Alexander, of the Jagiellonian dynasty, Ivan III seized every occasion to insist on his views and his territorial ambitions. And we see that ever since then Moscow has constantly spoken of cities and towns situated inside of the Polish commonwealth, constantly augmenting the number of cities mentioned, adding to these formulations the sacramental phrase "and many other cities and towns." . . . It is justly said by Milyukov that "on even the most cold-blooded reader of these dry ambassadorial reports, these heavy rhythmic strides of the Muscovite 'Stone Guest' may produce the impression of some crushing nightmare."[4]

But what were these lands—Kiev, Smolensk, Polock, Witebsk, "and many others," constantly demanded from the time of Ivan

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[4] *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, v. 3, p. 48. Cf. for the story of the Union of Florence, of Ivan III and Rome, the brilliant work of P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège* (1896-1912).

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III until Russia could be led to the final partitions of Poland? It would be appropriate to stress here that the project of these partitions started even in the time of Ivan III. To the Emperor Maximilian, he made suggestions which later on, after the similar plans of Peter I, were finally realized by Catherine II, Frederick of Prussia, and Maria Theresa of Austria—and were later repeated by Stalin and Hitler. What are these lands?

At the time when the Tartars invaded Rus, when they were stopped in the west by the Poles at the Battle of Lignica, 1241, when later on the Muscovite principality was established and before the Polish-Lithuanian union, there arose, spread, and developed between Poland and Moscow, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, an enormous empire organized by the dynamic, energetic and mighty Grand Dukes of Lithuania. Their ambitions and political horizons were equal to their military prowess. Very often they reached the gates of Moscow, menacing the city itself, and at any rate they had succeeded earlier in seizing from the Tartars all the Kievan Rus, with Kiev and all lands which now are known as White Ruthenia; so that Smolensk, Polock, Witebsk, Minsk, Mohilev, and the whole modern Ukraine found themselves within the borders of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state.

In 1386 this whole enormous state was, after the Congress of Krewo in 1385, united to the Polish kingdom, and the Grand Duke Wladyslaw Jagiello, following Polish suggestions, married the Polish queen Jadwiga of Anjou. These lands obtained, after the Pact of Horodlo, 1413, and later after the Union of Lublin, 1569 (a sort of confirmation and development of the Pact of Horodlo), a complete equality of rights and privileges with those which were established in the Polish Republic. After the Union of Lublin, Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (including White Ruthenia and Ruthenia) had a common parliament. And each successive King of Poland had to be elected by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as Grand Duke of Lithuania.

While Ivan III and later Basil, and finally Ivan IV (the Terrible) were trying to justify their territorial attempts on Poland, 175 centuries passed during which these lands were living in completely different political and social conditions. The regime of freedom, religious tolerance, and local autonomy became so strongly and solidly established in the Polish-Ruthenian-Lithuanian commonwealth that even Pskov and Novgorod, those peculiar republics accustomed to their freedom, menaced by the Muscovite despotism, made efforts to join the commonwealth. They paid very dearly for these desires; Ivan III and later Ivan IV uprooted these political dreams by the most terrific terroristic acts.[5]

186* 829 Returning now to the Muscovite Slavophils, one thing must be stressed—that the first period of their activity was connected with more or less Russian historical problems. According to Herzen the moment of the precise formulation of the Muscovite Slavophil doctrine was the year 1836, when the famous *Philosophical Letter* of Chaadaev appeared. Of course it would be possible to find ties between the Muscovite Slavophils and the Shishkovists of the beginning of the nineteenth century, but Chaadaev's Western doctrine, Catholic in its conception, became a kind of catalyzer which crystallized the Slavophil program.

However, it would be difficult to give a precise analysis of the Russian Slavophil doctrine without taking into consideration the so-called *ofitsial'naya narodnost'* (official nationality). This term was originated, I believe, by the famous historian of Russian literature Pypin and applied by him to the official Russian ideology elaborated at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I by certain high dignitaries, among whom the most prominent was S. S. Uvarov, minister of education. His system was based on three principles: autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality. Although it is possible that the first two elements of this system may raise no doubts, the third appears less clear. But for Uvarov and his followers it was not so. The concrete significance of the word "nationality" for Uvarov was "reduced," as justly stated by Pro-

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[5] Cf. W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, New York, 1944, p. 41.

of course, at the time of Catherine II when Russia began the "lib- 186*
eration" of White Ruthenians and Ruthenians from the Poles 829
through the partitions of Poland and finally "liberated" the Poles 668
from themselves. At the time of Alexander I the same conceptions reappeared. V. N. Karazin, a well known liberal of the times of Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum: "Is it possible that the sovereign ruler of free Slavs, the unique protector of the Orthodox Church, can look indifferently upon the sorrow of nations close to them by blood and by religion?" "It is true," says Pypin through whom I quote Karazin, "that Karazin suggested cautious action in order not to offend Austria. But his dreams went very far: he dreamed of the establishment of a 'Slavic Empire' with one of the brothers of Alexander at its head: this empire was, with time, to be extended to the Adriatic Sea in Albania and Macedonia, and on the other side to embrace the southern 'Serbo-Croatian' lands of Austria. . . . This Empire, which would very soon develop and organize, would be bound to the Russian Empire by ties of religion, blood, and thankfulness, and would become Russia's 'storehouse' and natural base for all her activities and relations with Europe and Africa."

The same were the conceptions of other political writers of that time—Bronevsky and General Chichagov. (cf. Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79). These conceptions were also discussed in Masonic lodges and even in several lodges of Slavic Unity which had been established in Kiev and in Petersburg. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 again galvanized these feelings of Slavic solidarity, but this was the time when there began in Russia the great discussions between the Slavophils and the Westerners—in other words, the time when the Slavophil doctrine started its period of crystallization.

I should like to stress the fact that we must have in mind several 186*
important historical dates around which the Panslavistic discus- 175 ●
sion became especially animated. These historical events and dates are: first of all, the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31, the Cracow Insurrection of 1846, the Slavic Congress in Prague in

186* 1848, the Crimean War of 1854-56, the Polish Insurrection of
175 1863, the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the period preceding the World War of 1914-18 with the so-called Neoslavism and finally the recent movements organized by Russia in Moscow and in this country among the American Slavic population and the Congress organized recently, also by Russia, in Belgrade.

2. The Polish Problem

186* The first "set" of the Muscovite Slavophils was composed of
668 well-to-do people, people belonging to the Russian landed nobil-
648 ity; they had estates with serfs, they had fine and rich apartments in Moscow. In the beginning they devoted their time either to discussions on historical, theological, and literary problems in Moscow salons or to writings in which they expressed their views. And they also manifested these views in a special national type of domestic life; they wore peculiar hats and *kaftans*, which very often provoked sensations in the streets of Moscow; they ate Russian meals and drank Russian vodka. All these details concerning their private lives and their naïve manifestations of Russianism are very pleasantly related in the memoirs of Herzen and Chicherin. At this stage of their development they were rather innocent and pacific, but they later became strongly intolerant and aggressive. Chicherin gives some episodes characteristic of this intolerance and aggressiveness. This appears particularly in connection with the great Slavic and European problem which the Muscovite Slavophils, by the very fate of their doctrine, were the first to be called upon to solve. This problem was the Polish one. Slavic reciprocity, Slavic sympathy, harmony, regeneration, wars for the liberation of the oppressed Slavic nations—all these slogans, ideas, and initiatives could mean but very little in the face of the still bloody Polish nation under the Russian regime. How could other Slavs who were outside of Russia trust all the great promises given to them by the Russian Slavophils and later Pan-

"patriotic syphilis" which was raging in Russia. The whole of 186*
reactionary and nationalistic Russia launched its offensive pre- 668
cisely at this point—the slogan was that the Polish Insurrection 648
was not a national one and that presumably the Polish masses 829
had nothing in common with it. This point of view became the leitmotif of all Katkov's writings, but very soon Aksakov's *Den'* (the organ of the Slavophils) joined Katkov's *Moskovskiya Vedomosti.* The Slavophil phraseology followed that of the government, and Aksakov as well as Samarin explained the Russian-Polish War of 1863 as a war of Slavs against Latinism, as a war of Russia against the Polish landlords. We may see that history indeed repeats itself. The same slogans were used during this war when it was necessary to abolish the legitimate Polish government in London. Herzen understood this situation very well. On January 1, 1864 he wrote in his *Kolokol* as follows: "Having grasped here and there some vague ideas about the social mission of Russia and about her lack of any solid aristocratic principle, our sweet dreamers preach that Russia represents some sort of democratic empire, some sort of kingdom of *equality* and masses, that *she* fights with Poland in the name of the freedom of the peasants against the landlords, etc. Do not be mistaken. . . ."[15]

Sumner in his excellent book *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 186*
1937) brings very correct comments to this development: "The 175●
Polish revolt of 1863 unleashed century-old hatred and fears. In 648
the years which followed, the old 'Congress Poland' was mercilessly dragooned within the framework of the administration common to Russia proper while the 'Western Lands' Lithuania, White Russia, and the Western Ukraine were subjected to every measure of Russianism. Meanwhile a campaign was initiated of the same nature in the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia; and, to show without mistaking that Russian meant Great Russian alone, the Little Russian or Ukrainian cultural revival of that time was successfully attacked by Moscow, above all by the prohibition in 1876 of the use of the Ukrainian 'dialect' for any academic or

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[15] *Istoriya Rossii v xix Veke*, vol. 3, Z. Lensky, "Polskoe Vozstanie," p. 322.

186* literary purposes. Symptomatically two of the men most actively
175 associated with this denationalizing, Russianizing policy, were
648 among the most prominent Slavophil or Panslav Muscovites of the
day: Prince Cherkassky and Yuri Samarin, a close friend of Aksakov."[16]

186* Cherkassky, Samarin, and N. A. Milyutin worked at the agrarian
668 reform in Poland, and Cherkassky "distinguished" himself in the campaign for reuniting the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. "Samarin and Cherkassky are significant in the Panslav movement in that, unlike Aksakov or the earlier Slavophils, and unlike the professorial type, represented by Lamansky, Miller, or Grot, they were active in administration and were well-known public figures. . . . Both men are also, above all, significant as representing the transformation of the idea of Panslavism into that of Panrussianism." (*op. cit., p.* 67) Characteristically enough, Samarin was, besides all the traits mentioned by Sumner, a "considerable theologian," the collaborator of Khomyakov in this field.

186* It is not mere chance that I mention this trait of Samarin's personality. The Slavophil doctrine was from its very beginning
812 deeply rooted in religious thought. The father of the Muscovite school, Ivan Kireevsky, was first of all absorbed by problems of religious and moral categories. Parallel to the pre-Romantics, the Romantics, and the German idealistic philosophers, he was primarily interested in the spiritual structure of the human personality and in the problem of perfecting it. He was fighting for the unity and entirety of the human personality and believed that the superior truth cannot be conceived by rationalism but by the entire spiritual personality in which the factors of feeling and belief were more efficient than reason. M. Gershenzon, in his book, *Istoricheskie Zapiski* (Berlin, 1932), sensationally enough stresses that Kireevsky committed a mistake which became the starting point for the whole Slavophil Doctrine. Milyukov pretends that the century-old Russian trends toward Constantinople and world domination also originated from a mistake—from an orthographic

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[16] B. H. Sumner, *op. cit.,* p. 66.

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the distant aroma of the lemon groves, and the smoky buildings 186*
in Cologne. . . . We love the body, the taste and the color of it, and 829
its oppressive deadly odor. . . . Is it our fault if your skeleton 539
cracks in our heavy, soft paws?"

9. Reactions Among the Slavs Toward Panslavic Conceptions

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Southern Slavs 186*
attracted no great attention from the world. However, after the 175 ●
Russian-Turkish wars of the time of Catherine II they began to move more distinctly on the political stage of Europe, as Pypin justly says.[61] The fight of Serbia for her independence, the fight of the Montenegrians against the Turks and their resistance against the French (I am still following Pypin), Illyria established by Napoleon—all this revealed the existence of energetic Slavic elements in the Near East. To this should be added facts as Vuk Karadžić's collection of popular songs in which the deeds of Serbian national heroes were glorified. The fights of the Croatians against the Hungarians, the Russian intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the part which Russia took in the liberation of Serbia, all created an atmosphere in which the Panslavistic conceptions could, of course, count on a sympathetic reaction. However, as far as the final results are concerned, Russian Panslavism was not at all successful even among the Southern Slavs. The Croatians, who in the forties when fighting against the Hungarians were dreaming of Slavic unity, very soon abandoned these dreams and looked more and more toward the West for help against Turkey. The Serbs in spite of their religious ties with Russia were returning closer and closer to the traditions of Obradović and of Vuk Karadžić and his reform which brought the Serbian cultural development away from Russian influences, and to conceptions of a national state, and of the building of a national culture. Russia's tactless approaches to Serbia, the Rus-

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[61] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

7$_3$ Lednicki S-4 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

186* ●175 sian tendency to consider Serbs as merely a new sort of Russians and the Serbian intelligentsia a class which did not represent the real feelings of the people, and facts such as the Russian correspondents calling Serbs "Russians of Belgrade *gubernia*" clarified the situation so that the famous letter of Khomyakov to the Serbs from Moscow published in 1861 created a very unfavorable impression in Serbia; and this found its expression in the answer of the Serbian scholar Daničić.[62]

In Bulgaria the situation has for centuries been even more complicated and dramatic because of the fact that when fighting for their national independence and national culture, the Bulgars had to fight against not only Turks but also Greeks. In spite of the activity of Venelin and the role which Russia played in the restoration of Bulgarian independence and the ties between Bulgarian intellectuals and Russian scholarship, the Panslavistic conceptions could not destroy the existence of strongly nationalistic tendencies.[63]

Among the Czechs and Slovaks, where in spite of their deep and pathetic Germanization there appeared the first great scholars in the field of Slavic philology and history—Dobrovský, Šafařík, Palacký, Havliček, and Jungmann (who, by the way, very often wrote in Latin and in German), the Panslavistic tendencies received a rather cold reception. As I mentioned above, it was only at the time of Jungmann, Rautenkranz, and Puchmajer that the pro-Russian feelings of the Czechs were strong—with Kollár giving the most eloquent expression of these feelings. Palacký, as we know, was an advocate of a Slavic federation but under Austrian leadership. He was too close to the Western traditions to feel any enthusiasm for a conception which would bring all Western Slavs under Russian domination. Such was, by the way, the attitude of the Congress in Prague in 1848. This point of view

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[62] Pypin, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[63] Here must also be stressed the religious pressure in Bulgaria coming from Constantinople and the fact that elements of national consciousness were preserved only among the people and the émigrés. Important, too, was the role of the monk, Paisy, his activity on Mt. Athos, and his collection of Bulgarian legends, songs, historical documents, and his *History of Bulgaria*, of 1762.

was formulated in *The Scientific Dictionary*, a Czech Encyclo- 186*
pedia.[64] The article referring to Panslavism is very reserved. 175 ●
The speculations of the Muscovite Slavophils on the item of Hussism as a purely Slavic movement which presumably had its ties with Slavic Orthodoxy did not appear very convincing to the Czechs.

In general, the Prague Congress of 1848 reduced the Panslavic 186*
tendencies to a formula of political organization of Austria which 668
would satisfy the national political demands of the Slavs. In this 575
way was developed a special Austrian Panslavism directed against Russia and later called Austroslavism. The same trends might be discovered in the so-called "Slavic Union" in the Vienna Parliament of 1908. However, under the leadership of the Czech Kramař there developed at the same time the so-called neo-Slavism, which stressed the political solidarity of all Slavic nations on the condition of complete cultural equality, but which certainly contained pro-Russian tendencies. The movement was created in 1908 at the Slav Congress in Prague, followed by a Congress in Petersburg in 1909 and one in Sofia in 1910. There took place only vague and very general formulations of Slavic mutual respect, sympathy, and efforts to calm the inter-Slavic antagonisms —Russian-Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Serbo-Bulgarian, and so on. In spite of the participation in this movement of several important political leaders among the Slavs, it did not reach any concrete results. Most Poles and Russians very soon abandoned it. The War of 1914 brought again to the fore ideas of Slavic union, proclaimed this time by representatives of Russian public opinion and by the Russian government. I should also mention the outstanding activity aiming at spiritual and intellectual collaboration among the Slavs of the brilliant Polish scholar, thinker, and writer Marian Zdziechowski, who established his Slavic Club in Cracow with its review *The Slavic World* before the War of 1914 and who entertained close relations with the Russian sympathizers of these trends, about whom I shall speak below.

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[64] Quoted by Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

and shares the fusion of *a* and *o* with the majority of this group. 197
Common isoglosses testify a close and prolonged neighborhood with Germanic, Iranian, probably Thraco-Phrygian and foremost with Baltic, which is tied to Slavic by significant innovations both in vocabulary and in grammatical and phonemic, especially prosodic, features. Old loan-words from Iranian pertain mostly to spiritual, and those from Germanic to material culture. Contact with Altaic and Finno-Ugric languages seems to be confined to the late stage of Protoslavic and has left but scanty vestiges in its vocabulary. The long evolution of Protoslavic, which took around three millennia, can be traced up to its final stage—the entrance of the Slavs onto the historical scene (fifth–sixth centuries), [175]
the oldest foreign records of Slavic proper and common nouns (fifth–seventh centuries), the formation of the first hereditary Slavic states (ninth–tenth centuries), the appearance of Slavic [538]
written literature (ninth century), and the final dissolution of the Slavic linguistic unity toward the beginning of our millennium.

The territory of present-day Poland, Byelo-Russia, and North- 175
western Ukraine seems to exhibit perceptible vestiges of the oldest Slavic settlements. According to the first detailed literary accounts about the Slavs, the sixth century A.D. witnessed a strong Slavic expansion to the South, West, and East. The Slavs swarmed over the Peloponnesos during the seventh century, but were eventually driven back from Greece. With Charlemagne began the protracted retreat of the Slavs in the West and the gradual Germanization of the Elbe and Oder basins in the Northwest and of the Slavic regions of Bavaria and Austria in the Southwest. In the tenth century the Southern Slavs became separated from the Western because of this continuous German offensive toward and the Hungarian intrusion from the East; later they were cut off also from the Eastern Slavs by the extension of Rumanian. While the expansion of the Western and Southern Slavs was curtailed and even repelled during the early Middle Ages, that of the Eastern Slavs has never stopped and particularly their colonization of the East still continued, checked only in the Bering Sea area in the late nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER VI

ORTHODOXY IN BONDAGE

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THE Sword of Damocles fell at last, and the menace which had hung over Eastern Christendom for centuries became the realized fate of the Orthodox peoples for centuries more. The armies of Islam swept over the Balkan peninsula and submerged it, though the city of Constantinople itself still stood inviolate.

In the year 1389 the battle of Kossovo was fought which decided the fate of Serbia, and brought its mediaeval glory to an end. A page of history was turned over. It was a page upon which the name of Sava had been inscribed, the national Saint of Serbia, prince, monk, educationalist and organizer of the Serbian Church, and the names of the saints and leaders of the Serbian Church who succeeded him. Upon it was recorded the achievements of the Serbian Empire in the first half of the fourteenth century, when the warrior Dushan struck terror into the hearts of his neighbours and at their expense brought wide territories under his sway. He was a lawgiver and administrator too, a stern dispenser of justice. On that same page is described the precocious civilization and enlightened culture of Dubrovnik, known otherwise as Ragusa, which in the fourteenth century, Miss Waring tells us,[1] had "a city police and sanitary board", as well as men of letters and exponents of the arts. And Dubrovnik if pre-eminent was not alone, as the mediaeval churches of Serbia and their furnishings testify.

The battle of Kossovo brought the Serbian Empire to an end. But in the minds of the Serbs themselves it also revealed

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[1] L. F. Waring: *Serbia*. London, 1917 (Home University Library), p. 154.

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.175 the idealism of the Serbian spirit at its highest point. For the night before the battle the Serbian Tsar had a vision in which he was offered the choice between an earthly and a heavenly crown. He chose the heavenly and rode out to the conflict and his own death on the morrow, knowing that from the earthly point of view all was already lost. There is something truly Orthodox here and especially perhaps Slav Orthodox, for Russian religion, too, is permeated by reverence for suffering in body or mind and a sense of its regenerating power.[1] It is this dark day of Kossovo which has become the National Day of the Serbian people. Day of utter defeat and obliteration of earthly hope as it was Kossovo Day has been observed ever since as a yearly memorial of the greatness of the past, and an occasion of self-dedication to the Serbia of the future.

But the new chapter of Balkan history which immediately follows bears the record of the Turk whose rule was marked by casual neglect, haphazard uncertainty and ingenious brutality.

The City of Constantine held fast for another sixty years. Then its walls were breached, and in the breach the last Byzantine Emperor died. Mahomet, the conqueror, rode to Justinian's Church of the Holy Wisdom where he dismounted and entered. He stopped the pillage that had already begun, and caused a passage from the Koran to be read from the pulpit.

For good and evil, Christian Byzantium had played out its part at the meeting place of East and West. Alexander's *Drang nach Osten* had come back like a flowing tide.

198 The story of the Orthodox Church under the Turkish régime is one to excite both admiration and pity. The Turkish point of view must be grasped. They drew no distinction between nationality and religion, to them secular and religious politics were one and the same. This might be said of the Byzantine Empire too, but with a difference. Within the latter, there was a Church distinct from, and it might be, opposed to, the State. The Turkish armies sallied out with the con-

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[1] Cf. Gorodetzky: *The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought*, London, 1938.

III

ELEMENTS OF A FOLK-CHRISTIANITY AND ITS RELATION TO MAGIC

Procopius in describing the manners of the Slavs has a 771
remark to this effect; that while they believed in a
supreme God and in many spirits and demons and
lesser gods, they neither believed in any fate, nor in any direct
influences over human life of a supernatural nature. What
the writer meant to convey by this extraordinary statement
is not known, unless that at that time the ideas of predestination,
the cult of fates, who regularly preside over
births, and that of the ancestors, for whose service the most
characteristic ceremonies of the peasant are designed, were
not in evidence; or that in general the religious attitude of
these barbarians differed essentially from that of the Greeks.
Procopius goes on to say that, when a man felt himself to 174
be in particular danger, through sickness or through war, he [782]
promised gifts to the gods, and, if the situation were grave
he made these in fact, hoping therewith to redeem his life.
This is still a fundamental element of popular prophylaxis.
Apart from such literary curiosities, the early religion of the
South Slavs can only be reconstructed from later evidence,
from recent folk-lore, and, in this case, not very helpful
archaeological study.

For the more northern branches of the Slavic race, there 771
is ample evidence of a pagan priesthood, of a shamanistic
type, and of an organised cult, with a foundation of animistic 175
magic, an established ritual, calendar and shrines. There is
no conclusive record of anything approaching such a highly
organised system amongst the South Slavs, and the traces
of idol worship have received no concrete archaeological
confirmation up to date. The fuller accounts of Helmoldus
amongst the West Slavs, and of Nestor amongst the Russians,

[p. 158 is blank]

5: Kemp E-4, 5 (1926-1933)1935
EF6 Serbs
Slavic Peoples E16
Historical Bulgaria EE 2

SP 771 175 describe a number of local or tribal cults; nor is it justifiable to imagine a basis of a uniform primitive Slav system.

In the South, that is to say, in the Lower Danube basin and in Illyria, tradition ascribes the first conversions to Christianity to the time of Heraclius, and there seems not to have been the same fierce and prolonged opposition to the new cult, with which it had to contend in Russia and Northern Europe. In Russia and in Poland, a dual confession, and apparently a heathen priesthood, lasted into the later Middle Ages; in the eleventh to twelfth centuries attempts were made
SP to re-establish the old faith on a national basis. True, the
HB rising in Bulgaria against Boris (eleventh century) was led
669 by an anti-Christian element, but we do not know of an active
795 priesthood in this connection, nor whether it was a revival
779 of Slavonic or Asperuh tendencies. Until the final establishment of a national, autonomous Church in Bulgaria, and in fact, until the turning-point of the Synod of Trnovo (seventeenth century), the indecision as to belief was evident not only in the varying allegiance to pope or patriarch, but in the activities of the numberless heretical sects, not merely tolerated, but at times enjoying considerable privileges and influence.

SP The presence of these sects, notably of a gnostic character,
795 pre-dates the Orthodox missions of the tenth century, and caused their retreat from Pannonia. The earliest account of
797 the Slav apostles mentions the 'thrice heathen heretics' who were unacquainted with Slavonic; probably referring to that mixture of Paulician and Eulite doctrine, which, since the fourth century, had spread into the Northern Balkans, and remains to this day among the Nazarenes of the trans-Danube. Syrian and Armenian colonies had been established in Thrace during the seventh century in the time of Constantine, still known to M. Psellos and Cedrenos as Massalians. Armenian Monophysites and Paulicians lived in the neighbourhood of Plovdiv, Sofiá, Devol, Rila, Moglena, Kjustendil, etc., from the eleventh to the thirteenth century; the Dragovišci being known in South-east Macedonia as extreme

Slavic Peoples E 16

Historical Bulgaria EE2
Historical Yugoslavia EF2

IV

SOURCES OF ANCIENT MAGIC AND MEDICINE

I

During the pagan and semi-pagan period the Slavs lived in small, independent tribes, later forming loose federations within territorial limits. For long the Greeks were unable to negotiate with them, because they did not agree among themselves and had no central authority. The organisation of a united state in Rascia coincided with the establishment of state Christianity, and the pagan empire of Bulgaria was comparatively short-lived.

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The tribal religious cult was likely to have been an extension of a domestic cult, probably rarely accompanied by the specialised functions of an official priesthood. The domestic cult lasts to the present day. The head of the household officiates in ceremonial, and the assistance of an outsider is not essential. In ceremonial which involves the whole tribe or village, the heads of households—the tribal elders—are again responsible; but that they have not an entire monopoly of ritual is evident in ceremonies which are performed by a group without a specially chosen leader, particularly those which belong to the younger people, or ceremonies conducted by old women doctors, etc.[1]

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[1] The rites of the peasants hint also at an independent development. It is not true only that the non-Christian element enjoyed a revival, tended to revert to type, after the fall of the mediaeval empire. A direction was taken at that time, perhaps, in which the popular religion continued a course of development and adaptation. The popular religion, or sometimes a popular aversion to religion as well as to social forms that flourished under a feudal church, must have sought new outlets much earlier. Local forms of peasant cults must be of comparatively recent growth, and contain more than the survivals of an ancient paganism. The *slava*, for instance, is a typical example of a domestic rite which does not require a special priesthood. It has become perhaps the central

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● 175, 113 E16 Slavic Peoples

[For an historical background of the Slavic Peoples, especially concerning their migrations in and to the Ukraine, see 7: Bregy and Obolensky, RD1 Ukraine, category 116, pp. 27-33.]

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Slavic Peoples E16

[For additional information on the origin and history of Slavic Peoples see: 4: Allen RDl Ukraine, cat. 116, pp. 41-52; 56-58;--Analyst]

4: Cross E16 Slavs E16
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[For information pertaining to the early history of the Slavic peoples, see category 116, pp. 1-2, 11-16, 52-142]